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Abstract  
The Co-operative Party, despite representing the largest consumer and social 
movement in Britain, is systematically overlooked or misunderstood in twentieth 
century British political historiography.  What makes this neglect more surprising is that 
from 1927 the Co-operative Party had a formal electoral agreement with the Labour 
Party, the basis of which remains in place today. Through this agreement the two 
parties agreed to work together to return joint Co-operative-Labour candidates in 
certain constituencies. This unique political alliance reflected a shared ideological 
ground between the two parties, united in their aim to displace capitalism with common 
ownership. However, despite this common aim, the methods through which this would 
be achieved varied and whilst the Labour Party focused on state ownership as key to 
the ‘socialist commonwealth’, the Co-operative Party, as the political arm of the 
co-operative movement embodied the ideal of a ‘co-operative commonwealth’ built on 
the principles of democratic voluntary association. 
Historians who have addressed the relationship between the Labour Party and the 
co-operative movement have argued that co-operative methods of ownership were 
systematically marginalised, overlooked and ignored by the Labour Party, particularly 
during the 1945 to 1951 period of Labour Government. In this context, this thesis will 
examine the political relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party 
in the broader period from 1931 to 1951. It will argue that both organisational and 
ideological factors contributed to the invisibility of co-operative methods of ownership in 
the policies of the Labour Party. Moreover, this will provide an additional perspective to 
debates regarding the development of the Labour Party during the 1930s and over the 
future direction of nationalisation post 1945. Despite its marginality the Co-operative 
Party represented a large body of working class consumers and a significant business 
organisation, which straddled both the labour movement and co-operative movement.  
Whilst this thesis agrees that co-operative ideas of ownership remained a minor 
influence on the Labour Party throughout this period, it will nevertheless argue that 
 
 
Co-operative Party contributions to policy discussions provide an alternative 
perspective from which a growing recognition of the diversity of influences on the 
Labour Party can be explored. In doing so this thesis will also provide an original 
interpretation of the organisational and policy history of the Co-operative Party. This will 
highlight tensions not only with the Labour Party, but also within the co-operative 
movement with regards to the function and purpose of the Co-operative Party - and 
more significantly the role of the co-operative movement in a socialist society.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Co-operative Party is the political wing of the co-operative movement, arguably the 
largest working class social and economic movement in Britain during the nineteenth 
and twentieth century. Formed in 1917, the Co-operative Party was until 2005 a 
department of the Co-operative Union, the federal body for co-operative societies in 
Britain.1 The Co-operative Party remains active in politics today, fielding both 
parliamentary and local candidates in alliance with the Labour Party, under the joint 
banner of Labour-Co-operative. There are currently 31 Labour-Co-operative MPs in 
Parliament.2 This alliance with the Labour Party was formalised by an electoral 
agreement in 1927, in which the two parties agreed to work together and return joint 
candidates in certain constituencies.3  
Despite bridging two significant working class organisations both the existence of the 
Co-operative Party and the durability of its relationship with the Labour Party is barely 
visible within wider accounts of twentieth century political, economic or social history.4 
This marginalisation is even more surprising given the unique historical position of the 
Co-operative Party; it is the only independent political party with which the Labour Party 
had a formal electoral agreement from 1932.5 This uniqueness is further emphasised 
                                               
1 Now called Co-operatives UK 
2 Official website of the Co-operative Party (www.party.coop) lists details of 31 Members of 
Parliament, http://party.coop/lists/members-of-parliament/ accessed 10 November 2014. 
3 Co-operative Congress Report, (1927) pp. 422-431. The practice of working together in 
constituencies was established from the outset but 1927 marks the national recognition of this 
alliance. 
4 See for example Paul Readman, ‘The state of Twentieth-Century British Political History’, 
Journal of Policy History, 21, 3 (2009) pp. 219-238. This article provides a recent review of the 
current state of twentieth century British history, providing a broad overview of the development 
of themes in the study of this history, including consensus, participation and a detailed 
bibliography for further research into aspects of British political history. However there is no 
reference to the Co-operative Party in this article highlighting its invisibility.  
5 The Independent Labour Party (ILP) disaffiliated from the Labour Party in July 1932. From this 
point there was a tightening of ranks in the Labour Party and with the exception of the 
Co-operative Party no other political party directly linked with the Labour Party. For more on the 
ILP split see Keith Laybourn, ‘The ILP and the Second Labour Government, c. 1929-1931: the 
move towards revolutionary change’, in J. Shepherd, J. Davies, & C. Wrigley, The Second 
Labour Government, 1929-1931: A reappraisal, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
2012) & Gidon Cohen, The Failure of a Dream: The Independent Labour Party from disaffiliation 
to World War II, (London, Tauris Academic Studies, 2007). 
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by the fact that the co-operative movement in Britain was the only one in the world 
which had its own political party.6 
This thesis will seek to rectify this absence by focusing on the history of the 
Co-operative Party and its relationship with the Labour Party. The pivotal focus of this 
thesis will be the Co-operative Party, from which the political interactions of the 
co-operative movement and the Labour Party will be explored. The Co-operative Party 
offers historians an alternative perspective through which to explore the development 
of the Labour Party, the political culture of the wider labour movement, and more 
generally the experience of political parties in Britain during the twentieth century. By 
concentrating attention on the Co-operative Party, as a political organisation in its own 
right, this thesis will contribute an additional dimension to the political culture and 
ideological identity of the wider British labour movement in this period. This introductory 
chapter will present a framework of research aims for this thesis by examining the 
existing literature regarding the Co-operative Party and its relationship with the Labour 
Party. It will also incorporate a discussion of the sources used and the methodology 
applied to the research and analysis. An outline of the chapters and summary of 
proposed findings will conclude this introduction. 
Research Aims 
This thesis will examine the political relationship between the Co-operative Party and 
the Labour Party in the period 1931 to 1951. In particular it will focus on the 
intersections between their organisational relationship and their ideological aims. The 
co-operative movement is viewed as the third pillar in the triumvirate of the British 
labour movement, alongside the Labour Party and the trade unions.7 Uniting these 
three pillars of working class organisation was a common ideological aim to displace 
                                               
6 Arnold Bonner, British Co-operation, (Manchester, Co-operative Union, 1961) states that in a 
survey by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1934 the British co-operative movement 
was the only movement that had a political party of its own, six had close relations with socialist 
parties, and 39 had no organic relations, but all were seeking to influence legislation, p. 309. 
The Co-operative Party remained a department of the Co-operative Union until 2005.  
7 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1974) p. 43.  
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capitalist modes of production and consumption with common ownership. However 
despite this common aim historians have long recognised that in terms of the methods 
advocated to achieve this the co-operative movement’s vision of a ‘Co-operative 
Commonwealth’ was not identical to the Labour Party’s interpretation of a ‘Socialist 
Commonwealth’ and this caused a real and potential divisions in the political 
relationship between the two movements.8 
In February 1918 the Labour Party adopted a new Constitution which established the 
Party as a national organisation with uniform structures. Influenced by the Fabian ideas 
of Sidney Webb, who helped draft the constitution, this constitution marked the Labour 
Party’s commitment to socialism through the extension of common ownership.9 This 
commitment was evident in Clause 4 which stated the Party’s aim; 
To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the 
most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common 
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange.10 
 
Toye has pointed out that the Labour Party’s commitment in 1918 to ‘common 
ownership’ could be interpreted to mean a variety of methods including state 
nationalisation, municipal control or a local co-operative society.11 Equally, as Bonner 
indicated, Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb discussed in their Constitution for a 
Socialist Commonwealth, published in 1920, the important role that voluntary consumer 
co-operation would play in this socialist society.12 Yet despite this open definition the 
Labour Party became overwhelmingly focused on state methods of ownership as a 
route to achieve socialism particularly during the 1930s and 1940s.13 
                                               
8 G.D.H. Cole, A Century of Co-operation, (Manchester, Co-operative Union, 1944) p. 318. 
9 Matthew Worley, Labour inside the Gate: A History of the British Labour Party between the 
Wars, (London, IB Tauris, 2005) pp. 11-12. 
10 Labour Party Conference Report, (1918) Appendix I, Labour Party Constitution, p. 140. 
11 Richard Toye, The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, (Woodbridge, Royal Historical 
Society/Boydell Press, 2003) p. 25. Toye suggests that both a centrally planned economy and 
local co-op would prove quite consistent with the 1918 constitution and programme, quoting 
Sidney Webb ‘This declaration of the Labour Party leaves it open to choose from time to time 
whatever forms of common ownership, from co-operative store to the nationalised railway’. 
12 Bonner, British Co-operation, p. 202. 
13 See Jim Tomlinson, ‘Labour and the Economy’, in Tanner (et al) Labour’s First Century, pp. 
51-52. Tomlinson argues that nationalisation remained at the core of the Labour Party’s 
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As a result, co-operative methods, despite representing one form of common 
ownership embodied within the wider British labour movement, did not feature in 
Labour Party policies. This has led to historians suggesting that the influence of the 
co-operative movement on Labour Party policies was minimal in spite of both their 
political relationship and common ideological roots, noted particularly during the 1945 
period of Labour Government.14 In many ways the co-operative movement’s vision of a 
‘co-operative commonwealth’ which would create a society in which there would be 
‘equal access to the means of living and the common enjoyment and control of what is 
commonly produced’ was not significantly different to the commitment in 1918 from the 
Labour Party.15 The idea of a ‘co-operative commonwealth’ was implicit in the British 
co-operative movement, as within the foundations of the movement was a desire to 
construct an economic and social order based on co-operation which would replace 
capitalism.16 However the crucial difference was that whilst the Labour Party focused 
on the state as a method of transformation, the co-operative movement saw voluntary 
association through co-operation and not legislation as a means to achieving change in 
society.17 As French Socialist, Ernest Poisson theorised in his work, The Co-operative 
Republic, whilst both the co-operative and socialist republic would achieve collective 
ownership of the means of production, the methods of attaining these ends is what 
distinguished socialism from co-operation, as socialists believed in state action.18 
Historians have demonstrated that this apathy from the Labour Party to co-operative 
methods of ownership created significant tensions in the relationship between the 
Labour Party and the co-operative movement, particularly when it began to directly 
                                               
programme from 1918 until many of these policies were enacted in the 1940s, and also 
remained crucial to the rhetoric of the Party until the 1990s. 
14 Martin Francis, Ideas and Policies under Labour, 1945-1951, (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1997) pp. 83-89, Kevin Manton, ‘The Labour Party and Retail Distribution, 
1919-1951’, Labour History Review, 73; 3 (2008) p. 274.  
15 Co-operative Party, The Organisation of the Co-operative Party, (1953) p. 5.  
16 Bonner, British Co-operation, p. 477. 
17 Lesson notes on the history of the Co-operative Party, Lesson II – The Philosophy underlying 
the Co-operative Movement, p. 5. NCA/CPY/9/1/3/2. 
18 Ernest Poisson, The Co-operative Republic, (Translated from French by W.P Watkins, 
Co-operative Union, Manchester, 1925) pp. 89-92.  
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undermine co-operative business interests.19 However the impact of this difference in 
approach to the methods of ownership has yet to be fully explored by historians, 
particularly in the context of the political relationship that existed between the Labour 
Party and the Co-operative Party. The Co-operative Party, as the political arm of the 
co-operative movement, yet electorally allied with the Labour Party, provides an ideal 
lens through which to explore the ideological and organisational relationship between 
the Labour Party and the wider co-operative movement. 
This thesis will address the issue of why co-operative methods of ownership failed to 
achieve any prominence in Labour Party policy. Two central research questions form 
the backbone of this thesis: firstly to what extent can the Co-operative Party’s lack of 
influence on the Labour Party in the period be traced to organisational and 
constitutional matters? Secondly to what degree did these ideological differences affect 
the political relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party? It will 
use the Co-operative Party and Labour Party’s varying approaches to collective 
ownership as a method to examine the organisational, policy and ideological 
relationship between the two Parties.  
In doing so, this thesis will contribute to a developing body of historical research 
concerned with the plurality of influences and organisations on the ideological 
development of the Labour Party.20 Despite its marginality the Co-operative Party is 
both an institution within the labour movement and a political body representing 
constituents of the wider working class community. The non-homogeneous nature of 
both working class culture and the broad interpretation of Labour’s definition of 
                                               
19 N. Robertson, The Co-operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914-1960: Minding 
their Own Business, (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010) p. 122, Peter Gurney, ‘The Battle of the 
Consumer in Postwar Britain’, The Journal of Modern History, 77 (2005) p. 965 
20 Matthew Worley, (ed) The Foundations of the British Labour Party; Identities, Cultures and 
Perspectives, 1900-1939, (Surrey, Ashgate, 2009). David Howell, MacDonalds Party: Labour 
identities and crisis, 1922-1931, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) Jeremy Nuttall, 
‘Pluralism, the people, and time in Labour Party history, 1931–1964’, The Historical Journal, 56 
(2013) pp. 729-756. 
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socialism as their objective from 1918 have been emphasised by historians.21 
Consequently in considering the political message the Co-operative Party 
communicated, both to co-operators as members of the wider labour movement, and to 
the Labour Party, this thesis will provide a valuable perspective illustrating the diversity 
of political thought within the labour movement, particularly regarding methods of 
collective ownership.  
The Co-operative Party — Absent from Historiography? 
In this section these central research aims will be situated within a wider review of the 
existing literature. Firstly the relative absence of the Co-operative Party in labour, 
co-operative and political historiography will be considered, and reasons for this 
suggested. Secondly it will address how historians have considered the contribution of 
the wider co-operative movement to the organisational development and political 
culture of the Labour Party, illustrating how this thesis will build and develop on this. 
Thirdly it will examine how the policy relationship between the co-operative movement 
and the Labour Party has previously been interpreted by historians, focusing 
particularly in the 1931 to 1951 period. These sections will provide an overview of 
some key arguments particularly regarding tensions in ideology and policy which 
existed between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement, before the final two 
sections signpost where this thesis departs from these, firstly in terms of ideology and 
policy and secondly with regard to the organisation of the Co-operative Party.  
The challenge the British co-operative movement presents to researchers is that it 
cannot easily be categorised into any definite academic discipline. Co-operation is an 
economic model, with an underlying social purpose, thus features in current business 
practice as well as in the history of consumerism or working class education. As Black 
states, the British co-operative movement ‘traverses political and social terrains, and 
                                               
21 Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson & Nick Tiratsoo, England Arise! The Labour Party and 
Popular Politics in 1940s Britain, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995) p. 215 & 
Worley, Labour inside the Gate, p. 218. 
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formal and informal politics’.22 However, the co-operative movement has recently 
benefitted from a revival in interest from historians, evidenced by an increasing number 
of academic publications. These publications have begun to address the challenges of 
studying the co-operative movement by addressing the marginality of co-operatives in 
business history, emphasising the diversity of the movement and illustrating the varied 
social and political culture of the movement. Yet this resurgence in attention has yet to 
extend to the Co-operative Party, as both a political and co-operative organisation.23 
There are some noted exceptions, for example Robertson’s monograph includes a 
chapter on ‘The Co-operative Movement and Political Action’.24 In this chapter 
Robertson addresses the different ways in which local co-operative societies 
responded to the decision to create a Co-operative Party, illustrating the diversity of 
responses at grass roots level. Equally Robertson here begins to explore the role of the 
Co-operative Party in the wider labour movement, discussing themes which will be 
pertinent throughout this thesis. Another exception is Stewart’s chapter, which 
examines the implications of the Co-operative Party-Labour Party alliance, in the 
context of the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981.25 
Ultimately the Co-operative Party has not received the attention it arguably deserves 
from historians. Although the co-operative movement is a recognised element of the 
                                               
22 Lawrence Black, Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954-
70, (Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010) p. 2. 
23 See J.F. Wilson, A. Webster & R. Vorberg-Rugh, Building Co-operation – A Business History 
of the Co-operative Group, 1863-2013, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) for the most 
recent history of the Co-operative Wholesale Society (now known as the Co-operative Group). 
For broader aspects of the business history of co-operation see Journal of Business History, 54, 
6 (2012) pp. 825-1021 for a special issue on, ‘The business of Co-operation: National and 
international dimensions since the nineteenth century’. See A. Webster, L. Shaw, J.K. Walton, 
A. Brown and D. Stewart, (eds) The Hidden Alternative – Co-operative values, past, present 
and future, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011) for an edited collection illustrating 
the broad range of topics to which the co-operative movement can contribute. See L. Black & N. 
Robertson, (eds.) Consumerism and the Co-operative Movement in Modern British History, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2009) for an edited collection placing the history of 
the co-operative movement in the context if a wider consumer history. See also N. Robertson, 
The Co-operative Movement and Communities in Britain, 1914 -1960: Minding their Own 
Business, (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010) for an illustration of the varying broader social and cultural 
context of the movement. 
24 Roberston, The Co-operative Movement, pp. 155-180. 
25 David Stewart, 'A party within a party?, The Co-operative Party-Labour party alliance and the 
formation of the Social Democratic Party, 1974-81', in A. Webster (et al) The Hidden Alternative, 
pp.137-156. 
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wider British labour movement, the Co-operative Party as a working class political party 
with an organisation and membership structure distinct from the Labour Party, has 
barely registered any interest amongst historians studying the British labour movement. 
In contrast the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), a more marginal political 
party in terms of electoral success than the Co-operative Party, has attracted more 
scholarly attention.26 Equally the Co-operative Party is not mentioned at all in a recent 
study of political organisation during the Second World War, despite more peripheral 
political organisations such as the Common Wealth Party being considered.27 The 
need for historians to look beyond the two main political parties has recently been 
highlighted by Fielding, who in a recent review article suggested that even if marginal 
political parties had ‘failed to break the mould’ this should not discourage historians 
from taking them seriously.28 Fielding argued that if nothing else a study of peripheral 
party organisations demonstrates the tensions and instabilities inherent in the 
Westminster party system.29 This reiterates the need for further historical research on 
the Co-operative Party which, albeit through their electoral alliance with the Labour 
Party, was the third largest party in Parliament from 1945 to 1983.30  
Carbery’s history of the Co-operative Party, published in 1969, is the only full scale 
academic study of the Party.31 In this study, Carbery deals systematically with key 
organisation and structural themes in the Party’s history and development, such as the 
relationship between the Party and the Co-operative Union, the political alliance with 
                                               
26 For example; Henry Pelling, The British Communist Party, (London, A & C Black, 1958) 
Matthew Worley, Class Against Class: The Communist Party in Britain Between the Wars, 
(London, Macmillan, 2002) Andrew Thorpe, The British Communist Party and Moscow, 1920–
1943, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000). 
27 Andrew Thorpe, Parties at War: Political organisation in Second World War Britain, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009). Although Thorpe does mention more peripheral Parties the 
focus of this study is on the Conservative, Liberal and Labour Parties. Despite a local approach 
and detailed analysis of local records Thorpe does not however mention the Co-operative Party 
as an influence on the varied development of Constituency Labour Parties. 
28 Stephen Fielding, ‘The Permanent Crisis of Party’, Review Article, Twentieth Century British 
History, 21, 1 (2010) pp. 106. 
29 Stephen Fielding, ‘The Permanent Crisis of Party’, Review Article, Twentieth Century British 
History, 21, 1 (2010) pp. 106. 
30 Stewart, ‘Party within a Party’, p. 137. 
31 Thomas. F. Carbery, Consumers in Politics: A History and General Review of the 
Co-operative Party, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1969). 
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the Labour Party, membership and finance. He also examines the policies of the Party 
focusing on social ownership, consumer affairs and foreign policy. His analysis 
highlights enduring themes in the history of the Co-operative Party providing signposts 
for future research. He concludes that the promotion of alternative forms of social 
ownership and consumer affairs provided the Co-operative Party with a distinct voice in 
politics.32 In his assessment of their policies on social ownership, Carbery argues that 
the Labour Party’s proposal to nationalise industrial assurance in 1949, (of which a 
significant portion was co-operatively owned) was a pivotal point in the relationship 
between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement, and one which forced the 
Party to determine its stance on public ownership.33 Carbery contended that in the 
years 1930 to 1945 too much time had been spent on organisational issues to the 
detriment of developing a coherent policy, yet he does not fully explore why 
organisation was a crucial issue and how this was closely linked to ideological and 
policy concerns.34 Despite its continued relevance, nearly half a century on, Carbery’s 
work is in need of reappraisal, as a rejoinder to the revival of interest in the 
co-operative movement and in response to broader historiographical trends which have 
shifted away from the strictly ‘formal politics’ approach epitomised in his study. 
Although this thesis will focus to an extent on the structural history of the Co-operative 
Party it will take a more multi-faceted approach which encompasses the broader 
nuances between policy, ideology and organisational issues and is situated in a 
broader context of labour historiography. 
The formation of the Co-operative Party has attracted some attention with some 
studies also providing a localised perspective of events.35 Historians have shown how 
                                               
32 Carbery, Consumers in Politics, p, 252. 
33 Ibid, p. 162.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Carbery, Consumers in Politics, G.D.H, Cole, A Century of Co-operation, (Manchester, 
Co-operative Union, 1944) Sidney Pollard, ‘The foundation of the Co-operative Party’, in Asa 
Briggs & John Saville (eds.) Essays in Labour History, 1886-1923, (London, Macmillan, 1971) 
Tony Adams, ‘The Formation of the Co-operative Party Re-considered’, International Review of 
Social History, 32 (1987) pp.48-68 and Mary Hilson, ‘Consumers and Politics: The Co-operative 
Movement in Plymouth, 1890-1920’, Labour History Review, 67, 1 (2002) pp. 7-27. 
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the changing role of the state and its greater intervention in economic affairs was one 
of the most powerful arguments used in deviating from the co-operative principle of 
political neutrality.36 Although there is some debate as to the extent to which the 
formation of the Co-operative Party represented evidence of a wider shift to the left in 
the early part of the twentieth century, it remains conclusive that the movement’s 
negative experience during the First World War was a deciding factor.37 McKibbin has 
also addressed the formation of the Co-operative Party in the context of its relationship 
with the Labour Party in his broader assessment of the early development of the 
Labour Party.38 McKibbin is critical of the success of the Co-operative Party by 1924, 
suggesting that the Co-operative Party became ‘neither of the things it was feared and 
hoped it might’.39 Nevertheless beyond the early development and intervention of the 
Co-operative Party into the political arena it has subsequently attracted little academic 
attention. 
The conspicuous lack of engagement with the Co-operative Party by historians can be 
attributed to three broad factors. Firstly, a general consensus exists amongst historians 
of the co-operative movement that the marginalisation of the co-operative movement 
more generally has been a reflection of both the movement’s decline in the latter part of 
the twentieth century and historiographical trends.40 These historiographical trends 
include a focus on for instance the Trade Unions and the Labour Party from historians 
of the left and a disregard more generally to consumer history, particularly in terms of 
the link between consumerism and political engagement. Gurney argues that 
‘historians have either ignored or largely misunderstood the important attempts made 
by British consumer co-operation to construct an alternative social and economic 
                                               
36 Robertson, The Co-operative Movement, p. 157, Carbery, Consumers in Politics, pp.16-17. 
37 Pollard’s article ‘The foundation of the Co-operative Party’ instigated debate on this issue by 
suggesting that the impact of the First World War was not as important as had been previously 
accepted and that it instead represented part of a wider swing to the left from the co-operative 
movement. Pollard’s work however represented a wider body of historiography, popular of that 
time, in which the forward march of the working class featured as a prominent theme.  
38 McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, pp. 43-47 & pp. 178-191.  
39 Ibid, p. 189. 
40 Lawrence Black & Nicole Robertson, ‘Introduction’, in Consumerism and the Co-operative 
Movement, p. 1. 
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order’. 41 He suggests that this marginalisation is due to Labour and Marxist historians 
of the post war era being drawn towards more heroic phases of struggle, or the 
powerful and influential trade unions and Labour Party. 42 Black cites the complete 
absence of the co-operative movement from Zweiniger-Bargeilowska’s seminal study 
on rationing as a key indicator that the co-operative movement is overlooked by 
historians.43 Wrigley describes the co-operative movement as the 'Cinderella' of the 
British labour movement, particularly in terms of political weight given to it by historians 
and indicates the need for more research on co-operative politics more generally.44 
However, the focus on the more dominant influences on the Labour Party such as the 
trade unions should not be at the expense of other influences, such as the 
Co-operative Party, which this thesis will address. 
Secondly, when the Co-operative Party is mentioned in Labour Party historiography 
there is often a portrayal of a non problematic relationship, indicating in some ways 
perhaps the complexity of the relationship is not discussed in any detail. Pelling in his 
history of the Labour Party provided little analysis of Co-operative and Labour relations, 
instead simply stating ‘the Co-operative Party became closely integrated with the 
Labour Party’.45 This is also evident in Thorpe’s history of the Labour Party, in which he 
states that ‘the two parties were to form effective alliances in many parts of the country’ 
and that this alliance would prove a great strength to Labour.46 These assertions 
                                               
41 Peter Gurney, ‘Labor’s Great Arch: Co-operation and Cultural Revolution in Britain 1795- 
1926’, in Ellen Furlough and Carl Strikwerda (eds.) Consumers against Capitalism: Consumer 
Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990, (Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 
1999) p. 135 and Peter Gurney, Co-operative Culture and the Politics of Consumption in 
England, 1870–1930, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996) p. 5. 
42 Peter Gurney, ‘Labor’s Great Arch: Co-operation and Cultural Revolution in Britain 1795-
1926’, in Ellen Furlough and Carl Strikwerda (eds.) Consumers against Capitalism: Consumer 
Cooperation in Europe, North America and Japan, 1840-1990, (Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield, 
1999) p. 135 and Peter Gurney, Co-operative Culture and the Politics of Consumption in 
England, 1870–1930, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996) p. 5. 
43 Lawrence Black, Redefining British Politics: Culture, Consumerism and Participation, 1954-
70, (Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010) p. 46. See also Ina Zweiniger-Bargeilowska, 
Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls and Consumption, 1939–1955, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000).  
44 Chris Wrigley, ‘The Co-operative Movement’, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts fur Soziale 
Bewegungen, 27, 2002, p. 103, p. 116. 
45 Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, (London, Macmillan, 1972, 4th ed., p. 47. 
46 Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party, (London, Macmillan, 1997) p. 41. 
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provide too much of a simplistic account of the relationship between the Co-operative 
Party and the Labour Party, which devalues the contribution played by the 
Co-operative Party to the development of the Labour Party, a theme which this thesis 
will develop. 
Thirdly historians have misunderstood the structure of the relationship between the 
Labour Party and the Co-operative Party. For example, a recently published history of 
the Labour Party completely misunderstands co-operative involvement in politics, 
stating that ‘another building block fell into place in the shape of the alliance between 
Labour and the Co-operative Society’.47 This misunderstanding reflects the lack of 
engagement by historians with the British co-operative movement and its structures, 
particularly in reference to its relationship with the Labour Party. A PhD thesis 
analysing Labour movement relations in Exeter summarised the difficulty of including 
an analysis of the Co-operative Party in its research stating:  
‘The complex arrangement of the Co-operative movement further adds to the difficulty 
of understanding and analysing the politics and functions of the movement. The 
Co-operative Party is the political arm of the retail co-operative movement, but is 
actually a part of the Co-operative Union, the body which acts as a coordinator for the 
whole movement’.48  
It is perhaps the complexity described by the author which underpins the three reasons 
elicited for the marginalisation and misunderstanding of the Co-operative Party in 
history. Therefore to enhance historians’ and political scientists’ understanding of the 
Co-operative Party, this thesis will address this complexity, analysing not only the 
political relationship between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party, but the finer 
details of the structure of the Co-operative Party within the co-operative movement.  
The Political Culture of the British Labour Movement and Influence of the 
Co-operative Movement 
                                               
47 Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain! A New History of the British Labour Party, (The Bodley Head, 
2010) p. 145. 
48 David Friend, ‘The Labour Party, the trade union movement and the co-operative movement: 
A Study of the Inter-relationship in the Labour Movement with particular reference to Exeter, 
Plymouth and Torbay’, (PhD thesis, University of Exeter, 2002) p. 55. 
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A recent article by Nuttall argues that an increasingly pluralistic approach to Labour 
Party historiography has ‘incrementally added to the sense of Labour’s story as a beast 
of many dimensions and parts’.49 The Co-operative Party is arguably one aspect of this 
‘beast’; therefore by examining its organisation, policy and relationship with the Labour 
Party this thesis will enhance historians’ understanding of this previously under-
researched aspect of Labour Party history. By emphasising its role as the political party 
of the co-operative movement, representing part of the wider fabric of working class 
society in Britain this thesis will make a valuable contribution to a broader 
understanding of the political culture of the wider labour movement in Britain during this 
period, emphasising the plurality of both the organisations and the ideologies it 
embodied. 
From traditional structural histories to a class based approach, the historiography of the 
Labour Party has extended beyond the Party as a political institution to include the 
wider political culture in which it is situated. This approach was evident in Howell’s 
monograph exploring the Labour Party during the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald. 
Howell argued that the structures and procedures of the Labour Party in this period 
owed much to pre–existing practices and culture, and consequently the roots of the 
Labour Party lay not in its Parliamentary organisation but in extra parliamentary 
institutions and affiliated bodies.50 Similarly Worley has illustrated how development of 
the Labour Party up until 1945 was informed by a multitude of organisational and 
ideological factors, addressing both the diverse foundations upon which the Labour 
Party was built and the varied influences on the Party at grass roots level.51 Worley 
contended that historians of the Labour Party have previously shown less interest in 
                                               
49 Jeremy Nuttall, ‘Pluralism, the people, and time in Labour Party history, 1931–1964’, The 
Historical Journal, 56 (2013) pp. 729-730. 
50 David Howell, MacDonald’s Party: Labour identities and crisis, 1922-1931, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002) p. 54. 
51 Matthew Worley, Labour inside the Gate: A History of the British Labour Party between the 
Wars, (London, IB Tauris, 2005) Matthew Worley, (ed.) Labour’s Grass Roots: Essays on the 
activities of Local Labour Parties and members, 1918-1945, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005) 
Matthew Worley, (ed.) The Foundations of the British Labour Party; Identities, Cultures and 
Perspectives, 1900-1939, (Surrey, Ashgate, 2009). 
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the subtle intricacies of Labour Party policy and organisation and his work marks a 
departure from this.52 Both of Worley’s edited collections include chapters by 
Robertson on the Co-operative Party and their relationship with the Labour Party 
locally.53 These chapters illustrate how local Co-operative Parties influenced the 
character of the Labour Party in various localities, whilst also making a valuable 
contribution to the limited historiography on the Co-operative Party. Worley has shown 
that there has been a diversity of influences on the Labour Party at grass roots level 
and that despite an attempt to create a national party after 1918, the Labour Party 
varied significantly according to local culture.54 For example, in areas where there was 
a strong miners’ union, there was an existing labour tradition influencing the 
constituency organisation whereas in areas with more mixed economies various 
strands of the labour movement sought to combine their energies.55 In the same way, 
Robertson has shown that local political cultures informed the incongruous 
development of the Co-operative Party, and for example even though co-operative 
societies in Kettering, Birmingham and Northampton were all affiliated nationally to the 
Co-operative Party, they all varied considerably in development, role and performance 
over time.56  
Other historians have also drawn attention to the connections between local Labour 
Party culture and co-operative involvement in politics. Rhodes has examined the 
special relationship the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society had with the Labour Party, 
in which the Society chose to affiliate nationally to the Labour Party in the first instance, 
                                               
52 Matthew Worley (ed.) Labour’s Grass Roots: Essays on the activities of Local Labour Parties 
and members, 1918-1945, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005). Introduction, p. 9. 
53 Nicole Robertson, ‘“A Union of Forces Marching in the Same Direction?” The Relationship 
between the Co-operative and Labour Parties, 1918–39’ in Worley, The Foundations of the 
British Labour Party, & Nicole Robertson, ‘The Political Dividend: Co-operative Parties in the 
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although it did in 1930 affiliate to the Co-operative Party.57 Black has shown how local 
labour culture affected the branch life of the Labour Party in the 1950s, stating how 
Woolwich was the largest Constituency Labour Party due to the affiliation of Royal 
Arsenal Co-operative Society to all Constituency Labour Parties in their trading area.58 
Marriott, in his study of the East End of London, argued that politicised co-operative 
societies there formed part of wider labour movement and played a role in Labour’s 
initial successes in the area.59 Savage has suggested that in Preston the development 
of co-operative societies into new areas of working class communities provided a new 
base for Labour Party mobilisation.60 
The correlation between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party in some localities 
and the impact of local political cultures, including co-operative political activity, on the 
development and organisation of the Labour Party has therefore been addressed by 
historians. Equally co-operative politics have been recently explored in the context of 
consumer history.61 However there has been less interest in the intersections between 
the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party at a national level, reflecting perhaps a 
broader move away from ‘high politics’ to an emphasis on local political culture. This 
thesis however seeks to bridge this gap between the local and national and will 
address the national policy and organisational relationship between the Co-operative 
Party and the Labour Party. By focusing nationally this thesis will draw attention to the 
uniqueness of the relationship and the consequent contradictions it posed in terms of 
organisation, policy and ideology, which contributed to this recognised diverse local 
political culture.  
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Co-operative Commonwealth or New Jerusalem? 
The tensions between the co-operative movement and Labour Party in terms of 
ideology and policy have been noted by historians of both the co-operative movement 
and the Labour Party.62 Although it is suggested that a natural affinity existed between 
co-operators and the Labour Party, deriving from their common roots in Owenite 
socialism, historians have indicated that a difference in emphasis on the methods to 
achieve socialism emerged through the first half of the twentieth century. 63 Gurney 
argued that these contrasting views on social ownership presented the most 
fundamental ideological divide between the Labour Party and the co-operative 
movement.64 However this difference in emphasis on methods of ownership have not 
been fully explored, particularly in relation to how this shaped the political relationship 
between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, a gap this thesis will address.  
In 1931 the Labour Government divided and split over economic issues caused by the 
world economic crisis. A.V. Alexander, Co-operative-Labour MP for Sheffield 
Hillsborough, was one of the Labour cabinet members that resigned from the 
Government in 1931 over these issues. Historians of the Labour Party have suggested 
that these events created several lessons for the Labour Party, notably that a ‘lack of a 
clearly defined short-term policy was a serious weakness’65 and that it became clear 
that ‘the next Labour government must deliver the good in terms of tangible benefits for 
the working class’.66 The year 1931 is therefore viewed as a new policy direction for the 
Labour Party, marking a change from the gradual socialism which had dominated the 
                                               
62 Some examples include Cole, The Co-operative Movement, p. 318, Francis, Ideas and 
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1920s to policies dominated by nationalisation and economic planning.67 Existing 
debates regarding Labour Party policy development from 1931 have tended to focus on 
the divide between the left and right of the Labour Party, the contribution of intellectuals 
and leaders and the influence of the trade union movement. 68 There has been no 
analysis of any possible co-operative influence particularly during the 1930s, reflecting 
both historiographical trends, but also the perceived marginality of their influence.  
There is a general consensus among historians of the Labour Party of the prominence 
of state ownership through nationalisation in the economic policies of the Labour Party, 
particularly in the period 1931 to 1951. Toye argues that because of an ‘overriding 
belief that state ownership was key to prosperity’ other policies, such as co-operative 
methods never achieved much prominence.69 The centrality of the state in the policies 
of the Labour Party has also been highlighted by Thorpe, who asserted that it 
‘assumed a primacy in the party’s doctrine which was virtually unchallenged’.70 Equally 
Thompson suggests that at the heart of the Labour Party’s economic literature in the 
1930s, there existed an ‘assumption that socialism could be built only on the foundation 
of a substantial extension of public ownership, particularly into those industries where 
private monopoly power prevailed’.71  
The Labour Party’s overriding focus on the state as a method of ownership has led 
historians to conclude that the co-operative movement’s influence on the Labour Party 
was negligible. This is emphasised because co-operative methods of ownership did not 
feature in the policies of the Labour Party, most noted in the 1945 to 1951 period of 
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Labour Government. Mercer has argued that in spite of the electoral agreement 
co-operatives felt they had a 'distinct disadvantage' in the period of the post war Labour 
Government.72 Equally, the subsequent tensions this political exclusion created 
between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party have been highlighted by 
Robertson.73 Although historians agree in regard to the political isolation of the 
co-operative movement, existing interpretations vary as to the reasons why, often with 
bias from either a Labour or co-operative perspective. For instance Gurney is critical of 
the Labour Party, concluding that its potential to radically restructure British society in 
the last half of the twentieth century was undermined by its inability to integrate 
consumers and producers, which reflected its emphasis on statist forms of ownership.74 
Gurney suggests that co-operators were acutely disappointed by the actions of the 
Labour Party (in relation to co-operatives) during their 1945 to 1951 period of 
Government. He cites a damning speech by Daniel Dow, a director of the Scottish 
Co-operative Wholesale Society, who in February 1951 spoke of how the Labour 
Government was indebted to the co-operative movement for its current position, yet 
made only occasional flattering references to the movement.75 What Gurney indicates 
is that there was a level of expectation, given the close political relationship between 
the Labour Party and the co-operative movement, that the Labour Party would embody 
co-operative ideas in their policies. However this interpretation is problematic as if the 
Labour Party was expected to represent the co-operative movement politically then 
what was the purpose of the Co-operative Party? Secondly, Gurney does not consider 
in any significant detail the extent to which the Co-operative Party, as the political 
vehicle for the co-operative movement distinctly advocated a co-operative alternative to 
state forms of ownership. 
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On the other hand, Manton has described as ‘curious’ that the Labour Party did not 
look to the co-operative movement for inspiration, particularly regarding their retail and 
distribution policies.76 He suggests that despite representing the same working class 
constituency and the co-operative movement having a strong presence on the high 
street, co-operative ideas were not taken seriously by the Labour Party.77 Manton cites 
three reasons for this; ‘political friction’ between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party, ideological issues, notably the co-operative movement’s opposition to state 
control as the only method of ownership and lastly the relatively poor performance of 
co-operatives as businesses in this period.78 In a broader assessment of the Labour 
Party and the co-operative movement, Manton argues that the negative conclusions of 
the Crosland Report on co-operation in Britain, published in 1958, represented 'the 
product of a Labour milieu that had long been critical of the political and economic 
foundations advanced by British co-operativism’.79 Manton in this article was also 
mapping out and analysing Labour’s post war nonchalance and indifference to the 
co-operative movement. In this respect Manton raises some key points regarding the 
complex ideological and policy relationship between the Co-operative Party and the 
Labour Party which echo throughout this analysis, in particular the ideological tension 
over forms of ownership.80 Nevertheless Manton is at times overly critical of the 
co-operative movement and underestimates the continued strength and relevance of 
the co-operative movement in working class communities.81 He does not explore the 
‘problematic relationship’ he described between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
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Party and thus his analysis of the political relationship remains somewhat 
underdeveloped in this respect.82  
What unites these assessments of the political marginalisation of the co-operative 
movement by the Labour Party in the 1945 to 1951 period is a recognition that the 
‘undeniably fraught post war years were symptomatic of a more deeply rooted set of 
intertwined ideological and political disagreements’. 83 Equally Burge in suggesting that 
the post war Labour Government was a ‘missed opportunity’ for co-operation 
acknowledges that this was a result of ‘profound differences’ which surfaced in the post 
war period based upon the different history and philosophies of the two parallel 
movements. 84 Emerging from these assessments is the question of what these 
ideological differences were and more importantly how did they affect and shape the 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, both in and prior to 
this period? Moreover how did this ideological relationship change over time according 
to the organisational priorities of each organisation? These questions will be addressed 
throughout this thesis. 
Historians of the Labour Party have indicated that by the late 1940s the future direction 
of the nationalisation programme was contested within the Labour Party. McKibbin, 
describing the Labour Party as being in an ‘ideological cul-de-sac’ by 1951, suggested 
that the electorate was either indifferent or opposed to further nationalisation at this 
point, although arguing that public ownership still united the party politically and 
ideologically.85 McKibbin interprets the Labour Party’s 1951 election defeat as being a 
result of the narrowness of their politics, and refusal to think seriously about the 
institutions of a social democratic or socialist state.86 Thompson outlines how the 
obvious candidates for nationalisation had been nationalised by 1950 leaving it not 
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immediately apparent where the Labour Party would look next.87 Similarly, Ellis 
suggests that by 1951 there was no agreement within the Labour Party about the 
desirability of future extensions of the public sector or the degree to which 
nationalisation should remain a shibboleth of the party.88 Ellis and Thompson describe 
a symbolic attachment to nationalisation by the Labour Party suggesting that any 
perceived attempt to undermine the importance of nationalisation would be viewed as 
threatening the achievements of the 1945 Labour Government and the prevailing 
meaning of ‘socialism’.89 Thus, the consensus from the work of a number of historians 
argues that by the late 1940s the Labour Party was not ideologically and politically 
united on the future direction and the purpose of nationalisation in their policy 
programme.  
In these broader discussions Francis has suggested that co-operative ideas did 
generate some interest from within the Labour Party particularly in the late 1940s, 
although this translated into limited support.90 He contends that although co-operative 
ideas were not relevant to the Labour Party in 1945, by 1950 Labour’s attitude to the 
co-operative movement appears to have become more positive.91 This discussion is 
situated within a wider analysis of the Labour Party’s attitudes and policies to public 
ownership in which he argues that ‘the most important aspect of the ideological tension 
surrounding nationalisation in the post-war period was the absence of any real 
measure of agreement among socialists as to what were the essential purposes of 
public ownership’.92 In this he highlights key debates which occurred within the Labour 
Party in the later 1940s about the future direction of nationalisation, illustrating that both 
ethical and practical reasons for nationalisation were put forward by the Labour Party.  
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What Francis therefore indicates is that co-operative methods of ownership did 
contribute to a wider spectrum of debate within the Labour Party as to the future 
direction and purpose of their nationalisation programme. This thesis will expand on 
this analysis initiated by Francis, but in the context of the political relationship between 
the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party. It will use the Labour Party’s proposal to 
nationalise industrial assurance in 1949 as an avenue from which to explore the 
changing policy relationship between the Co-operative Party, co-operative movement 
and Labour Party. This will further emphasise that the policy discussions within the 
Co-operative Party (and the co-operative movement more generally) provide an 
alternative perspective from which to explore the debates which existed across the 
wider labour movement regarding the purpose, function and future direction of 
nationalisation in the latter part of the post war Labour Government. 
Organisational and Constitutional Limitations? 
This thesis will focus on the Co-operative Party in considering what reasons 
contributed to the marginalisation of co-operative ideas, unlike previous assessments 
which have focused more generally on the relationship between the Labour Party and 
the co-operative movement. It will analyse the development of the policy of the 
Co-operative Party from 1931, focusing in particular on their policies regarding 
methods of ownership. As indicated by Mercer tensions in the 1945 to 1951 period 
were not just a studied indifference towards the co-operative movement by the Labour 
Party but reflected a divide over what ownership embodied.93 Consequently the 
research will focus on the extent to which the policies of the Co-operative Party differed 
from that of the Labour Party regarding forms and methods of ownership and whether 
distinct co-operative alternatives to state and municipal forms of ownership were 
promoted from 1931 onwards. Trentmann, examining the distribution of milk, argued 
that ‘the co-operative movement came to accept in the 1930s and 1940s that consumer 
interests were best protected in collaboration with the state’. He suggested that the 
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movement did not advocate their alternative model of a ‘Co-operative 
Commonwealth’.94 This raises the crucial question as to whether the Co-operative 
Party could have done more to influence Labour Party policy and if so what 
organisational and ideological limitations prevented them from doing so. The role of the 
co-operative movement, in particular the Co-operative Union in determining this 
ideological and policy will therefore be examined. Bonner has suggested that the 
Co-operative Union during the 1920s was more concerned with immediate problems of 
finance, trade and systems of management, and that problems raised by theorists like 
the Webbs, Poisson and others were not adequately discussed which resulted in the 
means becoming detached from the ends.95 Crucially this thesis will examine the 
changing priorities of the Co-operative Party and the co-operative movement to 
establish what other external factors affected the development of their political ideology 
and potentially hampered the development of their ‘co-operative commonwealth’. 
On the surface the Co-operative Party promoted a distinct identity from the Labour 
Party in that it was the only political party representing consumers in the House of 
Commons.96 This consumer identity was perhaps unsurprising given the retail 
dominated nature of the British co-operative movement and the legacy of the Rochdale 
Pioneers’ desire for ‘honest food at honest prices’. Robertson has recently highlighted 
how the varying priorities of elements within the labour movement regarding the 
promotion of consumer legislation during the Labour Party’s second period of 
Government created tensions between the co-operative movement, the trade unions 
and the Labour Party.97 Elsewhere Robertson credits the Party for achieving a measure 
of success in local consumer issues but suggests that it did not advocate a 
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co-operative alternative in other policies. 98 Robertson cites London co-operator, Vic 
Butler asking ‘if co-operators ought to consider if it is we are who to blame’ [for this 
marginalisation]. 99 
Likewise it has been previously suggested that the policy and ideological development 
of the Co-operative Party was hampered due to a prolonged debate over practical 
matters such as political organisation particularly during the 1930s.100 There is 
therefore an argument emerging here that suggests an element of responsibility lies 
within the Co-operative Party for the negligible influence co-operative methods had on 
Labour Party policy. This thesis will consider what factors contributed to this by 
assessing how the organisational structure of the Co-operative Party, in particular its 
relationship with the Co-operative Union, left little freedom for policy development. This 
point in particular leads to more speculative theoretical questions regarding the role 
and function of the Co-operative Party within the co-operative movement. What were 
the priorities for the Co-operative Party? Was the purpose of their relationship with the 
Labour Party to gain parliamentary representation or to influence their policy? 
Moreover how did these priorities change and develop over time?  
Overall this literature review has demonstrated that the Co-operative Party is in need of 
further examination, particularly in relation to its continued political alliance with the 
Labour Party and the underlying ideological differences between the two organisations. 
The local influence of co-operative culture on the development of the Labour Party has 
been highlighted yet there is no recent analysis of the national level relationship. 
Equally the tensions between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement in the 
post war period have been acknowledged yet not discussed in any depth. Furthermore 
these differences and tensions are not always situated within the specific context of the 
political alliance between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party and the 
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organisational challenges this alliance presented. In order to examine the extent to 
which the Co-operative Party’s lack of influence on the Labour Party can be traced to 
organisational and constitutional matters and the degree to which ideological 
differences affected the political relationship between the Co-operative Party and the 
Labour Party this thesis has been divided into two parts.  
The first part, encompassing chapters one and two, focuses on organisation and the 
second part, including chapters three and four, concentrates on policy and ideology. 
Four strands of research have been identified to provide the individual chapter 
structures; first, a focus on the organisation and structure of the Co-operative Party; 
second, an examination of the organisational relationship between the Co-operative 
Party and the Labour Party, third, the policy development of the Co-operative Party in 
the 1930s; and fourth an examination of the co-operative contribution and response to 
the Labour Government economic policies in the period 1945 to 1951. These will form 
the basis of the analysis to understand why co-operative ideas were marginalised by 
the Labour Party, illustrating that wider ideological differences contributed to an 
organisational alliance which gave little scope for co-operative ideas of ownership to be 
developed and considered. This research seeks to plug not only a gap in wider political 
literature by providing an analysis of an under-researched political party but also to 
contribute to an emerging field of literature which views the Labour Party as a myriad of 
organisations influenced by a range of ideological and cultural identities.  
Methodology and Sources 
Reflecting recent trends in historiography, the culture of co-operative politics and local 
relationships between the Labour Party and co-operative societies has to some extent 
already been addressed. These studies have illustrated the co-operative contribution to 
the diverse roots of the Labour Party. In contrast this thesis will address national 
organisation and policy debates, to provide a structural context to these existing 
interpretations. It will show how organisational and policy considerations shaped both 
the local and national relationship. Furthermore this will contribute to work by Worley 
26 
 
and Robertson emphasising the diversity of the Labour Party both in organisation, 
structure and ideology.  
Consequently the methodology applied to this thesis is what could be described as 
‘formal politics’. However whilst the analysis focuses on the national relationship 
between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, the research has drawn on local 
examples as appropriate to support arguments and conclusions. As the literature 
review indicated there has been no detailed academic study of the Co-operative Party 
since 1969 emphasising the need for an up-to date analysis. This is compounded by 
the absence, simplification or misunderstanding of the Co-operative Party and its 
relationship with the Labour Party in existing historiography. Although Thorpe overlooks 
the Co-operative Party in his recent monograph examining political organisation 
throughout the Second World War, his justification for a return to the ‘formal’ approach 
to political history can be applied here. Thorpe argues that the history of political 
organisation is crucial to understanding the political culture of an organisation and is 
not an old fashioned subject, yet has been seriously neglected by historians of 
twentieth century politics.101 
The nature of the sources available partially led to this structural and organisational 
approach. The Co-operative Party collection has been recently catalogued at the 
National Co-operative Archive and in the period which this research has focused, this 
collection comprises predominantly national sources. This collection, as indicated by 
the Co-operative Party’s relative invisibility in history, has rarely been consulted. 
However the originality of this research is achieved by the combination of using both 
the Co-operative Party collection and the records of the Labour Party held at the 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre.102 In addition records relating to the 
development of the Co-operative Party in the Sheffield constituency of Hillsborough 
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provide a localised perspective.103 Sheffield has been chosen as a local example 
because during the period 1931 to 1951 it represented a Co-operative-Labour 
stronghold, with A.V. Alexander holding the Hillsborough seat from 1922-1931 and 
1935-1951. Furthermore both Sheffield and A.V. Alexander have yet to benefit from 
any detailed research in the context of Co-operative-Labour relations.104  
The Party Conference reports for both the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party 
have been systematically examined for the period 1931 to 1952. These Conference 
reports include a record of the proceedings and debates as well as annual reports 
submitted by their Executive and National Committees. The analysis of these has 
mainly been qualitative, pulling out examples where the Co-operative-Labour 
relationship was discussed and where policy differences emerged, focusing particularly 
on details about social ownership. However these sources are equally as revealing for 
what they do not discuss. The Labour Party Conference reports contain little reference 
to the Co-operative Party, reflecting as this thesis will explore, the constitutional 
limitations of their electoral alliance and this can partly begin to explain its relative 
absence in Labour Party historiography.  
The Co-operative Party conference reports provide an overview of the Party’s national 
priorities as well as an insight into what key issues affected local co-operative political 
organisations. They in many respects provide a vital lens on the intersection between 
the local and national – and the organisational and political culture of the Co-operative 
Party. However it was not until the mid 1940s that sectional reports were included in 
the conference reports, and this has again contributed to the national focus of this 
research.  
As this thesis will explore in detail, Co-operative Party Conference reports only provide 
part of the picture, as conference had no authoritative power and decisions made at 
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Conferences were finally determined by Co-operative Congress. Therefore, this 
research has supplemented Co-operative Party Conference reports with a broader 
examination of the Co-operative Union collection, including not only Co-operative 
Congress Reports but also the minutes of the other departments of the Co-operative 
Union, particularly those of the Joint Parliamentary Committee and National 
Co-operative Authority.105 These minutes also include the minutes of the meetings of 
the National and Executive Committees of the Co-operative Party, which were 
predominantly concerned with grants, candidates, elections, staffing and arrangements 
in localities.106 Crucially it was via these meetings that the national finances of the Party 
were administered and where local level agreements with the Labour Party were 
negotiated and they are invaluable for assessing the organisation of the Party both 
nationally and locally, although they provide very little information in terms of the wider 
policy of the Party. Occasionally reference is made to ‘an interesting discussion’ on 
policy or the relationship with the Labour Party but frustratingly for the researcher the 
content of the discussion is left out.  
Perhaps the most crucial source in analysing relationship between the Co-operative 
Party and the Labour Party are the minutes of the Joint Committee of the Labour Party 
and the Co-operative Party, comprising members of both their Executive 
Committees.107 The records of this committee are available for the period 1925 to 1939 
and form part of the Labour Party Archive, yet have rarely been explored by historians 
of the labour or co-operative movement. In addition to minutes of meetings these 
records contain important memos and copies of correspondence from both the Labour 
Party and Co-operative Party discussing in detail aspects of both organisation and 
policy of their relationship that is not available in other records. These minutes 
contribute significantly to the original research undertaken in this thesis, providing a 
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previously unexplored perspective on the national priorities and concerns which 
dominated the relationship. There is also a limited amount of evidence on the Labour 
Party’s relationship with the Co-operative Party, particularly from the 1940s, to be 
found in the papers of J. Middleton, who was the General Secretary of the Labour 
Party.108 As Secretary of the Labour Party, Middleton played an important role in 
negotiations between the two Parties regarding the 1946 Agreement and this is 
reflected in the correspondence in his collection. Another source of information that has 
been consulted are the records of the Labour Party Research Department which 
include policy making information. These have been examined particularly in the 1945 
to 1951 period to assess the extent to which co-operative ideas were discussed.109 In 
1941 the co-operative movement joined the National Council of Labour, a body 
comprising the Trades Union Council (TUC) and the Labour Party which discussed 
policy issues affecting the wider labour movement. Therefore the minutes of the 
National Council of Labour have also been examined from 1939 to 1951 to assess the 
contribution made by the co-operative movement.110  
When combined the official national records of both the Labour Party and the 
Co-operative Party provide a balanced view on the alliance. In addition, a number of 
archive collections relating to the Co-operative Party in Sheffield have been consulted 
to provide a local perspective on aspects of the national relationship. The development 
of the Sheffield Co-operative Party has previously not been considered in any great 
detail by historians and neither have two key personalities closely associated in this 
period – A.V. Alexander and Albert Ballard. This is surprising given A. V. Alexander’s 
prominent position in both the co-operative movement and Labour Party. The Sheffield 
Co-operative Party collection is available at Sheffield Archives and contains the original 
minute books of the Party from its conception in 1918.111 Furthermore the records 
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provide local responses to national membership campaigns and also the relationship 
between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party in a constituency which had a 
Co-operative-Labour MP for the majority of the period 1931 to 1951. In addition the 
personal papers of Albert Ballard, Sheffield Co-operative Party Organiser and later 
Chair of the Co-operative Party have been consulted, also available at Sheffield 
Archives.112 His papers provide a valuable insight into the political and personal life of a 
grass roots activist who was instrumental in organising at a local level whilst 
contributing to the national direction of the Party. Equally the papers of A.V. Alexander, 
Co-operative MP for Sheffield Hillsborough have been examined as these provided an 
opportunity to explore the unique and contradictory position held by Co-operative-
Labour MPs.113  
Another significant part of the Co-operative Party collection utilised throughout this 
research are the pamphlets and periodicals published by the Party which discuss 
policy, organisation, the activity of Co-operative MPs and a wide range of other 
contemporary issues.114 The policy pamphlets in particular represent the outward 
manifestation of the Party’s political agenda, their purpose being to engage the active 
membership and possibly attract new members. Pamphlets published by the Party 
were also concerned to a large extent with the nature of co-operative involvement in 
politics, justifying and legitimising the purpose of the Party.115 The Monthly Letter 
published by the National Committee of the Co-operative Party from March 1944 has 
also been consulted. The contents of the Monthly Letter were a mix of opinion and 
news pieces intended to inform local party organisation and membership. The 
Co-operative News has been consulted where appropriate as have other co-operative 
publications including The Co-operative Review a monthly magazine published by the 
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Co-operative Union. These provide a range of contemporary views on the Party, its 
policies and relationship with the Labour Party. 
By drawing on this wide and varied combination of sources, many of which have not 
previously been examined in any great detail, this thesis will provide a new and original 
analysis to the history of the Co-operative Party, both as a political Party in its own right 
and in regard to its unique relationship with the Labour Party.  
Chapter Framework 
This section outlines the content and focus of each chapter and the key questions 
raised in the context of the wider research framework. Chapter one focuses on the 
organisation and structure of the Co-operative Party to situate it within the wider 
political historiography of the twentieth century. It will provide an analysis of its 
structural and organisational aspects, with particular reference to its symbiotic 
relationship with the Co-operative Union. This chapter is a response to the absence 
and misunderstanding of the Co-operative Party in existing literature, demonstrating 
how it represented in its own right a working class political organisation. In this chapter 
an analytical framework of the structures and organisation of the Party will be 
developed, from which the political relationship between the Co-operative Party and the 
Labour Party will be explored. Key questions will be posited such as what was the 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Co-operative Union, and 
moreover what were the implications of this on the development of the Co-operative 
Party. This chapter will highlight the contested nature of co-operative involvement in 
formal party politics and examine the changing role and function of Party within the 
wider political functions of the co-operative movement.  
Chapter Two will examine the national structure of the relationship between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, the organisational details of which have not 
been examined previously. Drawing on the rarely used Joint Committee Minutes of the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party this chapter will examine the organisational 
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tensions arising in this relationship particularly during the 1930s to illustrate how these 
reflected a greater divide over ideology and policy than has previously been 
acknowledged. A key question addressed throughout this chapter is why the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party maintained an electoral alliance, and how the 
nature of this alliance changed over time, reflecting the changing priorities of both 
Parties. This chapter will consider the reasons why the Co-operative Party did not 
affiliate nationally to the Labour Party and explore how the resulting alliance created a 
unique situation in the history of the Labour Party.  
Chapter three will focus on policy development of the Co-operative Party, particularly 
during the 1930s and the Second World War. This chapter represents a shift in focus 
from organisation to policy, addressing some of the conclusions regarding organisation 
in an examination of the policy development of the Co-operative Party. What this 
chapter will consider is the extent to which the Co-operative Party developed a distinct 
political policy during the 1930s but moreover how organisational peculiarities and 
constitutional limitations affected policy development. In addition this chapter will 
examine the broader challenges that affected the policy development of the 
Co-operative Party during this period, including the external threats faced by the 
co-operative movement and the extent to which the Co-operative Party needed to 
focus on defending, as opposed to promoting co-operative interests. In doing so this 
chapter will conclude that the marginalisation of co-operative ideas in the post war 
period had its roots in this crucial period of Labour Party policy development. 
The fourth chapter will focus on the policy interactions between the Co-operative Party 
and the Labour Party in the period 1945 to 1951. It will examine how the 
marginalisation of co-operative ideas in the Labour Party’s programme of 1945 was a 
combination of several factors, as illustrated throughout the previous three chapters. 
This chapter will assess in greater detail than has been previously considered the 
co-operative contribution to the debates which surfaced from about 1948 regarding the 
future of the Labour Party’s nationalisation policies, particularly as the policies 
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proposed by the Labour Party for a second term, notably the nationalisation of 
Industrial Assurance, began to impinge directly on the business of the co-operative 
movement. This chapter will argue that the political voice of the Co-operative Party in 
this period was stronger than before as they had to think more clearly about the role of 
the co-operative movement in a socialist society, although concluding that their 
influence remained marginal due to the organisational structure of their relationship 
with the Labour Party. Moreover this chapter will explore the changing dynamic 
between the Co-operative Party, the co-operative movement and the Labour Party 
during this period and indicate how this affected the policy of the Co-operative Party. 
Finally this chapter will consider what the tensions in policy which emerged in this 
period reveal about the relationship more generally – in particular emphasising that 
they encapsulated the reason why the co-operative movement did not affiliate 
nationally to the Labour Party and therefore remained only a peripheral influence.  
Summary 
Overall this thesis will provide an original interpretation of the organisational and policy 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, focusing on the 
period 1931 to 1951. Given the current contested position of the Co-operative Party 
following a difficult year for the Co-operative Group in 2013, this analysis of the history 
of the Co-operative Party and its relationship with the Labour Party is timely.116 As the 
literature review has indicated the existing literature addressing both the Co-operative 
Party and the political relationship between the co-operative movement and the Labour 
Party is fragmented. Historians have acknowledged that ideological and organisational 
tensions existed between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement but the 
analysis focuses on the marginalisation of the co-operative movement – and not the 
complicated and changing nature of the political relationship between the Co-operative 
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Party, Labour Party and co-operative movement. By grounding this research in the 
Co-operative Party and using previously unexplored archive material, this thesis will 
provide an additional perspective to the myriad of influences upon both Labour Party 
organisation and policy. Ultimately it will question why, despite a political relationship 
with the Co-operative Party, did Labour Party policy, particularly in the period 1931 to 
1951, not embrace co-operative methods of ownership. Previous interpretations have 
suggested that there was an indifference to co-operative ideas from the Labour Party 
which led to the political isolation of the co-operative movement. However this thesis 
will illustrate that the reasons for this marginalisation are complex and multifaceted, 
reflecting both organisational tensions and ideological differences. 
Stewart has argued that the Co-operative Party acted as the 'broker' between the 
co-operative movement and Labour Party, a hypothesis that this research will 
challenge by considering the structure, function and purpose of the Co-operative Party 
in the context of its relationships with both the co-operative movement and the Labour 
Party.117 This thesis will argue that on one level the Co-operative Party provided a 
democratic route for the co-operative movement to enter formal politics, and therefore 
broker a relationship in Parliament with the Labour Party to protect co-operative 
business interests. However it will demonstrate that the continued exertion of control by 
the co-operative movement over the Co-operative Party limited the extent to which it 
could act as a broker, as crucial discussions regarding political organisation and policy 
bypassed the party and took place directly between the Labour Party and the 
co-operative movement. Moreover this control from the Co-operative Union in effect 
limited the potential development of a distinct co-operative political programme, as 
during the period 1931 to 1951 the focus of the Co-operative Union was protecting 
co-operative business interests and it did not engage more widely in ideological 
discussions about the role of co-operatives in the restructuring of society.  
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Nevertheless what this thesis will argue is that the reason why the Co-operative Party 
continued to function as an independent political party, unaffiliated nationally from the 
Labour Party did reflect a significant ideological divide between the co-operative 
movement and the Labour Party over methods of collective ownership. It will illustrate 
how the underlying ideological differences in emphasis between voluntary co-operation 
and state socialism underpinned the unique nature of the organisational relationship 
between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party. Crucially this thesis posits that 
the ideological and policy tensions which emerged between the Co-operative Party and 
the Labour Party in the post war period reflected one aspect of a deeper divide within 
the labour movement regarding the best route to a ‘socialist commonwealth’. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CO-OPERATIVE PARTY: THE POLITICAL 
EXPRESSION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT?  
‘The support of the Party by the Co-operative Union ensures that the Party shall be 
regarded not as a political faction but as the political expression of the Co-operative 
Movement’.118 
Until 2005 the Co-operative Party was constituted as a department of the Co-operative 
Union. As the above quote suggests the Co-operative Union’s control over the 
Co-operative Party was necessary to ensure that the Co-operative Party was the 
‘political expression’ of the co-operative movement. This chapter will analyse the 
relationship between the Co-operative Party, the Co-operative Union and the wider 
co-operative movement, examining the implications this symbiotic relationship had on 
both the organisational and policy development of the Co-operative Party.  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: firstly it will provide a crucial context for an 
examination of the Co-operative Party’s relationship with the Labour Party which will 
form the basis of this thesis. One reason for the oversight or misunderstanding of the 
Co-operative Party within wider Labour Party historiography can be attributed to a lack 
of understanding as to the role, purpose and function of the Co-operative Party within 
the wider co-operative movement. The ambiguous organisational relationship between 
the Co-operative Party, the Co-operative Union and the wider co-operative movement 
has been overshadowed in studies which address the policy divide between the 
co-operative movement and the Labour Party in the post war years.119 Manton’s 
assessment of Labour and Co-operative political relations makes generalised 
references to the ‘co-op’ and does not fully acknowledge the different functions held by 
the Co-operative Party, other departments of the Co-operative Union, individual 
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distributive societies and wholesale societies.120 Furthermore previous studies 
acknowledge that the Co-operative Party’s need for political autonomy significantly 
determines their attitude towards affiliation to the Labour Party, yet what this autonomy 
actually means in practice is rarely considered.121 
 By exploring aspects of the symbiotic relationship between the Co-operative Party and 
the Co-operative Union this chapter will provide a new and deeper understanding of the 
organisational and structural background of the Co-operative Party. This will underpin 
the subsequent chapters that focus on the organisational and ideological relationship 
with the Labour Party. This chapter will show how the Co-operative Party was shaped 
by the unique political culture of the wider co-operative movement, which was divided 
in terms of theory, ideology and practice. 
Secondly, this chapter will provide a detailed explanation of the organisation of the 
Co-operative Party in the period 1931 to 1951. Recent studies addressing the 
Co-operative Party have tended to focus on the political alliance with the Labour Party, 
due to the bearing this relationship had on the development of the Labour Party.122 Yet 
this obscures the fact that the Co-operative Party was a separate functioning political 
organisation, with a vast affiliated membership and autonomous finances. A 
consideration of the Co-operative Party is, as outlined in the introductory chapter, often 
absent from wider accounts of politics in the twentieth century. Yet it is not an 
insignificant political organisation – in 1951 it represented an economic and social 
movement of almost 11 million members.123 This chapter will focus on the Co-operative 
Party in its own right – as a political party and an organisation within the larger umbrella 
of the labour movement. It will unpack the complex organisational structure and the 
intertwined relationship between the Co-operative Union, individual co-operative 
societies, their members and the Co-operative Party. In doing so this chapter will 
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illustrate how the Co-operative Party can contribute to wider debates regarding political 
participation, party identity and organisation in this period. 
To achieve these research aims this chapter will firstly examine the implications of the 
symbiotic link between the Co-operative Union and the Co-operative Party on the 
functioning and development of the Co-operative Party. What was the role and function 
of the Co-operative Party within the wider co-operative movement and how was the 
Party constituted? Secondly it will consider how tensions within the co-operative 
movement regarding political activity determined the development of the Co-operative 
Party. Did a combination of apathy and opposition to co-operative political involvement 
from within the Co-operative Union limit the potential strength and spread of the 
Co-operative Party? Thirdly, it will explore how the disparate geographical and 
chronological development of the co-operative movement affected the grass roots 
development of the Co-operative Party. Recent literature addressing the Labour Party 
has illustrated how existing political cultures, including the co-operative movement 
could influence the Party’s development.124 In turn this chapter will demonstrate how 
these existing political and co-operative cultures affected the development of the 
Co-operative Party. Fourthly it will explore the implications of this relationship on the 
political functions of the Co-operative Party, with particular reference to the authority 
the Party had to make decisions on both organisational and policy issues. Finally this 
chapter will situate the Co-operative Party within the wider framework of the 
Co-operative Union. It will demonstrate that the Co-operative Party was not the only 
politically active department within the Co-operative Union and argue that this created 
an ambiguous situation in which the traditional functions of a political party were taken 
on by the other departments and committees within the Co-operative Union. In doing 
so this chapter will begin to unpack this layering of political activity within the wider 
co-operative movement and how this limited the role and function of the Co-operative 
Party. Moreover, this reinforces the need to expand the primary source base beyond 
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the records of the Co-operative Party to include those of the wider movement in order 
to fully understand the dynamics of the political alliance with the Labour Party.  
The Co-operative Union: A Brief Description  
The link between the Party and the Union is explicit in the original constitution of the 
Party, which stated that: 
‘The National Co-operative Representation Committee [later Co-operative Party 
National Committee] shall be a committee of the Co-operative Union, responsible to the 
Central Board of the Union, and through it to Congress’ and that the functions of the 
Committee were ‘subject to the instructions and veto of the Central Board and 
Congress’.125 
From the outset, the Co-operative Party had no authority of its own and was ultimately 
responsible to the Co-operative Union. To understand the implications of this on the 
role and function of the Co-operative Party a brief summary of the Co-operative Union 
is useful. The Co-operative Union was formed in 1869, to co-ordinate co-operative 
activity across Britain due to the rapidly increasing number of retail co-operative 
societies. The Union summarised its role in its centenary history as: 
‘The keeper of the Movement’s ideals and principles, the social educator, the technical 
advisor, the arbitrator, and the watch-dog. It is the all embracing central organisation 
which knits together the whole movement , provides the machinery for policy making, 
for negotiations on its members’ behalf and for communication to and from the 
movement’.126  
 
The Co-operative Union was a federal organisation of co-operative societies to which 
retail, productive and special co-operative societies could subscribe. At the end of 1931 
there were 1,316 co-operative societies in the Co-operative Union, representing a total 
membership of 6,636,369.127 Furthermore, there were 263,037 people employed by 
societies.128 Of the 1,316 co-operative societies 1,188 were retail distributive societies 
and the membership of these individual societies varied dramatically; for example in 
1931 there were 18 which had a membership of over 50,000 yet at the other end of the 
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scale there were 39 societies with less than 100 members.129 In addition to retail 
distributive societies, members of the Co-operative Union also included distributive 
federations, productive societies, special societies, wholesales and insurance services.  
Individual co-operative societies were represented within the structures of the 
Co-operative Union, through democratically elected member representation. Each 
individual society would also have a board of democratically elected members who 
would oversee the governance of that individual society. Wholesale societies, for 
example the Co-operative Wholesale Society were co-operatively owned by 
co-operative societies. The complex structure of the Co-operative Union is illustrated in 
Image 1. This diagram is taken from a 1938 pamphlet, Your Co-operative Union, 
published by the Co-operative Union which explained to members the various functions 
within the Union, the need for such a publication further reiterating the complexity of 
this federal organisation.130  
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Image 1: Diagram of organisational structure of the Co-operative Union. 
 
As this diagram illustrates, the Co-operative Union contained several departments, 
committees and associated boards to support the functioning and development of 
co-operative societies as well as specialist committees dealing with particular trades 
such as coal, meat and milk. Education was a crucial aspect of the work of the 
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Co-operative Union and one that should be highlighted at this stage. As Vernon has 
argued in his recent chapter; ‘education has long been recognised as a central pillar of 
co-operative values and activity. Providing for the social and cultural development of its 
members was an essential feature that distinguished the movement from being simply 
a retail organisation’.131 The Co-operative Party was a department within the 
Co-operative Union to which local co-operative societies, affiliated co-operative guilds 
and other national co-operative bodies such as the Co-operative Wholesale Society, 
could pay subscription fees in support of its function. Similarly local co-operative 
societies could opt to affiliate to the Co-operative Wholesale Society or the Scottish 
Co-operative Wholesale Society depending on their geographical location within the 
United Kingdom. In terms of structure, the local co-operative societies formed the basic 
unit with the Co-operative Union as the central body. A central board of the 
Co-operative Union comprised representatives from geographical sections, which were 
further broken down into districts. The sectional and district boundaries of the 
Co-operative Union changed over time. 
The benefits for co-operative societies, wholesale societies and affiliated guilds of 
membership of the Co-operative Union included access to a range of services and 
departments providing practical and technical advice and assistance. Membership of 
the Co-operative Union also provided a sense of belonging and solidarity to a greater 
movement for local co-operative societies. Co-operative Congress also helped in 
building a communal identity and was of huge significance to active co-operators. Held 
annually, Co-operative Congress was a focal event in the Co-operative Union's 
calendar. It was in effect, a co-operators’ parliament where decisions which affected 
the co-operative movement were debated and discussed through resolutions submitted 
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by all types of co-operative societies, associated guilds and individual departments.132 
Votes at Congress were allocated according to the membership of each subscribing 
society or organisation with one vote per 1,000 members.133 Yet even though members 
of co-operative societies attending Congress may have voted in favour of a particular 
resolution, the democratic member control principle of co-operation meant it was up to 
individual societies and their members whether Congress resolutions were 
implemented. Nevertheless, Birchall suggests that the Co-operative Union and 
Congress played a crucial role in shaping co-operative opinion, providing an 
authoritative ‘backbone’ for the movement in assisting societies to thrive and 
develop.134  
The Co-operative Union Divided? Apathy and Opposition to Co-operative 
Political Involvement. 
Efforts to create unity and cohesion within the Co-operative Party once founded were 
compounded by the diverse nature of the co-operative movement itself. The 
Co-operative Party was the political expression of a movement which varied 
enormously in terms of activity, business and members, both in place and over time. 
The sheer size, scale and variance of the movement in the 1930s, as evidenced above, 
was a challenge to both creating political organisation and determining the role and 
function of the Party within the movement. Furthermore, not everyone within the 
Co-operative Union supported co-operative political action. These issues have their 
roots in the origins of the Party and how and why it was set up, and this section will 
explore the effects of these factors on the development of the Co-operative Party and 
how they may have hindered the progress of co-operative politics. 
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An attempt in 1897 to form a co-operative political organisation provides a telling 
example of the discord between decisions arrived at by Congress and their actual 
implementation at society level, as well as illustrating the contested nature of 
co-operative politics within the movement. At the 1897 Congress in Perth, a resolution 
was unanimously passed in favour of direct parliamentary representation, yet a circular 
issued to all societies following Congress asking societies what they would be willing to 
support revealed both general apathy and direct opposition to this decision.135 Of the 
1,659 societies to which the circular was sent only 160 replied – 47 of which declared 
themselves against the scheme.136 Consequently no political action was taken. In a 
later analysis of this, Shea suggests that ‘the enthusiasm carried away by the 
delegates leaving Perth had been drowned in the vaster seas of the movement’.137  
One significant difference between the 1897 resolution for political representation and 
the events of 1917, when the Party was actually formed, was that the decision by 
members of the Co-operative Union to seek parliamentary representation in 1917 was 
acted on by individual co-operative societies. Following this decision, stimulated by the 
perceived harsh treatment of the co-operative movement by the war time government, 
a political fund was started in 1917 and societies within the Co-operative Union actively 
began to subscribe on a basis of ½ d per member. This financial subscription 
represented the most basic yet necessary means of supporting the Co-operative Party, 
as without this it would not have the funds to function. Indeed, as cited above, the Perth 
example illustrates how earlier attempts at direct political representation for the 
co-operative movement had been frustrated largely by lack of support from societies, 
especially financial.  
The initial success of the Co-operative Party was evidenced by society affiliation. The 
affiliation of co-operative societies to the Co-operative Party provided the national 
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organisation with a vast affiliated membership, as all members of the subscribing 
organisation became affiliated members of the Co-operative Party. Consequently by 
1920 the Co-operative Party could claim it had an affiliated membership of over 
2,750,000.138 The 1919 Congress Report reveals that between October 1917 when the 
National Co-operative Representation Committee was formed and the end of 1918, 
573 societies had subscribed to the political fund, totalling over £7,000 in 
contributions.139 This support continued and throughout the 1920s the affiliated 
membership of the Co-operative Party continued to increase. 
The year 1930 was a significant turning point for the Co-operative Party as for the first 
time its affiliated membership represented a majority of the total membership of the 
Co-operative Union. The Co-operative News reported that 1930 was a ‘record year’ for 
the Party, the Party increased their affiliated membership by nearly half a million but 
also because the Party now had a majority of support from members of the 
Co-operative Union for the first time.140 This means that in its first fourteen years of 
existence the Co-operative Party received only minority support from the movement it 
was constituted to represent. One reason for this was the extent of direct opposition to 
the Co-operative Party from within the co-operative movement itself. The formation of 
the Party in 1917 was a contentious issue and there were many co-operators who 
remained opposed to the Co-operative Party, described by Carbery as an ‘omnipresent 
shadow to the Party’.141 He identified four main strands of resistance to the Party: firstly 
those who believed the movement should be free of any political association so as to 
remain free to take appropriate political action on matters only affecting societies and 
members; secondly, those who argued that any political affiliations were bad for trade; 
thirdly, those who contended that the Party was superfluous, redundant and a luxury 
and finally, opposition from those who believed societies should follow the example of 
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the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society by affiliating directly to the Labour Party and/or 
that the Co-operative Party should concentrate exclusively on trade related matters.142  
The damaging effects of this opposition within the co-operative movement on the 
development of the Co-operative Party was highlighted in a publication by the Party in 
1931 which stated that ‘that the Party had been faced with more opposition from within 
the movement than outside in its first ten years’.143 This pamphlet argued that this 
weakened relations with the Labour Party and resulted in the Party being ignored by 
the other political parties, the press and the public. It concluded that ‘if the Co-operative 
movement belittles its own Party, it cannot expect it to command the respect of non-
co-operative opinion’.144 Thus the issue of co-operative involvement in party politics 
was a divisive issue within the movement and remained contentious, especially as the 
Co-operative Party’s links with the Labour Party developed.  
Within the movement, there was also a strong element of apathy towards the Party, 
and involvement in politics more generally which limited the level of active support for 
the Party. At the Party's second conference in 1925, the secretary of the Party, Sam 
Perry, presented a paper on organisation in which he outlined 'difficulties within the 
movement' as a challenge.145 Perry blamed so called 'memory disease' for the 
indifference to the Party, claiming that co-operators had forgotten about the harsh 
treatment received by the movement during the war and consequently the initial rush of 
society subscription had waned.146  
Significantly, the next major surge in society affiliation was in 1933 and 1934 in 
response to the National Government’s decision to apply income tax to co-operative 
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profits. This hostile action from the National Government united the co-operative 
movement in opposition to this anti-co-operative legislation.147 The Report of the 
National Committee of the Co-operative Party in 1933 had suggested that society 
affiliation was declining in 1932, stating that the depression had compelled some 
societies to temporarily suspend their contributions to the Co-operative Party.148 
However, the effects of the depression did not prevent a massive surge in support after 
the Budget of April 1933 deemed co-operative profits liable for income tax. Society 
affiliation rose from 424 in 1932 to 462 by the end of 1933.149 It was widely 
acknowledged at the time that it was the tax issue which had bolstered the strength of 
the Party, with Barnes reporting at the 1933 Co-operative Congress that in the few 
weeks since the budget eleven new societies had joined the Party, adding that 'no 
speech of mine has ever had that effect'.150 On a similar note, Barnes noted in his 
Chairman's address to the 1935 Co-operative Party Conference how both Mr Neville 
Chamberlain and Mr Walter Elliot had been successful organisers for the Party.151  
The taxing of co-operative profits was an issue which united almost the entire 
co-operative movement against an increasingly hostile National Government, drawing 
parallels with the experience of the movement during the First World War.152 The tax 
incident was, as Bailey reflected fifteen years later, a stark reminder to co-operators 
that the future expansion of the movement was being affected by Government 
legislation, thus confirming that the interests of the movement could only be 
safeguarded by adequate representation in parliament and on local authorities.153 The 
increase in support for the Party in response to the 1933 budget demonstrates how 
co-operators were motivated into political action when the underlying principles and 
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business interests of the movement were threatened, but also reinforces the notion that 
there was a level of apathy towards political involvement when the movement was not 
feeling threatened. This illustrates the ongoing tensions within the co-operative 
movement as to the extent to which they should be involved in political activity – and 
moreover to what extent societies should support the aims and methods of the 
Co-operative Party. 
Changing Patterns of Support for the Co-operative Party. 
This section will demonstrate how the development of the Co-operative Party was 
affected by geographical and chronological variants in the expansion of the 
co-operative movement. Worley has emphasised how the development of the Labour 
Party locally was determined by existing political cultures, and that the co-operative 
societies were one contributing factor to these cultures.154 The research undertaken in 
this section will strengthen this argument, but by adopting a similar approach to 
Robertson will illustrate how existing local political cultures affected the development of 
the Co-operative Party as an organisation.155  
Purvis has demonstrated how in the nineteenth century co-operation flourished in 
traditional strongholds such as Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland yet 
in other areas, such as London, it failed to make an impact.156 However the success of 
the movement was also fluid over time and as Purvis illustrated, by the 1930s this 
situation had changed and although national co-operative statistics illustrated an 
increase in both trade and membership this was not a consistent picture across the 
movement.157 His research shows that the traditional strongholds of co-operation were 
now stagnating, suffering in the wake of economic downturn, the increased role of the 
state replacing that of the co-operative society, and with no further influxes of 
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population to build membership. Juxtaposed to this, he argues that co-operation in 
London for example was enjoying huge successes in membership and trade, as it had 
managed to establish itself in new areas.158 
Table 1: Sectional differences in society subscription to the Co-operative Party, 
1931.159 
Section Membership 
total of 
co-operative 
societies 
Membership total of 
co-operative 
societies 
subscribing to the 
Co-operative Party 
Representative 
percentage of 
membership 
subscribing to the 
Co-operative Party 
Midland 937,430 601,052 64 
Northern 581,446 173,459 30 
North-Eastern 883,608 354,908 40 
North-Western 1,336,606 559,231 42 
Scottish 759,432 339,808 45 
Southern 1,406,341 1,270,623 90 
South Western 286,780 120,761 42 
Western 200,491 102,724 51 
Great Britain 6,392,134 3,522,566 55 
 
Table 1 (above) is a compilation of the statistics available in the National Committee for 
the Co-operative Party’s annual report from 1931. The purpose of this table is to 
illustrate the striking contrast between geographical sections of the Co-operative Union 
in their support for the Co-operative Party. In total it illustrates that 55% of the 
Co-operative Union membership was affiliated to the Co-operative Party, illustrating 
again the rising support within the movement after 1930. Yet although the Co-operative 
Party could claim that they had support from a majority of the Co-operative Union as a 
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whole, this table indicates significant geographical variations in support. What also 
needs to be noted is that the names of these sections did not always represent the 
area they suggest. For example Wales was not a distinct section and was divided into 
three sections, with South Wales incorporated into the South Western section and 
North Wales into the North Western Section. Equally, the North Eastern section did not 
embody, as one would expect the north east of England, as this was known as the 
Northern section. It was the Northern section, including Newcastle-upon-Tyne and 
other large industrial towns such as Sunderland, Hartlepool and Middlesbrough with 
strong co-operative traditions, which had the least support for co-operative political 
action in 1931. At the other end of the spectrum, the Southern Section, representing 
London and the south east of England, had the largest affiliated membership 
suggesting that in this area support for political activity was strong.  
This divergence of support for the Party across the different sections was noted at the 
1933 Party Conference in which a remarkable increase in the affiliation of societies in 
the Southern Section was reported in stark comparison to the Northern, North Eastern 
and North Western sections.160 The report of the National Committee of the Party 
suggested that as the trade union and labour movements were strongest in these 
regions, the feeling was that there was no need for a Co-operative Party, as the Labour 
Party would adequately safeguard the interests of the co-operative movement.161 
Similarly in South Wales, over a decade later, it was reported that local co-operative 
societies tended to make contributions direct to local Labour organisation and 
consequently did not affiliate to the Co-operative Party.162 Thus, although these 
sections represented traditional strongholds of co-operation, the existing political 
landscape of these communities affected the development of the Co-operative Party 
here. These communities were also traditional Labour Party strongholds and the 
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politics of these areas was dominated by the miners’ union meaning that the 
co-operative candidates would have had little success.163 
In 1934, Barnes made a direct appeal at Congress to societies in Lancashire, 
Yorkshire, Durham and Northumberland the 'four counties which represent the 
historical beginnings of co-operation' stating that if the Party was to be politically 
effective they needed the full power of the movement behind them.164 It was important 
to the Co-operative Party that they gained some representation in these areas – as 
they represented safe Labour seats and consequently an opportunity for the 
Co-operative Party to gain a greater foothold in Parliament. The 1936 Co-operative 
Congress held in Newcastle-upon-Tyne presented another opportunity for Barnes to 
reiterate his appeal. He pointed out that none of the nine Co-operative Party 
representatives in the House of Commons came from the north east coast.165 This 
appeal was seconded by Mr George Riddle, Director of CWS and President of the 
Congress, who asked local societies 'to remove the stigma the Chairman has referred 
to, so that before we have another Congress on the North East Coast every 
co-operative society will be part of the Co-operative Party'.166 
This lack of support for the Co-operative Party in the traditional strongholds of 
co-operation compared to new areas of co-operative expansion reinforces Purvis’ 
findings. He suggested that the areas enjoying co-operative business success in the 
1930s were also the most politically conscious co-operative societies, particularly in 
contrast to established co-operative strongholds where existing local political conditions 
stood firm.167 In stating that there was ‘conclusive proof that the political and business 
progress of societies march vigorously and confidently ahead towards the Co-operative 
Commonwealth’, Barnes was indeed using statistics from the Southern Section to show 
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a correlation between those with member and trade increases and affiliation to the 
Party.168 This would not have been the case in areas such as Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
What this section has confirmed is that support for the Co-operative Party was uneven 
geographically and was affected by wider trends in the co-operative movement and the 
existing co-operative and political culture of an area. Nevertheless, the affiliation to the 
Co-operative Party from societies in the Co-operative Union was an upward trend and 
despite these geographical differences, by 1951 just over nine million of the 
co-operative movement’s almost eleven million members were affiliated through their 
societies to the Party.169 
Grass Roots Organisation and Participation in the Co-operative Party. 
The main challenge for the Co-operative Party during the 1920s had been to increase 
support in terms of society affiliation to strengthen the Party’s position within the 
Co-operative Union. As indicated earlier in this chapter, opposition or apathy from 
within the movement to the Party hampered the progress of the Party. A theme, 
therefore, of much of the early Party literature was to justify both the need for and 
legitimacy of the co-operative political organisation.170 However, by the 1930s, the 
Party had majority support from within the movement and consequently establishing, 
developing and consolidating local organisation became of paramount importance. This 
was illustrated by a resolution at the 1930 Party Conference which stated; ‘that this 
conference realising that the National Party cannot give adequate expression to the 
political aspirations of the movement until effective machinery is created in the area of 
each society, urges the Party to intensify its activities towards this end’.171 Yet how did 
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the disparate nature of the co-operative movement and support for the Co-operative 
Party affect the grass roots development of political organisation? 
Once a co-operative society affiliated to the national Co-operative Party, it was then up 
to them to form a local Co-operative Party, or political council as they were often known 
in the early history of the Party. The 1925 Co-operative Party Conference had identified 
local organisation as vital in connecting the national and local, providing a 'medium’ to 
educate the members in the duties and responsibilities of co-operative citizenship, to 
organise their votes for representative purposes and political communication with 
National Committee.172 Without local political organisation the Party would not have 
been able to achieve its primary objective of gaining local and national representation. 
On the other hand, co-operative political participation proved a divisive issue and 
support was geographically disparate, hence creating cohesive, effective and 
nationwide organisation proved challenging.  
Despite these challenges, reports from the National Committee of the Co-operative 
Party throughout the 1930s indicate significant progress with local organisation. At 
Co-operative Congress in 1932, the National Committee recorded their appreciation of 
the development of district and local organisations noting an encouraging increase in 
both the number of local Co-operative Parties and District Federations.173 The unit of 
local organisation for the Co-operative Party was the local society, which would form a 
Society Co-operative Party.174 The main objectives of Society Parties were to seek 
direct co-operative representation both locally and nationally and carry out local 
propaganda and education to further policies as approved by Congress.175 In addition 
to local Co-operative Parties, federations would be established to co-ordinate the work 
in the various districts of the Co-operative Union. In 1934 it was reported that 141 local 
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Co-operative Parties were definitely established and in some cases, for example 
London there were a further 70 divisional parties.176 The National Committee of the 
Co-operative Party continued to press the necessity of establishing local organisations, 
advising that they be called Co-operative Parties instead of political councils, possibly 
to create a cohesive uniform identity across the different localities and encourage 
individual membership of the 'party'.177  
Although on one hand Perry in 1925 stated that the strength of the Party was the 
presence of the movement across the country he further acknowledged that the Party 
also had to work ‘in unison with machinery not quite suitable for political warfare’.178 
Although the relationship between local Co-operative Parties and local Labour Parties 
has been deliberately omitted from this chapter as this will form the focus for the next 
chapter, it seems apt to point out at this juncture that a grass roots working relationship 
with a Labour Party was vital in the successful nomination of both local and national 
co-operative candidates. In terms of parliamentary candidates, the Labour Party had 
been organised on a constituency basis from 1918, unlike the Co-operative Party, 
which despite having the strength of existing co-operative societies and membership 
structures to draw upon, was not neatly organised into parliamentary constituencies. A 
Report on the Constitution of the National Committee of the Party in 1935 described 
how one society operating over an area including several Parliamentary constituencies 
or several societies operating in one constituency makes it 'virtually impossible to avoid 
some degree of duplication and overlapping' in the organisation of the Co-operative 
Party. It stated how 'the problem would have been simplified if the Co-operative Party 
could have been organised on a constituency basis’.179 The sporadic development of 
local Co-operative Party organisation would however have made this a virtual 
impossibility, and as one early historian of the movement observed the difficulties 
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presented by Parliamentary constituencies not being coincident with retail societies’ 
boundaries combined with some societies within a constituency being affiliated and 
some not, 'necessitated a flexible and complicated organisation’.180 As Ostergaard and 
Smith highlighted in their report in 1960 it was this complexity in local structure which 
generated problems in the Party’s relationship with the Labour Party.181  
To eradicate the problem of constituency boundaries, the Co-operative Party also 
encouraged the formation of Constituency Co-operative Parties which acted as an 
umbrella for all society parties and auxiliary organisations within a given constituency. 
Individual members could also join a Constituency Party providing it with much needed 
finance. The role of the constituency party was to provide the machinery needed to 
promote candidates for election and it was often the Constituency Party where 
agreements which negotiated agreements with local Labour Parties were made. 
Voluntary Co-operative Parties could also be formed in areas where the local society 
did not subscribe to the Co-operative Party to provide the opportunity for co-operators 
to participate in politics. Although they were unable to participate in the selection of 
candidates, voluntary Co-operative Parties fulfilled a significant propaganda role in the 
absence of local society support for co-operative political action. They were also crucial 
in persuading members of non subscribing societies to affiliate to the Co-operative 
Party and represented grass roots participation in co-operative politics. 
The success of the Co-operative Party, in terms of society affiliation and local 
organisation, was a key topic of discussion at Co-operative Party conferences 
throughout the 1930s, as a detailed reading of the printed conference proceedings 
reveals. At the 1935 Co-operative Congress, for example, a delegate from Penicuik 
questioned why the members of his society should affiliate to the Co-operative Party 
when, despite the overall strength of the co-operative movement in terms of trade and 
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membership, there were only 19 candidates for the forthcoming General Election.182 In 
response, Barnes outlined how 'the question of the number of candidates has nothing 
to do with the Party, nor the executive of the Party but rests entirely with local 
co-operative societies'. Furthermore Barnes added that;  
'We have large and important cities such as Cardiff, Liverpool, Newcastle, Leeds, 
Edinburgh ... powerful societies with tens of thousands of co-operative members in 
their ranks, and yet those societies are not doing their job. They have not been able to 
create sufficient political influence in their localities to promote Co-operative 
candidates'.183 
 
Barnes’ message could not be clearer – he was asserting that the success of the 
Co-operative Party in terms of political representation was determined not only by 
support from local societies but also the strength of local organisation and 
consequently the obligation was on each local society to both subscribe to the Party 
and build up grass roots organisation. A similar criticism was presented at the 1937 
Co-operative Congress by Mr McLaine of the London Society who claimed that 'the 
Party has failed to capture the imagination of the movement' stating that its 
performance in view of the size of the movement it represented was poor.184 McLaine 
added that although society affiliation may provide the grand affiliated membership 
figures, this in effect would make Lord Beaverbrook a 'supporter' of co-operative 
politics as he was a member of the London Co-operative Society.185 Responding to 
this, Mr D Morgan from Nottingham suggested that the ineffectiveness of the 
Co-operative Party came from within the movement as 'of the 516 societies affiliating 
only something like 156 have taken the trouble to form local Co-operative Parties' 
asking 'how can the movement expect to influence political thought if it cannot do better 
than that?186 In the same debate Barnes stated that there was a 'weakness in 
democracy' which ran right through the co-operative movement and there were many, 
not only in the rank and file, but in the boards of management who had not yet 
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appreciated the impact of the post war conditions facing the co-operative movement 
and consequently had not realised the need for co-operative political representation.187  
The emphasis on the establishment of effective Co-operative Parties as an important 
part of the Party’s machinery was still evident in 1937 when it was stated ‘if elections 
are to be won, success can only be achieved by the efficiency of the machinery, with 
which to bring the years of education and propaganda to completion’.188 These debates 
highlight the tensions within the Co-operative Party regarding both society affiliation 
and grass roots organisation and illustrate the contested nature of co-operative politics 
even within the Party. Party members looked to the national Party to broaden the reach 
of the Party, whilst the national Party emphasised that it was up to local co-operative 
societies and their members to actively engage in co-operative politics – ironic perhaps 
given the supposedly ‘bottom-up’ nature of the co-operative movement. 
A further consideration for the Co-operative Party was the question of individual 
membership. Affiliated membership provided the national Party with a large affiliated 
membership base and finance, however, individual membership was desired to 
strengthen grass roots participation and local finances. The need for individual 
membership was recognised at the Party's second conference in 1925, where in his 
Chairman's address Barnes described how individual membership was the basis of 
political organisation stating that 'in politics the centre gains its power from the 
circumference, not the circumference from the centre'.189 In contrast the Labour Party 
had realised the power of harnessing individual membership in 1918 by creating 
Constituency Labour Parties. Yet the Co-operative Party organisation was not as 
sophisticated as the Labour Party’s and by 1930 it was reported that many people were 
not aware that they could join the Party as individuals.190 This arguably fuelled a drive 
to increase local organisation and subsequently individual membership as well.191 In 
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the autumn of 1932 the Party led a National Campaign, seeking to expose the record of 
national Government, demonstrate co-operative constructive policy and moreover 
increase individual membership.192 This campaign 'exceeded expectations' resulting in 
both an increase in members and demand for pamphlets and literature, with one Party 
enrolling over 500 new members.193 The national reports of the Co-operative Party in 
this period do not contain accurate figures regarding individual membership, however, 
some indication can be gauged by the fact that in 1937, 20,000 individual membership 
cards were purchased by local Co-operative Parties.194  
There was a strong localised dynamic to the success of the Co-operative Party 
determined by the creation of local Party organisation which in turn provided an avenue 
for individual membership. Moreover where local co-operative political organisation did 
develop, there was evidence of a lively and active co-operative political culture. For 
example the National Committee reported in 1934; 
‘The activities of local parties are many and varied. The opening of Co-operative 
Institutes as centres of political and social intercourse, organisation of political schools, 
debating societies, canvassing classes, public speaking courses, and numerous 
propaganda and educational meetings find outlets for the activities of Co-operators.’195  
 
As a consequence of the increasing significance of local Co-operative Party 
organisation, the Co-operative Party constitution was amended in 1938 and gave 
increased recognition to local Society Parties allocating them eight seats on the 
National Committee of the Party.196 Prior to 1938 the National Committee of the 
Co-operative Party was made up of eight members of the Central Board, eight 
members of societies contributing elected representatives on a sectional basis, one 
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from the Executive Committee of the Co-operative Union, two from the CWS, one from 
the SCWS, one from the Co-operative Productive Federation, one from the Women’s 
Co-operative Guild, one from the Scottish Co-operative Women’s Guild, one from the 
National Men’s Guild and two from the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the 
Co-operative Union. In 1938 this was changed to include representatives from local 
party organisation, again with eight representatives elected on a sectional basis.197 In a 
pamphlet outlining the organisation of the Party, the National Committee is described 
as the Co-operative Party’s board of management, in that its role was administrative 
and functional.198 Three representatives of this Committee would attend Congress 
annually to present their Annual Report.199 In absence of a Party leader the nominated 
Chairman of the National Committee acted also in many respects as a leader, for 
example Barnes. 
Carbery suggested that the weakness of Co-operative Party organisation was not at 
national level but at local level.200 However this was an unduly harsh critique which 
undermines the successes of local organisation, particularly where the hard work and 
dedication of grass roots activists translated into both the successful election of 
Co-operative MPs and local representation. Perry stated that in considering the political 
organisation of the Party they could not disregard the movement which they were part 
of, however, these existing structures did not always translate into active political 
support and even created organisational problems.201 Both locally and nationally, the 
organisational structures of the Co-operative Party reflected varied levels of society 
affiliation and grass roots participation, local dominant political cultures and incongruent 
constituency boundaries. The main weakness the Co-operative Party faced from the 
outset was a lack of universal support for the Party from within the movement it 
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represented. The democratic participatory nature of co-operation meant supporting the 
Co-operative Party was purely optional. However, a mixture of apathy and opposition to 
co-operative involvement in politics, combined with the geographically diverse nature of 
co-operation itself presented various organisational problems in the development of the 
Co-operative Party.  
A Political Party without Authority? 
A 1944 pamphlet on the organisation of the Co-operative Party outlined how the 
Co-operative Union exercised control over it. Firstly the Union had direct representation 
on the National Committee of the Party, secondly the Party was subject to the guidance 
of the Union Executive Committee and Central Board and thirdly the Party was 
answerable to Congress.202 Consequently what will be detailed here is how the 
authority of the Co-operative Party over both its organisation and policy making was 
limited. Decisions could be made within the Co-operative Party, but these decisions 
were ultimately determined by the Co-operative Union. In essence what this meant was 
that co-operators and co-operative societies actively opposed or indifferent to the 
Co-operative Party were able to influence the direction and culture of the Party. This 
paradox was outlined in Smith and Ostergaard’s study in which they stated ‘the Party’s 
responsibility to Congress represents responsibility to a body composed of delegates 
with varied views on political action, including in some cases outright opposition to the 
idea of a Co-operative Party’.203  
What implications did this level of control have on the development of the Party 
nationally? If the Co-operative Party were limited in the extent to which they could 
influence their own policy then how could they be expected to influence Labour Party 
policy? Could this explain why co-operative ideas of ownership were marginalised by 
the Labour Party? Furthermore what was the rationale for the Party being under the 
direction of the Co-operative Union? These questions will be returned to throughout 
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this thesis and this next section will begin to outline some of the contradictions posed 
by the layering of political activity within the co-operative movement. 
The role of the National Committee of the Co-operative Party was largely administrative 
and functional, and a detailed survey of the minutes illustrates this as they were 
predominantly concerned with finance, candidates, local agreements and staffing.204 
From the National Committee, eight members were elected to the Executive 
Committee, one of which was voted in as Chairman. The National Committee of the 
Co-operative Party until 1951 had no ‘acid test’ of membership – meaning that its 
members did not have to declare any allegiance to the aims of the Co-operative Party. 
Furthermore as previously outlined every section of the co-operative movement was 
represented on this committee and it was only in 1938 that the constitution of it was 
changed to allow for representatives from local Co-operative Party organisation. In 
1925 Perry explained that this was because 'one has to recognise that membership of 
the co-operative movement, whether rightly understood or not, means an acceptance 
of the principle that co-operative collective effort must be substituted for private 
enterprise, for individualism and for private profit'.205 Thus at this point it was not 
relevant for the Party to impose restrictions on involvement in the Party, particularly as 
they sought to extend their influence throughout the co-operative movement. However 
in 1951 a revised Party constitution required that all members of the National 
Committee now had to sign and agree with this statement; ‘I am not a member of any 
political organisation which sponsors or supports Parliamentary or local government 
candidates in opposition to the candidates of the Co-operative Party or of any other 
party which it has an electoral agreement’.206 Therefore although initially there was no 
‘acid test’ of membership in 1925 by 1951 the Party had changed the conditions in 
which they operated, reflecting wider changes in the political culture in which they 
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operated – notably the changing relationship with the Labour Party - as we shall 
explore further in Chapter 2. 
The national Co-operative Party also had paid staff including the Party Secretary and 
national organisers (initially four in the 1930s rising to six by 1951) who covered 
various areas and provided a crucial bridge between local organisation and the 
National Committee. Their work included encouraging the affiliation of co-operative 
societies in their area, the establishment of local Party organisation, local relations with 
the Labour Party, organising an annual Summer School and Sectional Conferences.207  
A key event for the Co-operative Party was their Annual Conference, the reports of 
which have been a crucial source of data for this research. Co-operative Party 
Conference was held annually over Easter weekend and all co-operative societies, 
management, education, and political committees, Co-operative Parties, federations of 
Co-operative Parties and all national co-operative organisations were invited.208 
Motions and amendments to motions could however only be submitted by affiliated 
organisations [to the Co-operative Party], Political Committees, Co-operative Parties, 
federations of Co-operative Parties and all national co-operative organisations. 
Conference was managed by a Standing Orders committee (elected at the previous 
conference) including two representatives from the Executive Committee of the Party 
and three on a sectional basis.  
Bailey outlined how the main business of Conference was to consider Annual Reports 
and Policy statements from the National Committee as well as the motions tabled by 
subscribing societies and Party organisations.209 Voting on these was first by show of 
hands but if thirty delegates demanded it, a card vote had to be taken. Every 
co-operative distributive society affiliated to Co-operative Union had one vote and each 
affiliated to the Co-operative Party had another one additional vote per 1,000 members. 
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Each other society or organisation affiliated to the Co-operative Party also had the 
same number of votes to which it would have been entitled as a distributive society on 
subscriptions paid. In addition each society party, federation of Co-operative Parties 
and Voluntary Co-operative Party had one vote.210 Whilst this method of voting did not 
reflect the Rochdale Principle of one member one vote it was arranged on a similar 
basis to voting at Co-operative Congress and deemed an equitable way of voting. The 
changes in the 1951 constitution also affected the Co-operative Party conference. 
Firstly only affiliated co-operative organisations, societies and local Co-operative Party 
organisations were invited, and consequently had voting powers. Secondly those 
individuals voting at Conference on behalf of organisations were also required not to 
actively support any other political organisation, except for the Labour Party, or else 
that vote would be void.211 The Co-operative Party as an organisation was therefore 
beginning to exert more control over those participating in their organisation by 1951, 
again reflecting changes in the political culture it operated in, that the alliance with the 
Labour Party had changed and there was a marked attempt to squeeze out the 
influence of the CPGB in the Party. A Co-operative Party publication outlining the 
changes in the 1951 Constitution stated that ‘the most vital change concerns the 
conditions of membership – national and local. What we are seeking to ensure is that 
every person who joins the Co-operative Party is honestly able to advocate its policy, 
abide by its decisions and accepts its very reasonable discipline’.212 Individual 
members of the Co-operative Party and anyone elected onto local or national 
committees as well as potential candidates now had to sign, as quoted previously to 
confirm they were not members of another political organisation, (except the Labour 
Party). It was explained that this was to keep conditions of membership equal 
throughout the Party.213 Nevertheless, until 1951 any co-operative society could attend 
                                               
210 Bailey, The Co-operative Party, pp. 67-70. 
211 Co-operative Party, Comments upon the New Constitution, (London, Co-operative Party, 
1951) p. 3. 
212 Ibid, p. 1. 
213 Ibid, p. 3. 
64 
 
the Co-operative Party Conference and more significantly also had the same voting 
rights as a local Co-operative Party.  
Ultimately however final decisions on policy or procedure could not be made at 
Co-operative Party conferences. The Co-operative Party held its first Party Conference 
in 1920, at which its limited autonomy became evident. Sam Perry addressed the 
delegates stating:  
'I would like to make it perfectly clear that this is not a national conference of the 
Co-operative Movement. It is a national conference of the Co-operative Party, called to 
discuss policy and exchange views with the one object of helping the National 
Committee to put those views before Congress which is the final authority. It is 
perfectly true that this conference has no executive power.'214 
 
From this statement it would appear that although Congress remained the final 
authority over the Co-operative Party, the Party conference still provided an opportunity 
for delegates to decide on policy direction and other matters. Equally Smith and 
Ostergaard state that although the decisions taken at Conference had no binding 
effect, resolutions were influential in shaping the policy of the Party.215 Policy was 
initially proposed by the National Committee of the Party and it would be then 
discussed at Party Conference before finally presented to Congress for ratification. 
Three representatives were invited to attend Co-operative Congress each year where 
the Co-operative Party’s annual report was presented and motions submitted by the 
Co-operative Party regarding its organisation and policy were discussed.216 At the 1932 
Party Conference it was acknowledged that a number of resolutions concerning Party 
Policy were adopted at Congress of 1931.217 However, at the same time, it was also 
reported that the resolution on Agricultural Policy had been withdrawn in order that 
further consideration between the Party and the Agricultural Committee of the 
Co-operative Union may take place.218 Consequently one delegate commented that he 
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felt that this policy had been taken out of the hands of the Party — ‘with unity within the 
movement being regarded as more important than the resuscitation of agriculture’.219  
This lack of authority was a recurring issue for delegates at Co-operative Party 
Conferences. In 1933 one delegate stated that it was ‘a travesty of democracy for this 
Party to pass resolutions when in the ultimate the Co-operative Union has to determine 
whether these resolutions are going to co-operate or not’.220 Similarly in 1937 a 
delegate argued that the party 'should be a Party and not an appendage of the 
Co-operative Union' and instead should be controlled and influenced by those who are 
interested in politics as this in turn would capture the imagination of the movement.221  
This control from the Co-operative Union over the Co-operative Party extended even to 
the publication of Party literature. In a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Party 
in 1934 surprise was expressed at the decision taken by the Co-operative Union 
Executive Committee that all literature must be vetted by it prior to publication.222 It was 
highlighted that this decision would create great difficulty in carrying out the work and 
policy of the Party, especially in by-elections and General Election campaigns.223 In 
response to these concerns, the Co-operative Union’s Executive Committee agreed to 
assess the material with no delay, although reiterated that final authority remained with 
them.224 
Although a source of contention, the key figures in the Co-operative Party stressed that 
the primary purpose of these procedures was to ensure that the Party represented the 
views of the entire movement. It was argued that as the purpose of the Party was to 
promote and protect co-operative interests, this could only be determined 
democratically from within the entire movement. Jack Bailey, Chairman of the 
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Co-operative Party from 1945, stressed that this direction from Congress was a 
strength to the Party suggesting that it added authority to the policy of the Party as it 
reflected the mood of millions of co-operators and their families.225 This argued Bailey, 
meant party policy was consequently ‘less susceptible to caprice and fashion than 
some’.226  
This control over the Co-operative Party was deemed necessary by the Co-operative 
Union to ensure that ‘co-operative policy, whether considered right or wrong, has at 
least been determined from within the movement and not from without’.227 From this 
discussion two interlinked reasons emerge to suggest why this was the case. Firstly, 
because co-operative politics was a contentious and divisive issue, the movement 
needed to exert control to ensure that no external influences – particularly the Labour 
Party – could be seen as having a direct bearing on the Co-operative Party as this 
would exacerbate these further tensions. Secondly, the Co-operative Union were keen 
that the Co-operative Party did not just represent a politicalised minority within the 
movement – possibly to ensure that the business interests of the movement remained 
at the forefront of co-operative politics.  
Competing or Complimentary? Other Political Bodies within the Co-operative 
Union. 
The complexity of the structure of the Co-operative Union meant that there were other 
departments within the organisation that had political functions, which potentially 
contributed to the levels of tension, confusion and uncertainty surrounding the role of 
the Party. It is crucial that the broader political functions of the movement are 
considered throughout this thesis to fully understand the various levels of political 
involvement which contribute to the analysis of the relationship with the Labour Party. 
This section will examine the role and function of two other departments, the Joint 
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Parliamentary Committee and the National Co-operative Authority, in relation to the 
Co-operative Party to illustrate how this layering of political activity affected both its 
policy and organisational functions. 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Union was formed in 1881, in 
response to increasing state intervention in economic affairs, to act as a watchdog on 
legislation which would impact on co-operatives. The Joint Parliamentary Committee 
represented the Co-operation Union and also the two wholesale societies. As Cole 
described ‘it was the function of this body to watch legislation likely to affect the 
movement, to keep an eye on the administrative doings of government departments, to 
send deputations to ministers, to parry the attacks of private traders, and generally act 
as the organ of the movement in dealing with the state’.228  
Bailey noted how the purpose of the Co-operative Party was questioned due to the 
existence of the Parliamentary Committee. He emphasised that ‘the Parliamentary 
Committee possessed no electoral machinery, did not engage in public propaganda, 
and was technical in its approach to problems’.229 In many ways the Parliamentary 
Committee acted as a ‘business advisory organisation’, similar in many ways to the 
Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress.230 It was the Parliamentary 
Committee which had advocated the need to seek direct Parliamentary representation 
in 1917 leading to the formation of the Co-operative Party. The two departments were 
each complimentary to the other. Key Co-operative Party figures, notably A.V. 
Alexander were also involved in the Joint Parliamentary Committee. Alexander had 
started off his political career following his appointment in 1920 as Secretary of the 
Parliamentary Committee, a position he returned to from 1931 to 1935 when he was 
not in Parliament.  
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The Parliamentary Committee retained a reciprocal relationship with the Co-operative 
Party and two representatives of the Party (including one Co-operative Party MP) sat 
on the Committee and two representative of the Joint Parliamentary Committee were 
on the National Committee of the Co-operative Party.231 There is little evidence of any 
overlap in function or evident tensions between the two. A survey of the minutes for the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee for the period 1931 to 1949 illustrates the extent to 
which this committee was concerned with the technical aspects of legislation and how it 
affected the daily functioning of the co-operative movement as a business.232 This 
remained significant even after the formation of the Co-operative Party. The pamphlet 
Whitehall Ways, published by the Co-operative Union, emphasised the crucial role 
played by the committee during the Second World War.233 In 1949 the Co-operative 
Union made changes to its structure and the Joint Parliamentary Committee became a 
sub-committee of the newly created Central Executive of the Co-operative Union.234  
The second department, and arguably the most overlapping in terms of political 
function, was the National Co-operative Authority. As the research for this thesis 
progressed it became evident that the National Co-operative Authority was deeply 
involved in the political aspects of co-operation. For example in 1938 it took over from 
the Co-operative Party in their negotiations with the Labour Party regarding a political 
agreement. More significantly the National Co-operative Authority as a distinct body 
was peculiar to the period of this thesis’ focus as it only existed between 1932 and 
1949. 
The National Co-operative Authority was created in response to a recommendation of 
the Special Committee of Enquiry on the Future Government of the Co-operative 
Union. This Special Committee had been set up at the 1930 Co-operative Congress to 
inquire into the functions of the special committees and elected boards of the 
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Co-operative Union. Their report, presented to Congress in 1932, alludes to the 
changing role of the co-operative movement in wider society. It distinguished between 
‘domestic work’ carried out within the movement such as the organisation and 
administration of the Co-operative Union and ‘national’ work, which dealt with the 
movement within the wider public sphere and the movement’s policy on issues beyond 
their immediate domestic concerns. This report acknowledges the expansion of the 
co-operative movement as both a social movement and a business, but also 
emphasised the growing need for the movement to respond to wider changes in 
society. It firstly recommended that the United Board of the Co-operative Union was 
replaced by an Executive Committee which would oversee the 'administration, finance 
and general work’ of the Co-operative Union. Secondly it recommended that a National 
Co-operative Authority be created to make 'authoritative pronouncements' reflecting the 
joint opinions of all national co-operative organisations.235 The report indicated that this 
new body was necessary for the movement to speak with one voice on questions of 
national policy and public issues, and this is where its functions overlapped with the 
Co-operative Party. 
The National Co-operative Authority was empowered to make decisions on 
co-operative policy between Congresses, subject to a two thirds majority agreement.236 
That Co-operative Congress took all major decisions for the movement but only met 
annually was highlighted as an ongoing issue within the Co-operative Union. Although 
the report accepted that decision making through Congress provided for a democratic 
participatory process, and was therefore an integral aspect of co-operation, it also 
pointed to the problems this created for the movement. For example the main problem 
this caused for the Co-operative Party was its inability to make definite 
pronouncements on political issues which arose between Congresses.237 
                                               
235 Co-operative Congress Report, (1932) – Appendix: Report of the Special Committee of 
Enquiry on the Future Government of the Co-operative Union. 
236 Co-operative Congress Report, (1932) p. 431. 
237 Co-operative Party Conference Report, 1920, p. 15. 
70 
 
The report of the Special Committee exemplified both the complexity of the 
organisational structure of the Co-operative Union and the challenges to the movement 
in making unified statements. However, there was some opposition to this proposal, 
particularly from the co-operative wholesale societies which questioned its necessity. 
Mr Sutton of the CWS stated that 'the Parliamentary Committee as at present 
constituted is able to do the work of this new authority provided Congress allows it to 
do so’.238 Nevertheless, the recommendations of the report were taken on board by 
Congress and a resolution was passed creating the National Co-operative Authority. 
The new authority was comprised of the Executive Committee of the Co-operative 
Union, four representatives from the CWS, two from the SCWS, two from the 
Co-operative Party, one from the Co-operative Press and one from the Co-operative 
Productive Federation.239  
The minutes of the National Co-operative Authority are contained within the records of 
the Co-operative Union. As the Special Committee Report outlined, the National 
Co-operative Authority had been formed specifically to deal with the outward, policy 
aspects the co-operative movement faced in a society where the state, economy and 
business were becoming increasingly intertwined. In contrast, the Co-operative Party 
was viewed within this report as an administrative department of the Co-operative 
Union. However, the very nature of the Co-operative Party placed it at the forefront of 
politics and suggested the need for it to develop policy statements. Juxtaposed to this, 
although the National Co-operative Authority was not explicitly a political body, its 
responsibility to make decisions on the national policy of the co-operative movement 
subsequently affected the policy of the Co-operative Party.  
This duality in function and purpose was evident from its conception as in 1932 the 
National Co-operative Authority not the Co-operative Party headed the campaign 
against the government’s proposals to implement income tax on co-operative societies. 
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In 1935 the Co-operative Party was put in charge of the public platform in a campaign 
against the government and was responsible for organising centralised demonstrations 
and encouraging each society to organise supplementary activity in their area.240 Yet 
overall it was the National Co-operative Authority which took the lead role in 
determining the content of the campaign against the tax issue. 
A crucial difference which emerges between the National Co-operative Authority and 
the Co-operative Party was that the former had more authority than the Co-operative 
Party and could make decisions in private without consulting the wider representatives 
of the movement through Congress. Part of the justification for the creation of the 
National Co-operative Authority was that the time lapse between Congresses created 
difficulty in taking decisions which needed to be acted upon quickly regarding the policy 
of the movement more generally. Yet for the Authority to make decisions without 
recourse to Congress, in many ways made it inherently undemocratic and inimical to 
co-operative principles of democratic member control. In contrast the Co-operative 
Party was responsible to the Co-operative Union and its members, thus was denied 
policy making machinery, posing a contradiction in this relationship.  
The National Co-operative Authority was relatively short lived as a distinct body and in 
the 1949 reorganisation of the structure of the Co-operative Union its functions were 
merged into the newly created Central Executive.241 The Central Executive had a 
broader remit than that of the National Co-operative Authority but in principle there 
remained the same relationship with the Co-operative Party, as for example in 1949 it 
created a Policy Committee to discuss policy with the Labour Party. This continued the 
work of the Authority and contained two representatives from the Co-operative Party.242 
Conclusions 
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Carbery could not have been more accurate in claiming that 'the fate of the 
Co-operative Party is more than interwoven with that of the co-operative movement – it 
depends on it’.243 This chapter has demonstrated how the Co-operative Party was 
constituted within the Co-operative Union and the effect this had upon the grass roots 
development of the Co-operative Party, its ability to determine its policy and how the 
layering of political activity within the movement obscured its role and function. What is 
evident is that the Co-operative Party only represented one aspect of a wider 
co-operative political identity. Although for reasons outlined in the introductory chapter 
the focal point of this thesis is the Co-operative Party, from this chapter it is evident that 
it is crucial to understand the organisational framework and political culture in which the 
Party operated. Co-operative involvement in party politics was a contested issue within 
the co-operative movement and one which affected the development of the 
Co-operative Party.  
This chapter has illustrated how diverse geographical support for the Party, which 
required firstly affiliation and secondly grass roots organisation from local co-operative 
societies to succeed, shaped its political culture. Democratic participation and local 
society autonomy meant that the Co-operative Union could not impose co-operative 
politics on local societies and consequently support for the Co-operative Party was not 
universal within the movement. Society affiliation did continue to rise – by 1951 nine 
million out of eleven million co-operators were affiliated through their society to the 
Party.244 However, the development of local organisation varied in success and despite 
drives by the national leadership to increase local Party organisation throughout the 
1930s and Second World War, by 1946 it was reported that although 82% of the 
Co-operative Union’s societies were now affiliated to the Co-operative Party, 50% had 
yet to create local organisation.245 Grass roots participation was affected by both the 
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existing co-operative political culture of an area and the existing labour culture – and 
more often than not these were closely interlinked and hard to separate. 
The Co-operative Party as a department of the Co-operative Union was subject to 
Co-operative Congress. Furthermore, up to 1951 the organisation of the Party meant 
that it was possible for an opponent of co-operative political action to get elected to the 
Party’s national committee, and both attend and vote at Co-operative Party conference. 
This reflected the open membership aspect of co-operation, which was inclusive of all 
and based on the Rochdale Principle of ‘political and religious neutrality’. Arguably it 
also possibly reflected a desire by the Party to be fully inclusive to encourage 
participation from those mainly apathetic towards political involvement. Yet the 
membership conditions imposed in 1951 indicate that there were significant changes in 
the political culture of the Co-operative Party, and this changing nature of co-operative 
politics is a recurrent theme throughout this thesis. The Co-operative Party was an 
extension of the movement, but as the 1951 changes indicate the continued growth of 
it as an organisation, alongside the changing political relationship it had with the Labour 
Party, which will be discussed in the following chapter, necessitated some boundaries 
being imposed. 
What this chapter has illustrated is that the symbiotic relationship between the 
Co-operative Union and the Co-operative Party had significant implications on the 
functions of the Party. This was further compounded by the layering of political activity 
within the movement, most significantly the role of the National Co-operative Authority. 
Both the co-operative movement and the Co-operative Party were keen to stress that 
keeping authority within the wider movement meant that the Co-operative Party 
remained true to its co-operative principles. As a department of the Co-operative 
Union, the essential purpose of the Co-operative Party was to gain both local and 
Parliamentary representation for the co-operative movement. Thus in this respect the 
work of the Party was largely administrative and functional, facilitating a platform for 
political engagement and relationship with the Labour Party. Yet the Co-operative Party 
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also needed to engage in wider ideological and policy debates – although clarifying its 
position on many political issues would prove challenging due to these constitutional 
limitations. 
Therefore, what was then the role of the Co-operative Party? It can be argued that on 
the surface the Co-operative Party initially provided a democratic front for co-operative 
involvement in politics, and more significantly a relationship with the Labour Party. The 
contested nature of political involvement, particularly in the first decade of the Party 
meant it would have been impossible for the Co-operative Union to directly field 
political candidates, especially in conjunction with the Labour Party. However the 
creation of the National Co-operative Authority in 1932 signalled a shift in direction for 
the Co-operative Union in regard to political involvement. Thus the role of the National 
Co-operative Authority was both complimentary to and at times competing with the 
Co-operative Party, which despite being the ‘political expression’ of the co-operative 
movement ultimately had little influence over determining its politics. 
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CHAPTER 2: ‘AN INNER CONTRADICTION’? THE NATIONAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CO-OPERATIVE PARTY AND 
THE LABOUR PARTY, 1927-1946. 
‘The history of Co-op Labour relations is that of almost calculated vagueness, 
uncertainty and instability built upon a fairly secure base of joint recognition of each 
other’s claims. That they be allied is seldom held in doubt: as to the nature of the 
alliance, on this there is seldom long term agreement.’246  
 
Whilst the symbiotic link between the Co-operative Party and the co-operative 
movement undoubtedly provided a major influence over the course of the Party’s 
history, its relationship with the Labour Party was an equally critical influence on its 
development, organisation, culture and progress. As the above quote by Carbery 
indicates, the practical relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party was constantly changing and contested, yet underlying this was an acceptance 
that they would work together. The electoral alliance between the Co-operative Party 
and the Labour Party was formalised by the Cheltenham Agreement of 1927 in which 
both parties agreed to work together in certain constituencies. Although the formal link 
with the Co-operative Union has now ceased the Co-operative Party still operates an 
electoral alliance with the Labour Party, fielding both national and local candidates 
under the joint banner of Labour-Co-operative.247 The longevity of this alliance is 
testament to Carbery’s quote, as almost 90 years later the basic principle of the 
electoral alliance remains in operation.  
Throughout this alliance the Co-operative Party has retained its identity as a separate 
political Party and has always remained unaffiliated from the Labour Party nationally. 
This creates a unique situation for the Labour Party whereby they maintained an 
electoral alliance with another political party, despite that Party not affiliating nationally 
to the Labour Party. Rhodes detailed the organisational tensions between the Labour 
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Party and the co-operative movement and Co-operative Party in a paper published by 
the Co-operative College in 1962.248 In this paper Rhodes’ describes the situation in 
which locally the Co-operative Party was dependent upon the Labour Party for 
parliamentary representation, yet nationally, it remained unaffiliated and independent 
from the Labour Party as an ‘inner contradiction’.249 
This chapter will explore the unique nature of this alliance in the context of the history 
of the Labour Party and consider what challenges this ‘inner contradiction’ presented to 
both organisations. It will examine why the Co-operative Party developed an electoral 
relationship of this nature with the Labour Party and moreover what committed both 
parties to maintaining this alliance despite challenges which emerged. In doing so this 
chapter will demonstrate that the relationship with the Co-operative Party was of 
greater concern to the Labour Party than has previously been recognised. This will 
contribute to Labour Party historians’ understanding of the myriad of organisational 
influences on the Labour Party and challenges that they faced in attempting to creating 
a unified party encompassing a range of working class organisations. 
As the introductory chapter has indicated, the relationship between the Co-operative 
Party and the Labour Party has been both neglected and misunderstood by historians. 
Labour historians in particular have tended to gloss over the finer details, suggesting 
that both Parties became closely integrated following the 1927 agreement.250 Recently 
Manton observed that the ‘confused’ relationship between the Labour Party and the 
Co-operative Party had yet to be properly examined, yet his analysis was not focused 
on the organisational and structural aspects of the alliance.251 Worley, Robertson and 
others have acknowledged the contribution that the co-operative movement made 
locally to the development of the Labour Party. For example, Worley points out that 
although in Kettering and West Ham the co-operative societies formed an important 
                                               
248 G. W. Rhodes, Co-operative-Labour relations, (Co-operative College Paper, Co-operative 
Union, Loughborough, 1962). 
249 Rhodes, Co-operative-Labour relations, p. 60. 
250 Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, p. 47 & Pugh, Speak for Britain, p. 145. 
251 Manton, ‘The Labour Party’, p. 756.  
77 
 
part of the Labour movement and added to Labour Party success, in other places 
co-operative hostility to formal political activity prevented effective collaboration with the 
Labour Party.252 Yet despite this emerging interest into the local political culture and 
organisation there has been little addressing of how these diverse local experiences 
could be reconciled at a national level between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party.253  
Tensions in the national relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party and the effect these had on the Labour Party have been addressed by 
Redvaldsen. In a recent comparative study of the British and Norwegian Labour 
Parties, he acknowledged that ‘real tensions’ existed between the British Labour Party 
and the co-operative movement which cost the Labour Party both time and effort to 
repair.254 Redvaldsen argues that although local co-operative societies were generally 
supportive of Labour candidates irrespective of whether they were sponsored by the 
Co-operative Party, if the alliance with the Co-operative Party had ceased this could 
have compromised the electioneering of Labour in areas where the Co-operative Party 
had a strong presence.255 Elsewhere Redvaldesen has argued that the Labour Party 
attached a level of import to the political relationship between the Labour Party and the 
co-operative movement in his analysis of the 1929 General election, suggesting that a 
movement comprising six million members could not be ignored.256 Redvaldsen’s initial 
observations here provide a new perspective on the organisational relationship 
between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, suggesting that at certain points 
in the history of the Labour Party the alliance with the Co-operative Party had 
consequences for the organisational development and electoral success of the Labour 
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Party. This chapter will build on Redvaldsen’s observations, considering how the 
Labour Party’s approach to this alliance changed over time.  
Carbery argued that too much time was spent by the Co-operative Party deliberating 
organisational issues, particularly in the period 1931 to 1945, which he believed 
inhibited important policy discussion.257 However, this chapter will propose a more 
nuanced approach to the contested nature of the alliance between the Labour Party 
and the Co-operative Party arguing that a number of factors contributed to the 
changing nature of the alliance. This chapter will illustrate that the relationship did not 
operate in a vacuum and evolved in response to a multitude of changing 
circumstances, including the individual development of both Parties. It will address the 
issue of why the Co-operative Party did not affiliate nationally to the Labour Party, 
building on the conclusions of chapter one which illustrated how the Co-operative Party 
fell under the tight authority of the Co-operative Union. Therefore this chapter will argue 
that the organisational tensions which dominated the relationship during the period 
1931 to 1946 were symptomatic of underlying differences in the ideology between the 
Labour Party and the Co-operative Party.  
This chapter will extend the chronological remit of this thesis to include the formation of 
the Co-operative Party in order to facilitate an analysis of the Cheltenham Agreement 
of 1927 and the reasons why this agreement was reached. Secondly, this chapter will 
focus on the period 1932 to 1938 in which a series of organisational challenges beset 
the relationship. Using previously unexplored archival material, this chapter will detail 
how organisational issues, such as the financing of and selection of candidates locally, 
arose between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party in this period and explain 
why they occurred. This will highlight a hitherto unappreciated level of commitment 
from both the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party to maintaining their alliance.258 
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Lastly, this chapter will focus on the Agreement of 1946, detailing why a new 
agreement was needed. The major differences between the 1927 and 1946 
agreements will be identified to highlight what they demonstrate about the development 
of both political parties from 1927, and the broader context of their political relationship. 
The Cheltenham Agreement 1927  
At the 1927 Co-operative Congress held at Cheltenham, an agreement between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party was ratified by delegates. At a national level, 
this agreement provided for the establishment of a joint sub-committee representative 
of both executives, an exchange of minutes of both national executives and that joint 
campaigns be undertaken on special subjects during elections.259 Locally, it provided 
for affiliation between local Co-operative Parties or Councils and Divisional Labour 
Parties which would give them similar rights and responsibilities as other affiliated 
organisations.260 Crucially, however, this agreement was only optional and it stated that 
it was ‘not intended to interfere with existing arrangements’ where co-operative 
societies are already affiliated or an arrangement has been established’.261  
The Joint Committee of the Executive Committees of the Co-operative Party and 
Labour Party, started to meet in 1925, and it was this Joint Committee which drafted 
the terms of the Cheltenham Agreement.262 The agreement took account of existing 
local practices and provided national recognition of the, previously unofficial, 
understanding that the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party would work together 
where appropriate and not contest against each other in elections. Its optional non-
binding nature was to allow for both these existing practices and new alliances at local 
level. Although this agreement was actively sought by the Co-operative Party, their 
relationship with the Co-operative Union meant that this agreement needed to be 
ratified by Co-operative Congress, highlighting as chapter one outlined the lack of 
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authority the Party had over its own organisation and policy development. Although 
delegates at the Cheltenham Congress of 1927 voted in favour of this agreement, this 
was only by a narrow majority of 17, indicating the deep divide within the wider 
co-operative movement regarding a formal alliance with the Labour Party.263 As chapter 
one illustrated, the Co-operative Party during the 1920s was not supported wholly from 
within the movement and the developing alliance with the Labour Party was one source 
of contention regarding co-operative political activity. In contrast, the Labour Party 
approved this agreement at their annual Conference in 1927 without disagreement or 
discussion, signalling at this stage a level of indifference to the implications of this 
agreement, or perhaps a wider indifference to the Co-operative Party as a political 
organisation.264  
The shared ideological roots from which both the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party had emerged, in addition to an overlap in their ‘rank and file membership’ 
contributed to the local level alliances which necessitated this formal agreement.265 For 
example, a Co-operative Union education department lesson suggested that with so 
much in common it ‘was inevitable that the parties had close relationships with each 
other’.266 This mutual ground was emphasised by Alf Barnes at the debate on the 
proposed agreement at the Cheltenham Congress, in which he stated that the Labour 
Party was the only Party in Parliament which stood for the same principle which 
underpinned the co-operative movement; ‘common ownership of the things essential to 
life’.267 To a certain extent, therefore, the two Parties had a common political message 
stemming from their shared heritage which bound them together, and this still exists 
today.268 
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These common political aims and overlap in potential membership arguably resulted in 
a level of electoral pragmatism for the Co-operative Party. The primary aim of the 
Co-operative Party was to gain parliamentary representation and the Labour Party, with 
organisation in each constituency from 1918, provided an avenue for this. As chapter 
one has demonstrated although a number of co-operative societies affiliated nationally 
to the Co-operative Party, creating party machinery to facilitate the fielding of 
candidates was another matter entirely. The co-operative movement had a strong basis 
of organisation through local co-operative societies but this did not equate to the 
political machinery needed to contest elections as this organisation was predominantly 
focused on the operation of that particular society’s business interests. Moreover 
society boundaries did not marry with constituency boundaries. As Cole stated, 
although the co-operative movement’s ‘decision to embark on political action was 
unequivocal, the methods to be followed were by no way clearly defined’ suggesting 
that there was no organisational blueprint behind the 1917 decision.269 
By contrast, the Labour Party’s new constitution in 1918 established a Constituency 
Labour Party in every constituency in an attempt to create a national political 
organisation. Thus where local relationships between co-operative societies and 
aspects of the labour movement existed, constituency Labour Party machinery was a 
useful way to promote co-operative sponsored Labour candidates in the absence of 
co-operative political machinery. Moreover the benefits of working together became all 
the more apparent after the Paisley election of 1923. At this election tensions between 
the local Co-operative Party and the local Labour Party meant that both fielded 
candidates which in effect split the working class vote and resulted in a Liberal 
victory.270 This evidenced that there was not, as Cole argued, room for two parties 
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based predominantly on the working classes after the 1918 change in the Labour Party 
constitution.271 Before 1918, the Labour Party was according to Worley ‘a permanent, 
significant but inconsistent feature of British politics’.272 It was not a unified national 
political party but an association of trade union and socialist organisations. However, 
the 1918 Constitution created a uniform Party in which all groups, including the trade 
unions, had as their object ‘the creation of a socialist commonwealth’. By creating 
organisation in each constituency the Labour Party enabled both organisational and 
individual membership, making access to the party more universal. Thus the 
development and progress of the Co-operative Party, created in 1917, representing 
one aspect of the working classes was shaped by this significant change in the 
constitution and organisation of the Labour Party.  
The local links between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party were evident in 
the election of the first Co-operative MP, A. E. Waterson in Kettering in 1918. Waterson 
was a ‘Co-operative’ candidate but was also heavily reliant on the support of the local 
Labour Party and upon entering Parliament took the Labour whip.273 Therefore 
although local alliances predated the national electoral alliance between the Labour 
Party and the Co-operative Party, these also had implications nationally as Waterson 
was an identifiable member of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Sheffield provides 
another, previously unexamined, example of a city where early local Co-operative Party 
development created instinctive bonds with local Labour Party organisation. The 
Sheffield Co-operative Party held their inaugural meeting on the 5th January 1918, 
where it was resolved that they contest one constituency and proposed to contest six 
municipal wards following discussions with the Trades Council.274 These minutes 
further depict a level of bargaining between the two over which local seats would be 
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contested by whom, which was complicated by the fact that some candidates featured 
on both the Labour and Co-operative lists of candidates, such as Mrs Barton, further 
signifying the shared political space in which they operated.275 It was resolved that the 
Trades and Labour Council would withdraw from the Hillsborough ward, to allow 
co-operators to contest it, who in return would guarantee to support all Labour 
candidates who are co-operators.276 There was an element of mutual benefit in this 
agreement between the two organisations.  
The following week Perry, secretary of the national Co-operative Party, addressed a 
meeting with a deputation from the Trades and Labour Council where an amicable 
agreement was reached for the Sheffield Co-operative Party council to contest the 
Hillsborough parliamentary constituency in the upcoming by-election.277 At this meeting 
Perry advised that they ‘be very careful in selecting a candidate who would rally the 
support of the Trades Union and Labour Movement as well as the Co-operative 
people’.278 Sheffield Hillsborough was a new parliamentary constituency in 1918 and 
although Arthur Lockwood contested this seat as a Co-operative Party candidate with 
the support of local Labour Party organisation, the National Liberal candidate was 
elected. However by 1922 the situation was very different, and the Sheffield 
Hillsborough seat, along with the Sheffield Attercliffe and Sheffield Brightside seats 
were successfully contested for the first time by Labour Party candidates.279 A.V. 
Alexander standing as a Co-operative-Labour candidate defeated the Liberal candidate 
in Hillsborough which would become one of the Labour Party’s strongholds. By working 
together, the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party in Sheffield Hillsborough 
avoided splitting the working class vote and through Alexander’s successful election 
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demonstrated what could be achieved from working together. The example of Sheffield 
illustrates the importance of local political cultures: from the outset the Sheffield 
Co-operative Party was shaped by its relationship with the Sheffield Trades and Labour 
Council, but equally the development of constituency Labour Party organisation in 
Sheffield was influenced by the growth of the Co-operative Party there.  
Whilst these local practices informed national concerns, there was also a commitment 
nationally to brokering some form of agreement with the Labour Party. This was 
evident at the first National Conference of the Co-operative Party in 1920 where Sam 
Perry and Alfred Barnes both made clear their desire to develop relations with the 
Labour Party. Barnes outlined that if he had thought the intention was to develop a 
Co-operative Party antagonistic to the larger labour movement then he would not have 
become involved.280 This was unsurprising given Barnes’ trade union, ILP and 
co-operative background; he had first joined the ILP and Stratford Co-operative Society 
in 1908 and rose through the ranks of both organisations, by 1914 he was secretary of 
the East London Federation of the ILP and by 1915 president of the Stratford 
Co-operative Society.281 In addition he was a council member of the National Union of 
Gold, Silver and Allied Trades.282 As Bagwell states in his biography of Barnes, he 
came from a background in which ‘he sought to improve the living conditions of the 
people of the East End of London through co-operation and political action’.283 Yet 
although Barnes was not against working with the Labour Party, he and Perry both 
stressed their commitment to building up the Co-operative Party as a separate 
organisation, ‘so that co-operators can translate co-operative ideas into achievements 
through political machinery’.284 Barnes and Perry remained in their positions till 1945 
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and 1943 respectively, and in the absence of an official leader for the Co-operative 
Party had a significant influence on the direction of the Party as is evident throughout 
this thesis. However, beyond the official party line, there were a range of opinions on 
the relationship with the Labour Party, with one delegate stating that an alliance would 
be disastrous for both trade and membership.285  
Initially the Co-operative Party had sought an agreement with the Labour Party on 
equal terms, suggesting they worked together to form a United Democratic or People’s 
Party.286 In 1921 the Co-operative Party submitted a resolution to Co-operative 
Congress calling for an alliance with the Labour Party which was defeated. This 
Carbery argues was the last chance the Co-operative Party had in securing an equal 
electoral agreement between the two Parties due to their subsequent incongruous 
development.287 The formation of the first Labour Government in 1923 propelled the 
Labour Party beyond the infant status of the Co-operative Party and changed the 
political dynamic between the parties. In addition the inclusion of co-operators into the 
Labour government added to this emerging contradiction in loyalties between 
Co-operative and Labour. A. V. Alexander, Co-operative-Labour MP for Sheffield was 
appointed as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade in the 1924, a significant 
position from a co-operative business perspective.288 Alf Barnes, Co-operative-Labour 
MP for East Ham and R. C. Morrison, Co-operative-Labour MP for Tottenham North 
were also made Parliamentary Private Secretaries.289  
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Consequently at the Co-operative Party conference in 1925 there was a lengthy debate 
on the organisation of the Party, in particular its relationship with the Labour Party. Mr 
Mills from Kings Norton explained that regardless of how much time and effort was 
spent organising in a constituency it was of little consequence if the Labour Party 
comes along and takes the seat because there is no agreement in place.290 Mr H. B. 
Guthrie from Glasgow reiterated these sentiments stating; ‘we go into a constituency 
which we believe we can win by co-operative hard work. We pay the piper, then in 
steps the Labour Party and takes all over’.291 There was therefore a practical need 
demonstrated for a national agreement to both reflect existing practices and enable 
new local alliances by providing a framework for collaboration. As a result of this 
discussion, the National Joint Committee of the Labour Party and Co-operative Party 
was created which facilitated the drafting of the Cheltenham Agreement.  
The Cheltenham Agreement of 1927 was a response to existing arrangements 
between local Co-operative Party and local Labour Party organisation and was actively 
pursued by the Co-operative Party leadership to provide a framework for future local 
alliances as the Co-operative Party continued to expand. The significance of the 
Cheltenham Agreement should not be underestimated as it fundamentally changed the 
political dynamic between the Labour Party, the Co-operative Party and the wider 
co-operative movement. This agreement nationally endorsed the unique yet 
contradictory position whereby the Co-operative Party would field candidates in alliance 
with the Labour Party, yet continue to function as an independent political organisation. 
That the alliance remains in place today is testimony to this point. 
Organisational Tensions During the 1930s 
The Cheltenham Agreement initially met with a positive reception and at the 1929 
Co-operative Party conference, the National Committee reported the Cheltenham 
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Agreement was working well, particularly in local areas where it was described as 
having an immediate practical benefit.292 The National Committee stated how they 
appreciated the ‘spirit and desire’ from local parties in carrying out this agreement. It 
added that the National Committee were ‘firmly convinced that the agreement lays the 
foundation of a united workers’ movement, and will materially help in our task of 
safeguarding the interests of co-operation and achieving the ideal of a Co-operative 
Commonwealth’.293 However, in just over a decade the terms of the 1927 Cheltenham 
Agreement were in effect redundant, and the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party 
were seeking to reach a new agreement.294 
This section will look at the factors behind this and firstly will focus on the discussions 
regarding organisation between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party at a 
national level during the 1930s. Whilst historians have addressed the implications of 
the ILP’s split from the Labour Party in 1932, the organisational challenges which 
dominated the relationship between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party are 
rarely mentioned outside co-operative histories.295 In addressing the key points of 
conflict which divided the two parties organisationally during the 1930s this section will 
provide new insights for historians of the Labour Party into a previously unexplored 
organisational dynamic and will unpack wider themes underpinning the culture and 
nature of the relationship.  
The architects of the Cheltenham Agreement could not anticipate how the future 
development of each Party would affect the alliance. Although the agreement was a 
significant marker in the alliance between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, 
ultimately the voluntary and flexible nature of the agreement would prove problematic. 
Changes in the size, structure and internal culture of both the Co-operative Party and 
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the Labour Party throughout the 1930s created friction and exacerbated existing 
organisational tensions. During the 1930s the Co-operative Party was enjoying a level 
of success and acceptance within the wider co-operative movement. In 1931, a 
pamphlet described how co-operators were beginning to develop a faith and belief in 
the future of the Co-operative Party and looked to it as an instrument through which 
their political ambitions could be achieved.296 To this end, majority support from the 
membership of the Co-operative Union was achieved in 1931 and this affiliated 
membership continued to rise throughout the 1930s. Furthermore as chapter one has 
shown, the defensive role assumed by the Co-operative Party was bolstered by 
increasing support in 1933 as a result of the taxation of co-operative profits. 
Additionally, there was a marked effort to mobilise local Party organisation and 
increase individual membership throughout the decade and a discernible attempt from 
the Party to propagate a political programme as demonstrated by the publication of the 
Britain Reborn pamphlet series in 1931.297 Although in terms of electoral success there 
was only one Co-operative MP from 1931 to 1935, on balance this appears to have 
been counteracted by the advances outlined above and the Co-operative Party of the 
1930s was consequently much more confident, articulate and organised than it had 
been in its formative years.298  
Similarly, the Labour Party in the 1930s was undergoing a period of rapid 
organisational change and development. In January 1932 the Labour Party launched a 
membership campaign to both mobilise support and generate finance for constituency 
parties, and by 1935 the Labour Party’s individual membership was 419,311, almost 
double what it had been in 1929.299 Worley has argued that there was a shift in the 
organisational base of the Labour party throughout the 1930s, with strong constituency 
parties helping to facilitate Labour’s extension into non-union, less industrial areas in 
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response to both the split in the Party in 1931, and the ILP’s disaffiliation from the Party 
in 1932.300 Labour was also busy working on their policy and programme for 
Government, which would eventually lead to the publication of their Immediate 
Programme in 1937.301  
The individual development and subsequent organisational changes in both the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party contributed significantly to the organisational 
challenges which arose during the 1930s. This was recognised by John R. Clynes, a 
founding member of the Labour Representation Committee and MP for Manchester 
Platting, who stated in discussions regarding the future of the relationship in 1938 that 
‘the points of conflict between the two parties had emerged in consequence of their 
growth and internal development’.302 What then were the key points of conflict that 
divided the two parties organisationally during the 1930s and what do these reveal 
about the culture and nature of their wider relationship? 
In their 1960 study of the ‘Constitutional Relationship’ between the Co-operative Party 
and the Labour Party, Smith and Ostergaard state that four organisational issues 
emerged throughout the 1930s which affected the electoral alliance. These included 
the financial arrangements in constituencies, local organisation, payment of agents and 
the signing of the Labour Party standing orders.303 This section will address the 
implications of these organisational issues on the alliance, drawing on evidence from 
the Joint Committee of the Labour and Co-operative Party to analyse what recurrent 
themes dominated these discussions. 
In 1933, at their Hastings Conference, the Labour Party changed the financial 
procedures in constituencies to prevent domination by one organisation and placed a 
greater financial responsibility upon Constituency Labour Parties.304 As Rhodes has 
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outlined, the purpose of this was twofold: to prevent domination of the trade unions 
whilst encouraging constituency Labour Parties to mobilise support by recruiting of 
individual membership.305 Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that the Hastings 
Conference decision was in anyway targeted at curbing the influence of the 
Co-operative Party in constituencies, it was to have a significant impact on the electoral 
alliance between the two parties.  
Local Co-operative Parties tended to retain control over finance in constituencies 
where they had a joint candidate with the local Labour Party. In these instances, a joint 
committee would be set up representing both the local Labour Party and local 
Co-operative Party.306 Where these Joint Committees existed the local Co-operative 
Party would not have affiliated directly to the Constituency Labour Party and the local 
Joint Committee was often the unit of electoral organisation and not the Constituency 
Labour Party. A Labour Party memo regarding its position with the Co-operative Party 
details the significant variation in local arrangements; in 1934 there were 23 endorsed 
candidates, of which 9 had not yet completed the standing orders of the Labour Party, 
14 of which had agents directly employed by the co-operative organisation, and the 
agreements in Kettering and Barkston Ash gave special powers to the Co-operative 
Party in nominating candidates.307 Furthermore, it stated that there were several other 
joint committees proposed in constituencies where the Co-operative Party was not at 
present responsible for the candidate.308 
The Cheltenham Agreement had provided for this level of local variation and flexible 
approach, however by 1933 the Labour Party was seeking to create uniform practices 
throughout its organisation and this diversity became problematic. The model for local 
affiliation provided for in the terms of the Cheltenham Agreement was between local 
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Co-operative Party organisation and the divisional Labour Party yet in practice Joint 
Committees in many areas had been set up which bypassed the need for affiliation and 
created an extra layer of local political machinery. The impact of the Labour Party’s 
Hastings Conference decision on the relationship between the Co-operative Party and 
the Labour Party was immediate. From late 1933 onwards, the minutes of the Joint 
Committee of the Co-operative Party and Labour Party are overwhelmingly concerned 
with organisational issues brought to the fore by this Labour Party decision.309 
The undercurrent in many of the organisational discussions between the Labour Party 
and the Co-operative Party was the issue of affiliation. The Labour Party told the 
Co-operative Party that a way of overcoming these new regulations was for local 
co-operative societies to directly affiliate to the Labour Party.310 The local affiliation of 
Co-operative Parties, to local Labour Party organisation was an accepted practice, as 
provided for in the Cheltenham Agreement. Yet the Co-operative Party leadership did 
not want local co-operative societies to directly affiliate to the Labour Party and neither 
did they want to affiliate nationally. The Co-operative Party was not affiliated to the 
Labour Party, and had from the outset made it clear that affiliation was not on the 
agenda.311 The strength of co-operative feeling against affiliation is evident from the 
minutes of the Joint Committee of the Labour Party and Co-operative Party when the 
recorded minutes from a meeting of 12 July 1933 stated that ‘the affiliation of the 
Co-operative Party to the Labour Party whilst being a possibility for the future, could not 
be entertained at the present time without causing considerable difficulties to the 
Co-operative side’.312 Taken in isolation this would suggest that at some point affiliation 
would be a possibility, however, crucially at the following meeting the Co-operative 
Party requested that the minutes be amended, and the phrase ‘whilst being a 
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possibility for the future’ removed emphasising that affiliation was neither a possibility 
now nor in the future.313 In 1933 the Co-operative Party was rallying the movement 
around the issue of taxation of co-operative dividends and unity in the movement was 
considered to be essential: consequently there could be no hint that affiliation to the 
Labour Party was on the agenda. Moreover, the Co-operative Party remained opposed 
to affiliation arguing that it would undermine the purpose of their Party as an 
organisation but would also would mean compromising significantly on their 
independence. As chapter one has illustrated the Co-operative Party remained under 
the authority of the Co-operative Union in order that their policies would reflect the 
views of the entire co-operative movement – affiliation to the Labour Party would 
ultimately undermine the authority of the Co-operative Union.  
The Labour Party was unimpressed with the Co-operative Party’s unwillingness to 
budge on the question of affiliation. In response to the Hastings Conference decision a 
memo was sent from Labour Party representatives on the Joint Committee to the 
National Executive Committee of the Labour Party which outlined how it had been 
anticipated that the increasing ‘identity of interests’ between the Co-operative Party and 
the Labour Party would eventually lead to affiliation.314 Furthermore, this memo 
suggested that the Co-operative Party had indeed taken advantage of the Labour Party 
Constituency organisations to put forward its own Parliamentary and local government 
nominees, thus insinuating that the Co-operative Party was seeking to build up a 
potentially rival political organisation at the expense of the Labour Party.315 This Labour 
Party concern reflected the aftershocks of the 1931 split in the Labour Government and 
the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932, heightening sensitivity regarding the Co-operative 
Party developing as an independent Party. 
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Nonetheless, the Co-operative Party was keen to emphasise its continued loyalty to the 
Labour Party. At a Joint Committee Meeting in October 1934 George Lathan, MP for 
Sheffield Park and a member of the Labour Party executive committee, asked whether 
it was the intention of the Co-operative Party to work as a competitive or competing 
Party saying that he was concerned by a recent statement from T. W. Mercer, a 
co-operative journalist. Lathan suggested that Mercer’s statement quite definitely 
appeared to indicate that it was the intention of the Co-operative Party to work as a 
competitive Party.316 Responding to this, Alf Barnes, Chairman of the Co-operative 
Party, acknowledged that although it regarded itself as a separate political Party there 
was no way in which it intended or sought to be competitive or antagonistic to the 
Labour Party.317 
As Chairman of the Party, Barnes had the difficult task of building up the Party within 
the co-operative movement whilst also maintaining an electoral alliance with the Labour 
Party, which would enable the Party to achieve Parliamentary representation. The 
Co-operative Party was keen to assert its independence during the 1930s in part 
because it disliked the Labour Party treating it like just another affiliated organisation 
such as a Trade Union. As Rhodes has suggested, the Co-operative Party were very 
conscious of their ‘independence, status and dignity’.318 This discontent is evident at 
the 1944 Co-operative Party Conference at which one delegate asked that in the 
reformulation of the agreement, not only should the national party be recognised as a 
political party, but that the local party must be treated better than a branch of the Trade 
Union, as they were at present.319 Yet the Labour Party in their efforts to maintain a 
national uniform party, with consistent regulations to ensure fairness in selection and 
financing was not comfortable with this unique position the Co-operative Party has in 
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their structure and consequently viewed the Co-operative Party with a level of 
suspicion. 
The ongoing debate between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party’s Executive 
Committees regarding issues such as finance and constituency organisation were 
exacerbated by the London Labour Party’s forceful attempts to secure the affiliation of 
the Political Committee of the London Co-operative Society. Speaking publicly to 
members of the South Suburban Co-operative Society in April 1935, Alf Barnes implied 
that direct affiliation between co-operative societies and the Labour Party would only 
create further division due to fundamental differences between the labour and 
co-operative movements.320 Crucially Barnes was a key figure not only in the 
Co-operative Party but also in the London Co-operative Society and this attempt by the 
London Labour Party to secure the direct affiliation of the London Co-operative Society 
was treading on his territory.321 Whilst Barnes advocated close links with the Labour 
Party and had done throughout his political career, ultimately Barnes did not want this 
to be at the expense of the continued development of the Co-operative Party.  
Yet Barnes’ message in this speech incensed some Labour Party members and 
reinforced suspicions regarding the independent political ambitions of the Co-operative 
Party. At the Labour Party conference that year, one delegate asked why they wanted 
‘to associate with these people’ in reference to Barnes speech at the South Suburban 
Co-operative Society.322 Furthermore, Alderman W. H. Green of the Royal Arsenal 
Co-operative Society (RACS) used the ensuing discussion regarding Barnes’ speech at 
the conference to encourage delegates in local co-operative societies to affiliate 
directly to either local or national Labour Party organisation. Green suggested that 
‘whether this movement towards affiliation or closer relationship develops will not 
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depend on what Mr Barnes says, but on what you determine to do, and I say most 
emphatically, that the policy we have pursued is not against the declared policy of the 
whole Co-operative Movement’.323 What Green raises in this point is the issue of local 
autonomy of co-operative societies, which as democratically controlled units could 
choose to do whatever their membership desired. The national Co-operative Party 
ultimately had no power over the individual actions of co-operative societies and 
neither did the Co-operative Union. This voluntary nature of co-operative political 
involvement contributed to the diverse range of local agreements with the Labour Party 
and this consequently affected the national relationship between the two Parties. 
This incident provides a good example of the ways in which organisational differences 
reflect some of the underlying ideological tensions and contradictions. By highlighting 
fundamental differences between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party, Barnes 
was providing a rationale for why the Co-operative Party could not affiliate to the 
Labour Party as it needed to remain loyal to the ideology of the co-operative 
movement. Barnes wanted a harmonious relationship with the Labour Party and was 
not suggesting the Co-operative Party was in any way intending to be competitive, 
however he was keen to emphasise that they offered something both additional and 
complimentary. This was evident in an earlier address by Barnes in which he stated:  
‘Trade unionism, Co-operation and the Labour Party are so organically related, that I 
do not think it is advisable to aim of the development of either to the exclusion or 
expense of the others. They are all complimentary to one another, and each has its 
special interests and particular functions to perform.’324 
 
Nevertheless, the Labour Party was not entirely happy with this unique situation in 
which the Co-operative Party continued to develop as an independent political 
organisation, shaken after the 1931 split in the Party and the disaffiliation of the ILP in 
1932. The Labour Party did view the co-operative movement as part of the Labour 
Party, but not as a separate entity. In their endeavour to create uniform organisational 
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structures and build a national political Party the issue of how to reconcile the 
Co-operative Party within this was proving problematic.  
The issue of affiliation, stemming from these organisational difficulties, reached a 
crescendo in 1936 following a memo issued by the Labour Party to its conference 
delegates in 1936. This memo stated that ‘the Co-op Party, wishes to continue as a 
separate political party, on terms of equality with the Labour Party’ and that ‘this 
dualism is not co-operation and is calculated to cause weakness rather than 
strength’.325 The circular was the first occasion when organisational problems in the 
relationship were publicly raised at the Labour Party Conference and could arguably be 
viewed as a move to force the affiliation of the Co-operative Party. The Co-operative 
Party leadership was unhappy with the decision to issue this circular as they believed it 
would be detrimental to the Co-operative Party, particularly locally in constituencies 
where relationships were in the process of being brokered. This memo also caused a 
level of concern within the wider co-operative movement regarding the future of the 
alliance as evidenced by R. A. Palmer, the Co-operative Union General Secretary’s 
letter to James Middleton, General Secretary of the Labour Party. In this letter Palmer 
challenged the suggestion in the memo that co-operative political organisation was 
calculated to cause weakness, and stated that on the contrary the ‘Co-operative 
alliance with the Labour party since 1918 has added to the strength of Labour both in 
Parliament and on municipal bodies’.326  
National affiliation to the Labour Party was not an option for the Co-operative Party. As 
chapter one has illustrated the Co-operative Party had a constitutional responsibility to 
the co-operative movement. The Co-operative Party was formed within the 
co-operative movement to represent co-operators and despite varying levels of support 
within the movement for the party it was ultimately bound by decisions of Congress. As 
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a department of the Co-operative Union, financed and supported by hundreds of 
autonomous co-operative societies with local level political structures, affiliation to the 
Labour Party would jeopardise this independence and would risk the movement losing 
control over aspects of finance, policy and structure. The Co-operative Party was 
democratic in that each co-operative society decided independently whether they 
would support the political fund. Affiliation to the Labour Party would remove an aspect 
of this democracy and also would undermine the role and function of the Co-operative 
Party. Crucially what would be the point of the Co-operative Party if local co-operative 
societies directly affiliated to the Labour Party? The national Co-operative Party would 
be left with very little function, which is arguably what the Labour Party desired through 
affiliation. 
What is evident from these debates and discussions regarding organisation during the 
1930s was that the key priority for the Co-operative Party was retaining control over 
their finances, organisation and policy, as this ultimately provided the foundations for 
their existence. Jack Bailey writing in 1948 summarised this, stating that; 
‘The decisions of either the Co-operative Party or the Co-operative Union Congress 
have to be implemented or rejected in the boardrooms of over a thousand separate 
Co-operative Societies, and often at their members meetings. To enforce an outside 
discipline upon a Co-operative Society is not the same thing as the enforcement of 
discipline upon a Divisional Labour Party.’327 
 
What Bailey is arguing here is that national affiliation to the Labour Party from the 
Co-operative Party and the direct affiliation of co-operative societies to Labour Party 
organisation would undermine the democracy entrenched in the ideals of the 
movement. Thus, despite the limitations on the Co-operative Party from their 
constitutional relationship with the Co-operative Union and the questionable amount of 
democracy it allowed in terms of policy making, in the context of the relationship with 
the Labour Party remaining loyal to the co-operative movement remained of paramount 
importance. 
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Divided Loyalties? Co-operative-Labour MPs and the Signing of Standing 
Orders. 
Nonetheless, the contradiction remains that, despite this emphasis on creating an 
independent political organisation locally, the Co-operative Party did rely on their 
electoral alliance with the Labour Party to achieve both Parliamentary and local 
representation. The development of local alliances and the continued growth of the 
Labour Party meant that securing representation without the assistance of the Labour 
Party by the 1930s was neither a viable nor desirable option for the Co-operative Party. 
Maintaining a harmonious organisational relationship with the Labour Party was 
therefore crucial for the Co-operative Party as this paved the way for representation. 
Co-operative-Labour MPs epitomise the contradictory aspects of this political alliance. 
Local co-operative political organisations would nominate their ‘bona fide’ co-operative 
parliamentary candidates, run election campaigns financed by co-operative funds and 
yet ultimately MPs were elected on the joint identity of Co-operative-Labour, using local 
Labour Party electoral apparatus. Moreover upon entering Parliament, Co-operative 
MPs were to all intents and purposes members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 
which Waterson, the first Co-operative MP, had set the precedent for. This was further 
complicated in 1924 when Co-operative-Labour MPs also became part of the Labour 
Government. On one hand it could be argued that as members of the Co-operative 
Party their loyalty was firstly to the co-operative movement through the constitutional 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Co-operative Union. Yet as 
members of the Parliamentary Labour Party their loyalty and commitment was also to 
the Labour Party. In McKenzie’s 1958 study of party organisation, he dismissed any 
potential differences in political identity between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party stating that ‘in any every important respect the Co-op and Labour MPs are 
indistinguishable from other members of the Parliamentary Labour Party’.328 
                                               
328 R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The distribution of power within the Conservative 
and Labour parties, (Heinemann, London, 1967 2nd Edition) p. 529. 
99 
 
Initially, the loyalty of Co-operative MPs to the Labour Party was assumed and not 
officially recognised. The Cheltenham Agreement for example contained no reference 
to how this loyalty would be demonstrated. However, in response to the ILP split from 
the Labour Party in 1932 all parliamentary candidates were required to sign the Labour 
Party’s standing orders upon nomination. As Laybourn stated, it is generally accepted 
that the ILP disaffiliated from the Labour Party in July 1932 because of its refusal to 
accept the 1929 revised standing orders of the Labour Party which forbade Labour 
MPs from voting against the Labour Party in Parliament.329 Furthermore this was 
imposed more rigorously after the 1931 election when the Labour Party actively 
tightened up its ranks.330 
Consequently the issue of the signing of standing orders was of significant importance 
to the Labour Party which was anxious to assert party discipline. Yet this signing of the 
standing orders had not been required from co-operative candidates previously and 
represented an infringement of their autonomy which was compounded by the other 
ongoing discussions regarding finance and affiliation. It arguably brought to the fore 
more than any of these other issues the Co-operative Party’s divided loyalties - in that 
co-operative candidates were required to pledge their loyalty to Labour Party decisions 
in Parliament, despite being members of the Co-operative Party and bound by the 
decisions of Co-operative Congress. 
The concern of senior figures within the Labour Party regarding the signing of standing 
orders was evident at a meeting of the Joint Committee of the Labour Party and 
Co-operative Party in March 1935. Stafford Cripps asked ‘are we going to admit the 
principle that members of parliament who are elected as a result of Party assistance 
are to be entitled, when in Parliament to vote against the Party?’331 Equally Herbert 
Morrison emphasised how this issue needed to be satisfactorily cleared up to prevent a 
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situation whereby the Co-operative Party could hold a disproportionate amount of 
power within a Labour Government with a small majority.332 The members of the 
Co-operative Party Executive Committee explained that they would need some form of 
guarantee that if they were to agree to this request there would be some platform for 
discussion between the co-operative movement and the Labour Party to ensure the 
trading interests of the movement would be protected.333 The Co-operative Party’s 
response to this request is revealing as whilst on one hand the Co-operative Party 
were keen to assert their independence from the Labour Party on the grounds of there 
being fundamental ideological differences, on the issue of standing orders their 
approach was much more flexible. What this indicates is that the autonomy of the 
Co-operative Party was less of a consideration if it ultimately meant the protection of 
co-operative business and trading interests.  
To ensure that the business needs of the co-operative movement were protected, the 
Labour Party proposed that the Co-operative Union join the National Council of Labour 
(NCL) to participate in wider discussions on economic policy.334 The National Council of 
Labour, initially known as the Joint Council, comprised at this point the Trade Union 
Congress and the Labour Party.335 The Trade Union Congress was in many respects 
similar to the Co-operative Union, acting as a federal body for subscribing trade unions. 
Yet whilst trade unions provided a huge basis of support for the Labour Party there was 
no constitutional relationship between the TUC and the Labour party and the NCL 
acted as a policy forum for the two organisations. Brookshire has shown how the 
influence of the of NCL on the Labour Party varied over time, illustrating how during the 
1930s it was an important arena for policy discussion and helped strengthen the TUC 
and the Party at this time.336 
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Therefore at the time of this invitation, the NCL was a body of relative importance in the 
wider labour movement and was one of the arenas in which the policy of the Labour 
Party was formulated. Yet this invitation was declined by the National Co-operative 
Authority on behalf of the Co-operative Union on the grounds that many of the items 
discussed by the NCL were outside their scope of interest.337 The rejection of this 
invitation was reported with disappointment at the Labour Party’s 1935 Conference by 
G. R. Shepherd, the National Agent. He stated that they had invited the Co-operative 
Party to appoint representatives to the NCL because they were anxious to create one 
channel of communication between the co-operative movement and the trades union 
movement regarding policy, adding that he hoped the decision to decline this invitation 
was only temporary.338 Therefore although the Co-operative Party Executive 
Committee members had secured this invitation through their negotiations with the 
Labour Party, the wider co-operative movement were still reluctant to commit to any 
overt political involvement outside the scope of the movement’s immediate interests. 
This demonstrates the constitutional limitations under which the Co-operative Party 
operated, as in essence the decision by the National Co-operative Authority to reject 
this invitation undermined what the Party had perceived to be an appropriate step in 
ensuring the business interests of the movement were protected. Therefore, although 
the Co-operative Party were mindful of the need to be actively involved in broader 
policy discussions, particularly when their MPs were now to be bound by the standing 
orders of the Parliamentary Labour Party, they had no authority to act upon this and 
consequently were inhibited by the insularity of the wider co-operative movement. On 
this occasion a closer policy relationship between the co-operative movement and the 
Labour Party had been brokered by the Co-operative Party, yet the trade-off negotiated 
by the Co-operative Party with the Labour Party was undermined by National 
Co-operative Authority, as the representative policy voice of the movement, which at 
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this point did not consider the impact of future policy on their business and trade 
concerns. 
This aside, the signing of the standing orders proved less of a contentious issue than 
the discussions over finance and nomination of candidates. At a Joint Committee of the 
Labour Party and Co-operative Party in 1936, the Labour Party executive outlined how 
if the co-operative movement had access to Labour ministers to protect their trading 
interests then there was no reason why members of the Co-operative Party who had 
not signed the appropriate nomination paper should do so now.339 Was there then a 
discernible level of resignation amongst the Co-operative Party leadership that once a 
candidate had been elected to Parliament that Labour Party identity would take 
priority? Mrs Smith, from the Coventry Co-operative Party, asked at the 1935 
Conference whether the Co-operative-Labour MPs met to form policy to present to the 
House of Commons. In response a representative of the National Committee stated 
that this was not the case as Co-operative MPs acted as general members of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and would take their part in the general procedures 
regarding policy.340 Thus at this point Co-operative MPs did not operate as identifiable 
group in Parliament, although this is unsurprising given that between 1931 and 1935 
there was only one Co-operative MP. The Labour Party leadership were keen to 
emphasise the need for cohesion to members of the Co-operative Party at 
parliamentary level. For example Hugh Dalton, the Labour Party’s fraternal delegate at 
the 1937 Co-operative Party conference claimed that ‘in the House of Commons the 
frontiers between the Co-operative and Labour MPs are invisible’. In 1939 Clement 
Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, speaking again as the fraternal delegate outlined 
how although in theory differences may arise between Co-operative and Labour MPs in 
Parliament this was not the case.341  
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The Mutual Benefits of the Electoral Alliance 
What the above statements from Dalton and Attlee indicate was that despite recurring 
challenges regarding the detail of the electoral alliance, the Labour Party leadership 
were keen to reassure Party members, and any press in attendance that overall unity 
prevailed. Equally at the 1935 Labour Party Conference, at which there had been 
discussions regarding the South Suburban speech by Alf Barnes, the National Agent, 
G. R. Shepherd played down negotiations with the Co-operative Party, emphasising 
that they were purely organisational.342 In 1939 the Labour Party invited a fraternal 
delegate from the Co-operative Party to their annual conference, marking a new 
departure in the history of their relationship and signalling a continued desire to work 
together.343 Yet a detailed survey of Labour Party conference reports throughout the 
1931 to 1951 period has shown that there was little open discussion regarding the 
alliance with the Co-operative Party. This is indicative of why historians of the Labour 
Party have previously overlooked the nuances in the organisational detail of the 
Labour-Co-operative alliance as at the Labour Party Conference the relationship with 
the Co-operative Party did not appear to be either a priority or of any concern. Indeed 
the fact that the Cheltenham Agreement in 1927 was passed without debate illustrates 
this. Equally, discussions regarding the relationship at Co-operative Party Conferences 
were also often in a private session.344 Nevertheless a survey of the Joint Committee 
Minutes of the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party from 1933 to 1939 has 
revealed that considerable time was spent by members of both the Party executives in 
considering the organisational difficulties which blighted the relationship during the 
1930s. The time and effort spent negotiating these organisational issues demonstrates 
a real and continued commitment to working together. 
Why was this time and effort spent? The mutual benefits of this alliance were perhaps 
most obvious for the Co-operative Party, as through local alliances with the Labour 
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Party they were able to achieve political representation, as the successful election of 
23 MPs in the 1945 election paid testament. However, there were also benefits from 
this alliance for the Labour Party in terms of increased local support, finance and grass 
roots activity from local co-operative political organisation, regardless of whether there 
was a co-operative candidate or not.345 The Co-operative Party aided the development 
of the Labour Party in new areas and tended to contest marginal and unwinnable 
seats.346 As McKenzie has illustrated, there was a strong tendency for Trade Unions to 
agree to sponsor candidates in safe Labour seats, in contrast to the Labour Party. For 
example, in 1951 only 10 out of a potential 38 Co-operative candidates were elected in 
contrast to 105 out of 139 potential Trade Union seats.347 A report from the 
Co-operative Union for the National Council of Labour in March 1945 noted that ‘it is 
suggested that the Co-operative Party should limit its activities to districts where there 
is little political consciousness’, but contends that this would mean the policy of the 
Co-operative Party would naturally be less progressive.348 
Beyond the formal electoral alliance the co-operative movement could also seek to 
influence votes of members of their societies in other constituencies and actively did so 
from 1935 when the Labour Party pledged to reverse the tax on co-operative 
societies.349 In this election the National Co-operative Authority actively organised a 
campaign backing the election of Labour Party candidates in all constituencies.350 
There was, therefore, on many levels a growing sense of political unity between these 
two working class organisations by the close of the 1930s.  
Towards a Workable Compromise? The 1946 Agreement. 
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In 1946 a new agreement was reached regarding the political alliance between the 
Co-operative Union and the Labour Party, replacing the 1927 Cheltenham 
Agreement.351 The first difference noted here is that the 1946 Agreement, although 
concerning the electoral arrangements between the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party, was a political agreement between the Co-operative Union and the Labour 
Party. Thus one aspect which this section will explore is how the agreement shifted 
from a bilateral one between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, as was the 
case in 1927 to a trilateral one between the Co-operative Union, Co-operative Party 
and the Labour Party. In examining the negotiations which led to this agreement and 
the reception that accompanied it, this section will consider the ways in which this 
differed from the 1927 Cheltenham Agreement, what compromises had to be made, 
and what implications this agreement had for the broader political relationship between 
the Co-operative Party, Labour Party and co-operative movement. 
The Agreement of 1946 was described by Jack Bailey as a ‘workable compromise’, 
which recognised the contradictory nature of the Co-operative Party’s relationship with 
the Labour Party but also its mutual benefits.352 The agreement was comprised of two 
parts; the first established a National Policy Committee between the Co-operative 
Union and the Labour Party executives which, as will be discussed was also a new 
departure. The second created a Joint Organisational Committee between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, comprised of four representatives from each 
party’s Executive, and its role was to facilitate the resolution of local level 
organisational disputes. In order to overcome the issues regarding finance and 
organisation which had dominated the disputes in the 1930s this agreement provided 
for affiliation from the constituency Co-operative Party to the constituency Labour Party 
as the model for local agreements, again marking a change in emphasis. The 
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exception here was for existing arrangements where a Co-operative MP already held 
the seat.353 
The 1946 Agreement was the consequence of the series of negotiations that had taken 
place since the 1933 Labour Party Hastings decision, in which the financial 
arrangements for Labour Party candidates had changed. As this chapter has 
illustrated, organisational tensions blighted the alliance between the Co-operative Party 
and the Labour Party as they both sought to develop robust party organisation. The 
Co-operative Party, in creating its own political machinery while forming local alliances 
with the Labour Party created a challenging situation for the Labour Party leadership 
who were seeking to create uniform nationwide political organisation. 
By 1938 it appears that the co-operative movement had realised the contradictory 
position of the Co-operative Party. At a meeting of the National Co-operative Authority 
in November 1938 the chair, Sir Fred Heyward, who was also a member of the 
Executive of the Co-operative Union, outlined how local co-operative societies and 
parties had been encouraged to affiliate to the local Labour Party organisation whilst 
nationally there was still not affiliation. He also highlighted the multiple obligations for 
Co-operative MPs who were responsible not only to Congress but also to their 
constituencies and to the Labour Party in Parliament. Heywood contended that the 
Co-operative Party had, whether intentionally or not, become part of the Labour Party 
machine thus making it virtually impossible to return to the conditions of 1933.354 
Heyward’s remarks here perhaps signal a realisation by the leadership of the 
co-operative movement that for the best results in terms of parliamentary 
representation they needed to work within the Labour Party. Earlier that year Heyward 
had outlined some key questions for the Labour Party at a Joint Committee Meeting. 
He asked what they desired the relationship of the two parties to be and whether they 
                                               
353 Lesson notes on the history of the Co-operative Party, Lesson IX – Relations with the 
Labour, p. 8. NCA/CPY/9/1/3/2. 
354 Co-operative Union Minutes/National Co-operative Authority/3 November 1938. 
107 
 
viewed the Co-operative Party as a political organisation akin to a Trade Union branch. 
He also questioned whether at no stage was the Co-operative Party entitled to have an 
opinion different from the Labour Party?355 Responding to these broader questions at a 
later meeting the Labour Party executive replied that it ‘would like to see the Co-op 
party affiliated but it would not move a finger to undermine it’ adding that ‘the Labour 
Party looked upon the Co-op Party as an equal with itself and was willing to give it 
every assistance’.356 The tone of these statements was somewhat more conciliatory 
perhaps than the crux of the organisation problems in 1936. Nevertheless the Labour 
Party still made it entirely clear that the desired relationship would be one that would 
include full affiliation.  
A crucial development here is the shift in responsibility for negotiations with the Labour 
Party from the Co-operative Party to the National Co-operative Authority.357 Whilst this 
signalled a greater interest from the wider co-operative movement in party politics, it 
also emphasised the limited capacity of the Co-operative Party to determine its own 
political path, particularly when relations had broken down with the Labour Party. As 
chapter one outlined, the replication of political functions within the co-operative 
movement provides another reason why the relationship is hard to categorise and often 
misunderstood. 
The Co-operative Union’s increased interest in political matters was also evident in 
their eventual inclusion on the National Council of Labour. In 1939 the Co-operative 
Union was again invited to join the National Council of Labour, initially in a consultative 
capacity.358 Despite declining an invitation to join in 1935, the outbreak of the Second 
World War clearly changed the landscape in which the co-operative movement was 
operating. Their experience, particularly in the retail and distributive industry, was 
coveted by the wider Labour movement, and was something which the Co-operative 
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Union believed they could usefully contribute to. Was there then a business motive for 
the Co-operative Union in joining the National Council of Labour as only four years 
earlier the movement had deemed this body of having little relevance? In July 1941 the 
Co-operative Union joined the National Council of Labour on the same terms as the 
Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party.359 The National Committee of the 
Co-operative Party reported at the 1942 Conference that ‘we are glad that the Co-op 
Movement is now actively participating in the consultations and decisions by the 
National Council’ and added that the Co-operative Party were allocated one of the 
places.360 On the surface this signalled closer relations across the wider working-class 
movement and a greater political role for the co-operative movement. However the 
influence that the co-operative movement could exert through this body was limited as 
Brookshire has argued that by 1941 the influence of this body had declined as its 
Parliamentary Labour Party members became more involved in taking policy decisions 
in Government.361  
In 1938 an understanding was reached between the National Co-operative Authority 
and the Labour Party that a new agreement was needed. However on the outbreak of 
war negotiations were suspended on the basis that this understanding should remain 
unchanged until normal electioneering resumed.362 The decision to shelve these 
negotiations for the period of war were questioned by delegates at the 1940 
Co-operative Party Conference. Councillor Jarrett of the London Political Committee 
outlined how local people were members of both Parties and they needed some solid 
lead so as not to impair Co-operative Party interests when the time of election came.363 
In response to these concerns Barnes stated that the difficulties never represented a 
difference in policy or programme which affected presenting a joint programme to the 
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electorate but were purely organisational.364 He added that these organisational 
difficulties were because they could not permit the Labour Party to impose its 
arrangements, in particular the 1933 Hastings Conference decision to impose 
limitations on the financing of elections, on the Co-operative Party.365  
It was reported at the 1945 Co-operative Congress that the Co-operative Party had 
informed the National Co-operative Authority that it was desirable that negotiations 
should be resumed with the Labour Party in preparation for a general election. The 
National Co-operative Authority subsequently appointed a sub-committee to negotiate 
with the Labour Party which included Albert Ballard and Alf Barnes.366 Both Barnes and 
Ballard were members of the National Co-operative Authority and although they played 
a pivotal role in the renegotiation of the alliance with the Labour Party, the Co-operative 
Party as an organisation had little influence. 
It was local circumstances which generated the resolution at the 1945 Co-operative 
Party Conference to secure a new arrangement with the Labour Party. In moving the 
resolution Mr D. Wilson of the Renfrewshire Party stated that the two Parties should be 
devoted to ensuring the return of a socialist government but instead would be too busy 
squabbling and fighting among themselves.367 He argued that ‘this undercurrent of 
conflict between local organisations should be tackled before it grows to any greater 
extent’.368 Yet the nature of the alliance with the Labour Party remained a divisive issue 
within the Co-operative Party’s membership and at this Conference a lengthy debate 
on affiliation to the Labour Party took place. Although the proposal to affiliate was 
overwhelmingly rejected, what this debate illustrates is that there was a minority of 
members which believed working within the Labour Party would achieve better results 
for co-operative politics.369 The motion to affiliate was moved by the Royal Arsenal 
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Co-operative Society and supported by the Manchester and Salford Society. In general 
the motion outlined that it was wasteful to have two democratic parties each competing 
for the votes of same people and that the best way to make the working class 
movement democratic was to be within the labour movement.370 Mr H. E. Campbell of 
the Enfield Highway Society stated that the proposal to affiliate was unrealistic as 
ultimately it would need to be the whole co-operative movement which affiliated thus 
disbanding the Co-operative Party. However, he prophesised that even if this affiliation 
occurred, the ideological friction between the co-operative movement and Labour Party 
would eventually lead to the movement having to withdraw from the Labour Party and 
start again from scratch.371 Mrs C. S. Ganley of the London Society also argued against 
affiliation stating that the ‘co-operative movement has a particular economic 
contribution to make in the political field and this must be safeguarded’.372 What these 
remarks suggest is that there was an awareness of potential ideological and policy 
discord which is why the movements had this unique arms-length relationship. The 
rejection of the motion to affiliate also indicates that the majority of the attendees at the 
conference were of the opinion that the Co-operative Party had a role and purpose that 
the Labour Party could not embody. Yet as emphasised by Mr J. Allison, presenting the 
view of the National Committee, although they were against national affiliation this did 
not mean disunity, as they supported local affiliation and a sacrifice of co-operative 
electoral machinery to work through the Labour Party.373 The level of debate and 
divisions over the nature of the Co-operative Party’s relationship with the Labour Party 
here illustrates its continuing complexity and contradictions.  
The subsequent agreement was presented to both Party Conferences and 
Co-operative Congress to accept or reject in its entirety, and was accepted at both.374 
At the Co-operative Party Conference, Albert Ballard, who had been involved in the 
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formulation of the agreement, described how they were faced with one of two extremes 
in the negotiation of this agreement; either complete affiliation or complete 
independence, but they had come between the two.375 The early negotiations between 
the sub-committee of the National Co-operative Authority and the Labour Party reveal 
that there were still ongoing concerns within the Labour Party about the autonomy of 
the co-operative movement. In an internal document regarding the proposed new 
agreement, the Labour Party Executive outlined concerns about the implications of the 
inclusion of a joint policy committee, as they, like the Co-operative Union, did not want 
to lose autonomy over their policy.376  
Ballard further outlined how although united policy action and electoral action were 
possible under this agreement there was still the required independence for policy 
making. For the Co-operative Party this meant that Congress would remain the final 
and sole authority on the policy of the Party but equally this limited the power of this 
newly formed policy committee as its recommendations were not binding on either 
Party.377 This policy committee, therefore, would have no authority over the policy of 
the Labour Party, which had been one of their concerns. However, Ballard emphasised 
that there was a real desire for unity between the Labour Party and the wider 
co-operative movement in this agreement and moreover that this unity was already 
evident in the work of the National Council of Labour.378 Nevertheless, the 
establishment of this policy committee did represent a change in the nature of the 
political relationship between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Union, as 
although it had no real authority it provided explicitly for the first time a committee to 
enable policy discussions between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement.  
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Writing in the Co-operative Review in 1946, Jack Bailey suggested that the policy 
committee was more significant than the organisational arrangement stating;  
‘If the outlook and economic aims of the two movements can be mutually adjusted it 
ought to be possible to dovetail electoral plans. Agreement has been reached not by 
concealing or surrendering different views, nor by any process of absorption, but by 
creating machinery for consultation’.379  
 
Organisation, therefore, needed to recognise and reflect the differing ideological needs 
of both organisations whilst providing appropriate scope for consultation.  
The 1946 agreement was not however without compromises and perhaps the most 
significant changes in terms of the operation of the electoral alliance was that potential 
Co-operative Party candidates would now be required to be individual members of the 
Labour Party. The 1945 document regarding relations between the Parties evidences 
this desire by the Labour Party to secure a guarantee that co-operative candidates 
were not supporters of other Parties ineligible for affiliation to the Labour Party or those 
who owed no allegiance to local Labour Parties.380 This was a crucial concern for the 
Labour Party who were keen to keep other political organisations, in particular the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) outside their political organisation.381 
However this requirement was a potentially contentious issue for the Co-operative 
Party. Consequently at the Co-operative Party Conference, R. G. Gosling of the 
National Committee, in anticipation of questions from the delegates regarding this 
matter stated that ‘the worst that can be said of that provision is that it is unnecessary; 
but it is not vicious; it is not repugnant to our policy’.382 The Party leadership were right 
to recognise that this would cause some discussion, in particular from Mr J. McNeil of 
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the Kilmarnock Party who stated that this would be more problematic in Scotland where 
many co-operators did not think along Labour lines’.383  
The 1951 change in the constitution of the Co-operative Party reflected this change in 
the agreement, evident in the inclusion of a declaration for individual members, 
candidates and Party officials that they were not members of any political organisation 
which sponsored or supported Parliamentary or local government candidates in 
opposition to the candidates of the Co-operative Party and of any other party which it 
has an electoral agreement.384 This also reflected a broader consensus in both the 
Labour Party and the Co-operative Party of the need to remove communist influence 
from their organisations. For example a resolution had been passed at the 1941 
Co-operative Party Conference regarding membership, stating ‘that this conference is 
of the opinion that membership of the Co-operative Party should be confined to 
supporters of the political programme and policy of the Co-operative Party as from time 
to time declared by the Co-operative Congress’.385 This final resolution differed from 
the initial resolution which had specified that members and supporters of the 
Communist Party be ineligible for membership.386 The mover of the original motion, Mr 
A. Pollock, suggested that the infiltration of communists into local Party organisation 
was a negative influence.387 This concern was also raised in the debate regarding the 
new agreement at the 1946 Co-operative Party Conference. A delegate noted that 
there was a real fear that this condition of dual membership would make compromises 
on the identity of co-operators, however he posited whether objection to this was 
sufficient enough basis to reject the agreement, as the concern of the Labour Party 
imposing this was to prevent people from proscribed organisations coming into the 
Party through the looseness of Co-operative Party membership.388 
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The Agreement of 1946 did to a certain extent represent a ‘workable compromise’.389 
Furthermore Bailey had contended ‘critics must learn to apply co-operative standards 
to co-operative matters, and not the ordinary measurements of political organisation’.390 
Yet the compromises made were mainly on the part of the Co-operative Party, as local 
affiliation was now encouraged to the Labour Party and membership conditions had 
been imposed, thus suggesting that this agreement adhered to the standards of 
organisation required by the Labour Party.  
Conclusions 
The 1927 Cheltenham Agreement recognised existing local practices but also mapped 
out a unique political alliance which exists still today. The close links between the 
co-operative movement and the Labour Party in some localities meant political culture 
of some areas, for example in Sheffield the development of the Co-operative Party was 
bound up with the development of local Labour Party organisation. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, however, the nature of both the national relationship between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party was determined by the constantly evolving 
organisational culture of each party. 
What this chapter has demonstrated is that the political alliance between the Labour 
Party and Co-operative Party, and later the Co-operative Union represented a unique 
dimension in the organisation of the Labour Party, particularly in a period when the 
Labour Party was curbing the potential influence other political organisations could 
have on the Party.391 During the 1930s this anomalous position created a series of 
organisational tensions at local level which were played out nationally between the 
executives of both Parties. Underpinning these organisational discussions was the 
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issue of affiliation – the Labour Party did not want the Co-operative Party to continue to 
develop autonomous political organisation as this did not fit with their agenda to create 
a unified Party encompassing all working class organisations. Yet the Co-operative 
Party, constituted as a department of the Co-operative Union, could not affiliate to the 
Labour Party as this would undermine its role and purpose, along with the autonomy of 
Co-operative Congress. One key change this chapter has highlighted was the gradual 
incursion of the Co-operative Union into politics, as the National Co-operative Authority 
took an increasingly greater role in managing the relationship with the Labour Party.  
The 1946 Agreement was essentially a compromise, mainly on the part of the 
Co-operative Party which accepted that local affiliation to the Constituency Labour 
Party represented the most efficient way of working within the Labour Party to achieve 
political representation. This varied from the 1927 Cheltenham Agreement which had 
given greater scope for existing practices, such as the formation of local joint 
committees to manage the fielding of candidates. The main concession however was 
the condition that candidates now also had to be members of the Labour Party, in an 
attempt to stymie the infiltration of the Labour Party through the Co-operative Party by 
members of other political organisations, notably the CPGB. These compromises 
reflected the ‘inner contradiction’ the Co-operative Party found itself in – whilst leaders 
of the Party and the Co-operative Union wanted to retain a level of autonomy from the 
Labour Party they also saw the value of working within the Labour Party to achieve 
parliamentary representation. The compromises made were softened by the inclusion 
of a National Policy Committee between the Co-operative Union and the Labour Party 
which signalled a greater role in politics for the movement. Nevertheless the usefulness 
of this policy committee has since been questioned by Rhodes who contended that it 
was impossible for the policy committee ‘as constituted by the 1946 Agreement to 
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reach effective conclusions on many of the many specialised matters of policy which 
were the concern of both Parties’.392 
What is evident throughout this chapter is that a significant amount of time and effort 
was spent on organisational discussions by both the Co-operative Party and the 
Labour Party, demonstrating a reciprocal commitment to maintaining this alliance. 
Crucially what needs to be considered is that in the main during this period the 
leadership of both the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party were keen to 
emphasise unity and maintain that these differences were purely organisational. 
Redvaldsen suggested that for the Labour party the dispute with the Co-operative Party 
fundamentally related to how much autonomy Parties affiliated to them should have.393 
In contrast, for the Co-operative Party and the co-operative movement, the 
compromise boiled down to how much of their autonomy they were willing to concede 
to maintain the benefits of this electoral alliance.  
Control, therefore, was a key issue underpinning these discussions as maintaining 
autonomy over policy was vital to both organisations. Therefore the tensions which 
dominated the 1930s regarding organisation did represent an awareness of ideological 
differences between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party. This has been noted 
previously by Friend, who studied the wider relationships between working class 
organisations in the 1990s, and argued that the dilemma regarding ideological theories 
was a reason for the arms-length relationship between the Labour Party and the 
co-operative movement.394 In maintaining their own political organisation the 
co-operative movement believed that they had a distinct contribution to make to politics 
– and this explains why affiliation to the Labour Party nationally was not an option. As a 
Co-operative Union lesson on the Co-operative Party aptly summarises; ‘in general 
political opinion of the Co-operative Movement is similar to that of the Labour Party, 
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which makes such a working agreement possible, but there are also important 
differences which make a distinctive Co-operative Party necessary’.395  
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CHAPTER 3: ‘THE WASTED YEARS?’ THE POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CO-OPERATIVE PARTY, 1931-1945. 
‘The Co-operative and the Labour movement do not see eye to eye on every phase of 
political action. We both do believe, however, in Co-operative and Public Ownership of 
the sources of wealth as against individual ownership, and this binds us together as 
open and declared allies.’ Alf Barnes, 1932.396 
The above quote from Barnes indicates that the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party were allied politically due to their commitment to ‘co-operative and public 
ownership’. As the previous chapter has illustrated the electoral alliance between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party reflected this shared ideological ground. 
However, what became evident in the analysis of the organisational relationship 
between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, was that they both wanted to 
retain autonomy over their policy and this shaped the nature of their alliance. At the 
emergency conference, from which the Co-operative Party was created, it was stated 
that ‘co-operation is a theory of society, and, therefore a legitimate basis for a political 
party’.397 Thus, the Co-operative Party had a different political vision to the Labour 
Party, based upon the principles of the movement which it represented. This chapter, 
moving away from an analysis of organisation, will focus on the policy and ideological 
aspects of the relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party in the 
period 1931 to 1945. 
Speaking in 1932, Barnes’ statement echoed to an extent the Labour Party’s 
developing commitment at that time to achieving socialism through public ownership, 
as Clause 4 of their 1918 Constitution had outlined. Barnes use of the terms 
‘co-operative and public’, however, highlights a key point of ideological difference 
between the two movements, which would emerge particularly in the post war period. 
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Whilst historians have indicated that this ideological difference in emphasis created 
tensions between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement, particularly in the 
1945 to 1951 period, there has been no detailed examination of the policy making 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party.398 Co-operative 
historians have tended to focus on the organisational aspects of both the Party and its 
relationship with the Labour Party in the 1930s, concluding that the Party overlooked 
policy development due to time spent on organisational matters.399 In contrast, 
discussions of the post 1945 period often pivoted around the Labour Party’s proposal 
to nationalise co-operatively owned insurance services as evidence of the 
marginalisation of co-operative ideas.400  
This chapter will therefore examine what factors contributed to this marginalisation of 
co-operative ideas by the Labour Party in the postwar period by drawing upon evidence 
from 1931 onwards, when both the Co-operative Party and Labour Party began to 
consider more seriously what a Labour-Co-operative programme for government would 
embody. For the Labour Party, the link between the development of policy in the 1930s 
and the programme implemented by the 1945 Labour Government has been 
established by a number of historians. Francis has argued that ‘the content and 
character of the nationalisation programme of 1945 was very much a reflection of the 
socialist priorities and expectations of the 1930s’.401 Furthermore, Thompson has 
suggested that socialist thinking that took place following the collapse of the Labour 
Government in 1931 ‘had a profound impact on the evolution of socialist political 
economy in Britain in that decade’.402  
It can, therefore, be argued that if the Co-operative Party was to have any influence on 
the post war nationalisation programme of the Labour Party, or on its wider ideological 
                                               
398 Francis, Ideas and Policies, pp. 83-89, Manton, ‘The Labour party’, pp. 756-778, Roberston, 
‘A Union of Forces’, p. 224. 
399 Cole, A Century of Co-operation, pp. 326-327, Rhodes, Co-operative Labour-Relations, 
p.38.  
400 Gurney, ‘Battle of Consumer’, p. 965. 
401 Francis, Ideas and Policies, p. 90. 
402 Thompson, Political Economy, p. 92. 
120 
 
progression this would need to have been framed within this period of socialist 
rethinking and consequent policy development during the 1930s.403 Taking up this 
theme, the focus of the analysis and research for this chapter will centre on notions of 
ownership. It will ask to what extent the co-operative movement, through the 
Co-operative Party, advocated co-operative forms of ownership in contrast to the 
Labour Party’s focus on state forms during this crucial period of policy development. 
Whilst the co-operative movement and the Labour Party were committed to common 
ownership, the methods through which they envisaged this being achieved were 
different. As G. D. H. Cole outlined in his history of the co-operative movement in 1944, 
the labour and co-operative movements ‘approached political problems from different 
angles’, although he noted that they did converge for the most part on common 
solutions.404 In 1925 the Co-operative Union included a commitment to the 
‘Co-operative Commonwealth’ in its aims, which Cole suggested emphasised their 
hostility to capitalism.405 However to what extent was the idea of a ‘co-operative 
commonwealth’, meaning a society in which goods and services were co-operatively 
owned and controlled through voluntary democratic association, evident in the policy of 
the Co-operative Party?  
This chapter will argue that the structure in which the Co-operative Party operated 
created a number of organisational challenges, which in turn significantly impeded the 
Party’s ability to form a distinctly co-operative political policy. It will illustrate the 
difficulties the Party faced in trying to carve out a political identity for itself. In doing so, 
it will ask how the policy development of the Co-operative Party was affected by the 
simultaneous need to be the independent political voice of the co-operative movement 
and part of the Labour Party electoral machine. Did the Co-operative Union have a 
strong political commitment to the advancement of a ‘Co-operative Commonwealth’, or 
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was it, as Bonner suggested, more concerned with immediate problems of finance, 
trade, systems of management?406 Gurney contended that ‘co-operators suffered 
constant pressure from external threats during the interwar years’, and this chapter will 
build on this and consider how these affected the political culture in which the 
Co-operative Party developed their political programme.407 It will illustrate that external 
factors impacted on the political development of the Co-operative Party during this 
period, and thus organisational limitations were just one of several factors in a broader 
environment which affected the development of a distinct co-operative policy.  
Starting with the Labour Government split of 1931, it will firstly explore how the 
Co-operative Party, like the Labour Party, began to pay more attention to developing a 
programme for Government. Secondly it will examine the emerging policy programme 
of the Co-operative Party during the 1930s and how it compared with that of the Labour 
Party, in particular regarding economic policy and methods of ownership. Thirdly, this 
chapter will discuss how the development of the Co-operative Party programme was 
navigated and affected both by the implicit link with the Co-operative Union and their 
electoral alliance with the Labour Party. Fourthly, it will examine policy discussions 
between the Co-operative Party, Labour Party and co-operative movement in this 
period, in the context of the organisational relationship. Finally, this chapter will 
conclude with a consideration of how the development of policy between 1931 and 
1945 was affected by the broader political culture in which the Co-operative Party 
operated. How did external challenges to the co-operative movement, including the 
changing international situation which led to the outbreak of the Second World War in 
1939, affect the political outlook of the Co-operative Party? 
1931: A Turning Point? 
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The year 1931 was a turning point for both the Co-operative Party and the Labour 
Party. The minority Labour Government elected in 1929 and headed by Ramsay 
MacDonald was faced with a serious worldwide economic crisis. MacDonald’s budget 
response in August 1931 to this economic crisis was not supported by the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and consequently the Party split, with members of the 
cabinet resigning from Government. Amongst these was Co-operative-Labour MP, A. 
V. Alexander, who resigned from his position as Lord of the Admiralty, demonstrating 
his commitment to the Labour Party. However, Alexander’s actions represented not 
only a personal commitment from him to the Labour Party, but also reflected a more 
significant commitment from the Co-operative Party to the Labour Party. Alexander’s 
unique position as both a Co-operative and Labour MP and a member of the Labour 
Government was the focus of ‘long and full’ discussions by the Executive Committee of 
the Co-operative Party. The minutes of the Executive Committee on the 30 August 
1931 recorded that having heard a statement from A. V. Alexander on the political and 
financial crisis’ they approved of the grounds upon which Alexander and T. Henderson 
(a Co-operative-Labour MP for Glasgow Tradeston and Comptroller of the Household 
in the Labour Government) resigned their positions as Ministers and ‘agreed that 
Co-operative Members in Parliament should associate themselves with the official 
Opposition to Government’.408 The subsequent General Election results of 1931 proved 
to be a devastating blow to the Labour Party, and this in turn impacted upon the 
Co-operative Party, resulting in only William Leonard being elected as a Co-operative-
Labour MP, in the Glasgow St Rollox constituency. 
The experience of the Labour Party in 1931 resulted in what has been described as a 
‘process of stocktaking’ which represented a new direction for the Party and a break 
from the evolutionary socialism of the MacDonald era.409 Thompson has argued that 
the collapse of the Labour government in 1931, combined with the political and 
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economic circumstances surrounding the collapse, ‘raised certain fundamental 
questions about the nature and fate of capitalism, the general economic strategy to 
which Labour had been committed and the theoretical basis upon which that had 
rested’.410 In addition, other historians have suggested that one of the key lessons 
gleaned from 1931 was the need for the next Labour government to deliver the goods 
in terms of tangible benefits for the working class. This was illustrated by the 
appointment of a Policy Subcommittee in December 1931.411 
Historians have addressed the policy development of the Labour Party during the 
1930s, and in doing so have demonstrated how the ideas formed in this period formed 
the basis of their 1945 Manifesto. For Socialism and Peace published by the Labour 
Party in 1934 was the result of the work of the policy sub-committees and gave a 
higher priority to nationalisation than previous policies and showed how the Labour 
Party’s priorities had changed since the 1920s.412 This policy statement advocated ‘full 
and rapid socialist planning’ through the common ownership of banking, transport, 
water, coal, electricity, gas, agriculture, iron and steel, shipping, shipbuilding, 
chemicals, engineering, textiles, insurance and land.413 Furthermore, as Worley, has 
demonstrated the methods through which these would be achieved had less emphasis 
on municipal methods and more focus on state, arguing that ‘national rather than local 
solutions were now entrenched at the top of the Party’s agenda’.414 This focus on the 
state also reflected the decline of guild socialism, as advocated by intellectuals like G. 
D. H. Cole in the 1920s, as a strand within Labour Party policy. This, Riddell argued, 
meant ‘Labour lost a facet of its ideology which could have been a means of avoiding 
some of the weaknesses of the collective socialism created by the post 1945 Labour 
governments’.415 Equally, increased Trade Union influence on policy development 
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during 1930s has been noted, due in part to the reduced size of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party.416 Riddel states how Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the Trade 
Union Council argued that because the Trade Unions created the Labour Party they 
should have full involvement in policy formation.417 He suggested that through the 
National Council of Labour the trade unions could directly influence the policy of the 
Labour Party, and argued that during the 1930s this had a steadying influence on the 
Labour left.418 Within this context, what influence could the Co-operative Party exert on 
the development of the Labour Party policy? 
The events of 1931 prompted the Co-operative Party to reflect on their policy and 
purpose as illustrated by their pamphlet The Crisis of 1931.419 This pamphlet proposed 
a greater co-operative identity in politics, suggesting that the ‘individuality of the 
Co-operative Party should be more clearly and forcibly expressed’.420 It outlined that 
this did not mean a break with the Labour Party, but that the Co-operative Party must 
devise more clearly a distinctive co-operative contribution to political policy and express 
it effectively.421 This reflected the fact that the movement was beginning to look to the 
Co-operative Party as the instrument of their political ambitions.422 
It is important to note here that an examination of Co-operative Party records reveals 
that work on a clear political programme did in fact pre-date the 1931 crisis.423 Although 
the crisis coincided with the publication of the Britain Reborn policy statements, work 
had started on production of these policy documents in 1930.424 A Joint Meeting of the 
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Executive Committee of the Co-operative Party and the Parliamentary Group met in 
November 1930 to discuss the Party’s attitude to Free Trade and Protection, a key 
political issue of the time, and one which directly affected the business interests of the 
movement. At this meeting it was proposed that a revised programme for the 
Co-operative Party be drafted, containing positive proposals from the co-operative 
movement for a practical solution of the unemployment problem and reconstruction on 
co-operative lines.425 The meeting discussed that, although the Party remained 
opposed to tariffs, simply advocating Free Trade was ‘not an effective weapon to deal 
with existing economic crises.426 In a subsequent meeting, Mr Hall, a member of the 
Party Executive highlighted that this programme needed to be a statement on the 
Party’s attitude to immediate problems.  
The new political programme was communicated through a series of colourful 
pamphlets entitled Britain Reborn. The Britain Reborn series of pamphlets were 
headlined as ‘a series of pamphlets explaining the policy of the Co-operative Party for 
grappling with the unemployment evil and for starting the deliberate building of the 
Co-operative Commonwealth’.427 Seven pamphlets were published in total, plus a 
summary of them all printed in 1934. The pamphlets, which were bright, colourful and 
appealing, dealt with a range of subjects including Power and Fuel, Transport, The 
Countryside, Buy British, Men and Money, Work for All and Civic Ideals. Carbery 
described the Britain Reborn series as so inconsistent and vague that they were 
‘embarrassing in their naivety’.428 Yet the content of these pamphlets would form the 
basis of the Co-operative Party’s economic policies until 1945 and should not be 
dismissed purely by their lack of distinctly co-operative content. As will be illustrated 
throughout this chapter their content symbolises how the Co-operative Party was 
limited by various organisational factors in developing detailed policy statements. It will 
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also argue that Co-operative Party policy, as epitomised in the Britain Reborn series 
represented one aspect of the range of political opinion which existed in the broader 
labour movement. 
The report of the Co-operative Party to Congress in 1932 outlined how the pamphlets 
‘are excellently compiled, well-illustrated and have created a widespread impression’, 
adding that they were ‘invaluable to speakers, students and others who are anxious to 
secure the most up-to-date information upon the leading problems of the day’.429 It was 
clearly intended that these pamphlets be used in a practical way to encourage policy 
discussion at local level. The General Election of 1931 provided an opportunity for this 
newly written policy to be tested with the Co-operative Party manifesto of 1931 boldly 
stating ‘Capitalism must give way to Co-operation’.430 A speech by A. V. Alexander, at 
Queens Hall in London in October 1931, emphasised the distinct and practical 
contribution the co-operative movement offered through this new political 
programme.431 This speech was one of many within a series of conferences organised 
by the Co-operative Party in the autumn of 1931 to promote and publicise their 
programme. Alexander’s speech reflected the policy outlined in the Britain Reborn 
pamphlets, with him lobbying for state control of power, fuel and transport.432 However, 
Alexander’s speech did not contain anything distinctly co-operative in terms of how 
co-operative methods should be used to reshape the economy, and instead echoed the 
Labour Party’s 1931 election manifesto, Labour’s call to action, which also called for 
the national ownership and control of power, transport and iron and steel.433 Alexander 
needed to represent in his speeches not only the point of view of the Co-operative 
Party but also the Labour Party, as he was elected on the dual identity of Co-operative 
and Labour. Thus for practical electoral reasons could the policy of the Co-operative 
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Party be expected to offer a different message to that of the Labour Party? Did the 
Britain Reborn series therefore reflect not only a need for unity within the co-operative 
movement but also a need for unity across the wider Labour movement? In 1929 
Barnes stated that;  
‘Trade Union and Socialist opinion has dwelt mainly on State and Municipal action to 
obtain our ends, whilst Co-operative thought has placed its reliance on voluntary 
methods. The work of the Co-operative Party is to bridge the gap between the two, and 
to show that the State, the Municipality and the Co-operative Movement can each play 
their part in creating the Co-operative Commonwealth.’434  
Did then, the Co-operative Party bridge this gap Barnes described, and advocate a 
co-operative contribution to the policy debates regarding both state and municipal 
ownership during the 1930s? 
Co-operative Party Policy: Advocating a Co-operative Commonwealth? 
Although the Britain Reborn pamphlets are clear evidence of an attempt by the 
Co-operative Party to define their policy, an analysis of the content of these does 
indicate that the extent to which these pamphlets embodied co-operative ideas of 
ownership and control is limited. Whilst the frontispiece of each pamphlet outlined that 
they explain ‘the policy of the Co-operative Party for grappling with the unemployment 
evil and for starting the deliberate building of the Co-operative Commonwealth’, their 
content arguably does not articulate distinctly co-operative methods of ownership. 
Britain Reborn: No 1 Power and Fuel advocated the ‘establishment of a National Power 
Board to acquire all electricity and gas undertakings in Great Britain, and to organise, 
extend, and develop them into a unified and nationalised power and lighting authority 
with the primary object of providing the community with the cheapest and most efficient 
service that scientific knowledge and engineering can contrive’.435 It also stated that 
coal was immediately ready for nationalisation, as ‘systematic advanced planning can 
only come when the whole of the power and fuel resources of the national are 
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consolidated under national ownership and subject to unified administration’.436 
Similarly Britain Reborn: No 2 Transport proposed a ‘unified and nationalised transport 
authority’ to acquire all railways, canals, air services and public road services’.437 It 
stated that this was necessary as it was ‘manifestly futile to rely on unification and co-
ordination establishing themselves in the absence of public ownership’.438 Britain 
Reborn: No 5 Men and Money also advocated the public ownership of the Bank of 
England.439 There is nothing distinctly co-operative in terms of methods of ownership 
advocated in these three pamphlets, with all proposing that national boards be 
established to control these nationally owned services. Whilst this still represented 
collective ownership there were none of the key principles of co-operation, such as 
voluntary association or consumer/worker/producer controlled boards proposed in 
these policies.  
The consumer identity of the Co-operative Party was adhered to in Britain Reborn: No 
4 Buy British, which outlined proposals for avoiding tariffs and consequently reducing 
prices for the consumer, reflecting the growing concern felt within the co-operative 
movement regarding the impact of tariffs and trade rings both on their trade and the 
consumer.440 The emphasis on consumers in this pamphlet affirms the role embodied 
by the Co-operative Party to support consumers yet there was nothing distinctly 
co-operative about this pamphlet – it did not offer a co-operative solution to the 
problems of wholesale, distribution and retail – despite these being key to the identity 
of the British co-operative movement.  
Britain Reborn: No 3 The Countryside was the exception to the rule and this pamphlet 
proposed ‘to apply co-operative methods, first to the marketing of agricultural produce; 
and then to whole process of raising, marketing, manufacturing, and distributing food 
                                               
436 Ibid, p. 32. 
437 Co-operative Party, Britain Reborn: No 2 Transport, p. III. 
438 Ibid, p. 22. 
439 Co-operative Party, Britain Reborn: No 5 Men and Money, p. III. 
440 Co-operative Party, Britain Reborn: No 4 Buy British. 
129 
 
products’.441 This pamphlet is the only one in the Britain Reborn series which 
advocated use of co-operative methods in the restructuring of the Party, although did 
not give much detail as to how this would work in practice. Furthermore, the agricultural 
policy of the Co-operative Party articulated in this pamphlet, as shall be explored later 
in this chapter, was contested by both the Co-operative Union and the Labour Party.  
Peter Shea, an active co-operator, commenting upon the Britain Reborn series in the 
1950s remarked that ‘more emphasis was laid upon the socialisation of nationalisation 
than upon the socialism inherent in the Co-operative Movement itself’.442 However he 
added that this was ‘of course necessary at this time’.443 Therefore, although the Britain 
Reborn series of pamphlets can be criticised for not containing a clear co-operative 
message of ownership, Shea writing only twenty years after their publication illustrated 
how the content of these pamphlets reflected the political culture of the Co-operative 
Party at that time. For example the seventh pamphlet, Civic Ideals, stated that the 
national and municipal proposals framed in these pamphlets were designed to promote 
the maximum measure of unity between the co-operative, trade union and labour 
movements.444 Moreover, it outlined how ‘it directs the right use of political power by 
indicating the type of services that first should be brought under public ownership’ and 
‘describes the services that can be developed more rapidly and better on a 
Co-operative plan’.445 A summary of the pamphlets published in 1934, outlined these 
distinctions stating how coal, oil, gas, electricity, railways, public road services, air 
services and waterways would all be brought under state and municipal control, that 
the Bank of England would be a publicly owned corporation and that there would be 
producer and consumer co-operative agencies for agriculture.446 
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Therefore, Co-operative Party policy at the beginning of the 1930s complemented the 
policy of the Labour Party by advocating that key industries and services, such as 
power and transport, should be nationalised. Although the Britain Reborn series made 
notional comments about the role of the co-operative movement in the restructuring of 
agriculture, the pamphlets as a whole did not provide a clear blueprint for a society 
arranged on co-operative lines. This is further evident in 1933 a resolution was passed 
at the Co-operative Party conference which stated:  
‘The object of the Co-operative Party is the establishment of a co-operative 
commonwealth, wherein the means of production shall be collectively owned, and 
wherein the co-operative movement shall function as the medium for the provision of 
the personal and domestic requirements of the community.’447  
 
Moving this resolution, T. E. Williams of Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society, stated 
that the purpose of this resolution was to focus attention on the role the movement 
could play in a collectivist state – hence the emphasis on ‘personal and domestic’. 
Whilst this resolution was ‘heartily accepted’ by the whole conference there was no 
discussion on its detail and the distinctions between the various forms of collective 
ownership. In this respect, whilst calling for a co-operative commonwealth, this 
resolution is not arguing for a radically alternative approach to that of the Labour Party 
in this period. This is unsurprising given that its mover, T. E. Williams, was part of the 
Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society which identified closely with the Labour Party – 
and due to their affiliation to the Labour Party, Williams was a member of the Labour 
Party’s National Executive Committee.  
From this we can conclude that although the Britain Reborn series signified a positive 
attempt by the Co-operative Party to define a political programme, the series did lack a 
distinct co-operative policy. Equally a clear co-operative interpretation of collective 
ownership was absent, even in Co-operative Party conference resolutions which called 
for a ‘co-operative commonwealth’. It is for this reason that Carbery has described this 
period as ‘the wasted years’, in which he argued that more time on policy had been 
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necessary ‘to argue the case for co-operative forms of social ownership to complement 
nationalisation’.448  
A Co-operative Exercise Amongst Co-operators? Limitations on the 
Development of a Distinctly Co-operative Policy. 
The following discussion will consider why a distinctly co-operative policy on ownership 
did not emerge. It will illustrate that the policy of the Co-operative Party, as articulated 
in Britain Reborn, reflected an overwhelming desire for unity, not only with the Labour 
Party, but within the wider co-operative movement. The formation of policy was not a 
straightforward exercise for the Co-operative Party and they faced some key 
challenges in determining the content of their political programme. As outlined in 
chapter one, the Party was constituted to reflect the views of the movement and final 
authority on policy remained with Co-operative Congress, not within the Party. Thus, 
policy was decided by co-operators who may not necessarily have been supporters of 
co-operative political action, and represented a range of political opinions. As illustrated 
in chapter two, this need for autonomy was the fundamental reason the Co-operative 
Party could not, and did not affiliate nationally to the Labour Party. Developing these 
arguments, this section will explore how the size and diversity of the co-operative 
movement and the layers of political function entrenched in the federal structures, as 
illustrated in chapter one, proved a challenge to the development of a coherent political 
policy. Recent work on the Labour Party has included the co-operative movement as 
just one influence in the ‘Broad Church of Labour’.449 However the co-operative 
movement itself represented a ‘broad church’ of political opinion both beyond and 
within the labour movement.450  
A detailed analysis of the Co-operative Party Conference Reports throughout the 
period illustrates that the content of the Britain Reborn pamphlets aroused some 
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discussion amongst members of the Party. The main point of contention was the type 
of nationalisation that these pamphlets espoused. Fred Longden, a Co-operative 
Parliamentary candidate for the Birmingham Co-operative Party, voiced his concern at 
the 1933 Party Conference that the methods suggested in Britain Reborn for the 
planning of public ownership and control may ‘lead to the thwarting of voluntary 
co-operation and the founding of a new capitalism’.451 Londgen clarified that he was not 
objecting to the Party’s programme but just asking for a reconsideration of the methods 
implied’.452 Likewise another delegate wanted the Party to be more specific in regard to 
the constitution of ‘National Boards’.453 In response, Barnes stated that ‘the whole 
conception and philosophy behind the Co-operative Party programme is that the 
boards should be controlled by democracies of consumers and producers through their 
representative bodies, like Parliament and local authorities’.454 The Britain Reborn 
series had advocated that national boards would be created to manage the newly 
nationalised industries but had not outlined how these boards would be constituted, 
although Barnes appeared to indicate here that this would be through state or 
municipal control – not though voluntary co-operation.  
At the following Party Conference in 1934 the subject of nationalisation and the Britain 
Reborn series was raised again by Mr Wheeldon, who stated he was aggrieved that 
the Executive Committee had not, as promised in the last Conference discussed 
methods of ownership in Britain Reborn with them.455 Wheeldon further added that he 
believed that Barnes’ nationalisation was different from theirs’.456 Longden reiterated 
this point stating that ‘the party is demanding the old fashioned nationalisation’, 
whereas he wanted something more inspiring for the youth, bigger and better than 
what the programme contained.457 Barnes responded stating that he had met with the 
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Birmingham Party as agreed and had specifically outlined to them that public 
ownership meant full and complete nationalisation’.458 This emphasis on nationalisation 
was again resonant of the concurrent development of Labour Party policy, in which 
common ownership as embodied in Clause 4 of their constitution, was interpreted as 
being achieved through state control and economic planning. 
Longden stated that he was keen to ensure that Co-operative Party policy statements 
on nationalisation should not reflect the Morrisonian model epitomised in the London 
Transport Bill.459 The Morrisonian model, which would form the basis of the post war 
nationalisation programme, did not embody worker or co-operative control but instead 
appointed specialist boards to the operation of nationalised industries. Clarifying why 
the Co-operative Party did not offer in its policy an alternative structure to this form of 
nationalisation and control, Barnes stated that he was keen to establish a measure of 
agreement on these political questions within the movement before the Party 
committed to a policy.460 Barnes made it perfectly clear that he had to consider the 
structural factors of the co-operative movement when working out political forms, 
suggesting that it was the co-operative movement control over the policy of the Party 
which was inhibiting a more defined approach.461  
Thus the issue of how these nationalised industries would be structured, a factor upon 
which the Labour Party was not always wholly agreed, divided opinion within the 
co-operative movement as well. Equally, Longden, who had been the Co-operative–
Labour MP for Birmingham Deritend from 1929 to 1931 and was re-elected in the 1945 
General Election represented both the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party – and 
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his views regarding nationalisation in these debates offer an alternative to 
mainstream.462 A pamphlet written by Longden in 1935 illustrates Longden’s views on 
the relationship between co-operation and labour, and thus explains his approach 
which was at odds with the leadership of the Co-operative Party during the 1930s.463 In 
this pamphlet he outlines his views on the crucial differences between co-operation and 
labour but concludes that a ‘formation of a grand Tripartite’ would ensure that 
socialists, trade unionists and co-operators would all work together to promote their 
common ideal and individual needs.464 Longden was therefore opposed to working 
more closely with the Labour Party, as this would be to the detriment of co-operative 
methods yet he still desired overall a more equal alliance which would be of benefit to 
all the identities contained within the labour movement. 
The concerns of Longden and the Birmingham delegates at Co-operative Party 
conferences over the nationalisation policies in Britain Reborn therefore also reflected 
a frustration with the approach of the Party Executive, as they believed that the 
inherent conservatism of these policies failed to capture the imagination of people. 
However, the diversity of the co-operative movement and the apathy of its leadership in 
promoting distinct co-operative methods beyond immediate business interests, as will 
be discussed later in this chapter, meant that it was not easy to formulate a policy 
which would meet the expectations of the entire movement. Consequently, it can be 
argued, deliberately vague, arguably safe policies on ownership and control were taken 
forward by the Co-operative Party in the 1930s. 
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In these circumstances how could the Co-operative party expect to influence the 
policies of the Labour Party if they themselves were not fully conversant with ideas 
regarding co-operative ownership? Moreover the emphasis Barnes as a party leader 
placed on ‘nationalisation’, and not co-operative ownership was perhaps not only due 
to his personal commitment to this policy, epitomised during the 1945 Labour 
Government in which he was responsible for the drafting of the Transport Bill which 
incorporated the board model of control, but reflected also the lack of an agreed 
co-operative alternative at this stage.465  
This examination of Co-operative Party conference reports also revealed that creating 
an environment of unity and cohesion regarding policy was important, due to the 
Party’s political relationship with the Labour Party as well as reflecting their need to 
work within the Labour Party’s electoral machine. What this further indicates is that the 
structural arrangements in which the Co-operative Party operated further limited the 
role and function of their Party Conference. Not only did conference have no final 
authority over policy, it was open to all within the movement, regardless of political 
inclination, and debate regarding potentially contentious issues of policy was stifled 
amongst delegates. Barnes as Chairman of the Party took on a leader role at 
Conference, acting as an intermediary in the wider debates until he retired from this 
position in 1946. Another key player at Co-operative Party Conferences was Albert 
Ballard, who would ultimately take on the role as Chairman of the Party in 1955. At the 
1932 Party Conference, Ballard outlined the municipal policy of the Party, and stated 
that the ‘programme was really getting down to the difference between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party – not a difference in point of view, but a 
difference in contribution in the experience co-operators could make to the problem of 
municipal social problems’.466 The first clause of this municipal policy, regarding 
democratic control created discussion amongst delegates, with one Bristol delegate 
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outlining that if the Labour Party brought a similar bill to London Transport Bill, (which 
had been based on expert board control) then the Co-operative Party and the 
movement must oppose it. In support of this, Mrs Ganley from the London Co-operative 
Society, rallied Conference ‘that if we agree with a principle then we should work for 
it’.467 Yet delegates from the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society and Manchester and 
Salford Co-operative Society, noted that they were concerned that this would put the 
co-operative movement at odds with the wider labour movement.468 
Diplomatically, Barnes advised that the adoption of this policy would not lead to 
differences with the Labour Party as, if a problem did arise, negotiations would take 
place and a friendly solution would be worked out.469 This illustrates the intermediary 
role taken on by Barnes as Party Chairman, and how he underplayed these ‘minor’ 
differences regarding issues of control and ownership to facilitate a smoother 
relationship with the Labour Party. The Co-operative Party represented a movement 
based upon voluntary, democratic control and this was integrated into the structure of 
their business. Members of co-operative societies, voted in by other co-operators, 
represented the needs of their society from local store level to Co-operative Congress 
making decisions affecting the business as appropriate. The policy discussed in 1932 
advocated co-operative control of municipal boards and was therefore representative of 
an integral part of the ideology of the movement. However Barnes, for a number of 
politically motivated reasons, did not allow Conference to dwell on this crucial 
ideological point of difference between municipal and co-operative methods, arguably 
because dwelling on it represented a potential for division with the wider labour 
movement. Ballard retorted to Barnes that ‘the folly of the Co-operative Party was that 
it was always apologising and wondering who they were going to offend’.470 This 
observation from Ballard is extremely significant as it illuminates the inherent weakness 
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of the Party, trying to please both the co-operative movement and the Labour Party, to 
the detriment of its own identity. Nevertheless this debate signals that there were 
emerging differences between Co-operative and Labour ideology, particularly regarding 
the forms of ownership. It also reveals the diverse range of opinion within the 
Co-operative Party regarding policy, with some local Party organisations, notably the 
Manchester and Salford and Royal Arsenal more closely identifying with the Labour 
Party than others.471 
This delicate balance between promoting co-operative ideology and maintaining a 
political relationship with the Labour Party was also evident at the 1935 Co-operative 
Party Conference. A resolution from the Co-operative Men’s Guild advocated that the 
Party seek a scheme with the Labour Party in which only co-operative societies could 
import or distribute milk, and that this scheme be adopted into the Labour Party 
programme.472 Moving this resolution Mr Holland stated ‘we have to make it clear that 
the distributing structure under the socialist state was the one that the co-operative 
movement has built up’ and argued that whatever happens to ownership, the 
co-operative movement must retain control.473 This resolution signifies a clear 
awareness amongst some members of the Co-operative Party, and in this case also 
members of the Co-operative Men’s Guild that the unique control offered by the 
co-operative movement could be lost to state controlled socialism. As Trentmann has 
argued ‘milk served as the showcase for co-operative economics, and for many 
organized consumers offered practical proof that the movement could reform political 
economy without state assistance’.474 Moreover, this resolution also reflected the need 
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to both protect and promote co-operative business interests as by 1939 co-operatives 
had over a quarter of the national milk market’.475 
The advancement of this argument at Conference suggests that there was both a 
desire and expectation from co-operators to influence Labour Party policy, particularly 
regarding the control of industries in which the co-operative movement had significant 
business interests. However, the debate sought here by the Men’s Guild never 
materialised. Barnes, again acting as mediator, requested that the Guild not press the 
resolution at this stage citing that there was machinery established with the Labour 
Party in which this issue was already being discussed and ‘while our objective is yours, 
this type of resolution would cut across the procedure the National Co-operative 
Authority has arranged with the Labour Party’. He further added that ‘it would not be 
fair to the Labour Party to ask them to incorporate a resolution of this kind into their 
Party programme at this stage’.476 Barnes’ objections to this resolution reaffirm the lack 
of authority the Co-operative Party had in forming policy, as negotiations with the 
Labour Party regarding policy over specific political issues which affected the business 
of the movement were in fact in this period conducted by the National Co-operative 
Authority. The Guild, upon an understanding that the Executive agreed in principle with 
the resolution, withdrew the resolution without further discussion.477 What this illustrates 
again is the fact that political discussions regarding the role of the co-operative 
movement in a socialist society were being undermined by the constitutional and 
organisational structure in which the Co-operative Party operated. 
Thus, at Co-operative Party conferences, a supposedly democratic arena where 
subscribing societies, parties and affiliated organisations were invited to send 
delegates to discuss policy, debate was stifled in order not to disrupt top level 
discussions between the Labour Party and the co-operative movement. The 
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Co-operative Party was left on the periphery of policy making, suggesting that both the 
co-operative movement and the Labour Party viewed its role and function as purely 
administrative in terms of achieving representation. This top down approach to policy 
making is seemingly at odds with the principles of democratic control entrenched in the 
co-operative movement. Gurney suggested that one reason discussions over policy 
were purposefully avoided was to play down divisions in policy so as to avoid 
embarrassment to those local parties working together.478 However, the consequence 
of this was that at this formative time in the development of the economic policies of the 
Labour Party, the Co-operative Party in restricting this open debate was curbing the 
potential they had to make a positive co-operative contribution to the Labour Party 
programme.  
Furthermore, the desire and difficulty in achieving unity on policy within the 
co-operative movement was problematic, as Barnes’ response to a delegate’s question 
at the 1941 Party Conference illustrates. The delegate asked whether there would be 
an effort to achieve unity with the Labour Party on their policy of post war 
reconstruction, to which Barnes replied:  
‘You know from experience when we dealt with Britain Reborn that before we actually 
make a programme public we have to take into consideration the views of all other 
bodies in the Co-operative Movement, and finally get it approved by Congress.’479  
Barnes further outlined that in regard to unity with Labour Party, the co-operative 
movement felt that agreement was needed first on co-operative side before sharing 
with Labour Party colleagues.480 Consequently, the policy of the Co-operative Party 
was often more contested within the co-operative movement than by the Labour Party 
– and this was a primary reason why it did not offer a co-operative alternative to the 
Labour Party in this period. 
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Interestingly what emerges from this examination of Co-operative Party conference 
reports is that although conference may not have publicly and democratically facilitated 
discussion regarding potential points of conflict in the policies of the Labour Party and 
the Co-operative Party, discussions did take place between the co-operative movement 
and the Labour Party regarding issues of political policy. As Barnes’ response to the 
Co-operative Men’s Guild resolution in 1935 regarding milk supply and distribution 
illustrates, one of the key reasons this resolution was blocked was that consultation 
with the Labour Party on this issue was already taking place outside the scope of the 
Co-operative Party. An examination of Co-operative Congress reports reveal that 
negotiations were instead led by an Agricultural Policy sub-Committee of the National 
Co-operative Authority.481 Although the Co-operative Party was represented on the 
National Co-operative Authority, the grass roots activists of the Co-operative Party 
represented at Co-operative Party conferences still remained disengaged from 
discussions regarding the policy of the Party. Instead, decisions affecting policy, which 
Party members would be expected to promote and implement in their locality, were not 
always made openly and democratically but behind closed doors.  
The formation of the National Co-operative Authority in 1932 affected the policy making 
of the Co-operative Party as both participated in co-operative politics and co-operative 
policy and thus created competing roles. In addition to taking over the organisational 
negotiations between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party in 1938, the 
National Co-operative Authority also took over functions we may have expected the 
Party to fulfil, in attempting to influence the policy of the Labour Party. For example in 
1939, the Authority reported to Co-operative Congress that ‘we are endeavouring, and 
with some success, to impress upon the Labour Party the fact that the consumer is a 
factor in political philosophy that requires more consideration than so far they have 
been disposed to give him’.482 The report added that they were still faced with the 
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difficulty as to whether certain trades should be carried on by co-operative societies, 
municipalities or by joint arrangements between the two, and that this ultimately 
represents the vital difference in their ideologies.483 To an extent this suggests that 
debates regarding the role of the co-operative movement in Labour Party policy were 
taking place, however the focus of these was on the short-term trade interests of the 
existing co-operative movement. Thus, the Labour Party and the National Co-operative 
Authority were not engaged in a broader debate about where co-operative ideas of 
ownership would fit into the Labour Party’s broader vision of socialism at this point, 
reflecting the inertia of the co-operative movement to ideological discussions beyond 
their immediate trading remit. Furthermore, it was not the Co-operative Party as the 
political party for the movement which acted as a broker for these negotiations, neither 
was the content of these negotiations discussed in any detail at Co-operative Party 
Conferences. This emphasised not only the relative lack of influence the Co-operative 
Party had over its policy, but also its ability to promote a positive political vision for the 
co-operative movement with the Labour Party. 
Labour Party Responses to Co-operative Party Policy 
This section will examine in further detail policy discussions between the Co-operative 
Party and the Labour Party during the 1930s. If the National Co-operative Authority 
conducted policy discussions with the Labour Party on behalf of the Co-operative 
Union, then did the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party consult on issues of policy 
at all? The Joint Committee of the Labour and Co-operative Party, which comprised 
members of each Party’s executive, was heavily concerned with organisational issues 
during the 1930s as illustrated in chapter two.484 However, the earlier minutes of this 
committee initially indicate that through this committee the Co-operative Party and 
Labour Party did consult on policy. The minutes record that in March 1931, the 
Co-operative Party submitted its draft programme for consideration. At this point the 
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National Agent of the Labour Party drew attention to certain features of the programme 
which departed from their policy outlined in Labour and the Nation and advised that the 
Labour Party would report back at the following meeting.485 It was resolved however at 
the subsequent meeting that these differences did not affect the programme of the 
Labour Party, with the exception of agriculture which was already in hand.486 Therefore, 
even when differences in policy were noted between the two Parties, reconciling these 
extended beyond the remit of this committee which serves to reinforce its 
administrative purpose. From 1931 there were no further mentions of policy in the 
minutes of this committee, which in part reflected the organisational problems which 
dominated, but also was because the Co-operative Party was left on the periphery of 
discussions regarding policy, particularly after the creation of the National Co-operative 
Authority in 1932.  
An examination of the Labour Party conference reports provides an alternative 
perspective on their policy relationship with the co-operative movement. At the 1932 
Labour Party conference, it was reported that the National Planning of Agriculture 
report was the work of an ad hoc committee ‘which has had the advantage of 
consultation with representatives of the Co-operative Party’.487 It was noted however, 
that they had yet to reach total agreement on the aspect of Import Boards, but were still 
working on an agreement as they desired ‘that when we go to the country, we go as a 
united Party representing all sections’.488 In this respect, the Labour Party viewed the 
Co-operative Party as a section of their political organisation, as at this point the 
leadership was still hopeful for direct affiliation as the debates regarding this had yet to 
peak. At the Labour Party conference the following year it was reported that agricultural 
policy had still not been finalised, although this was not the fault of the Labour Party but 
because there was no agreement within the co-operative section. There was again an 
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emphasis on unity in policy to prevent division later as the report states how complete 
agreement was needed so that when it came to framing Bills they would not have ‘to sit 
down and thrash out details’.489  
This was clearly a desire by the Labour Party to get agreement and subsequently 
support from the co-operative movement for its agricultural policy. However, this was 
made more difficult because the agricultural policy of the co-operative movement was a 
contested issue not only with the Labour Party but within the co-operative movement. 
The co-operative movement represented a large agricultural interest, as farmers, 
producers and consumers and the varying priorities of these caused tensions. This 
explains why the co-operative movement had a vested interest in shaping the 
agricultural policy of the Labour Party as the focus of the movement was in food retail 
with staples like milk and bread accounting for a significant portion of the national 
trade.490 
The discussions between the two movements regarding agriculture demonstrate that 
the co-operative movement enjoyed some success in influencing Labour Party policy in 
the early 1930s, evident by the report of the National Co-operative Authority to 1936 
Congress which recorded that on the issue of agriculture, Labour and Co-operative 
ideas were not as divergent as they had thought twelve months ago.491 Therefore, 
avenues for discussion on political policy existed between the Labour Party and the 
co-operative movement when needed. These decisions affected the policy of the 
Co-operative Party even though they were absent as an organisation from these 
discussions. In contrast to Manton, who cited the issue of agriculture and in particular 
Labour’s Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931 as a way to illustrate the divisions between 
the co-operative and labour movement, this evidence demonstrates that the Labour 
Party sought to achieve agreement with the co-operative movement on agricultural 
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policy when tensions arose.492 This arguably reflected a wider aim from the Labour 
Party in 1932 to create a unified organisation, in which the co-operative movement was 
an affiliated section and not a separate political organisation. As chapter two indicated, 
the continued development of the Co-operative Party was the antithesis to what the 
Labour Party desired in terms of political organisation during the 1930s – as the Labour 
Party did not see the co-operative movement as an opponent but part of the wider 
working class identity which their politics embodied. 
The engagement between the co-operative movement and the Labour Party on 
agricultural policy remains, however, an exception. A detailed analysis of the Labour 
Party conference reports for the period 1931 to 1945 reveals few other references to 
the co-operative movement, with the exception of reporting on the ongoing 
organisational difficulties with the Co-operative Party.  
The few references to co-operation in the conference reports include a 1931 resolution 
on trade in which it was stated that;  
‘As stated in Labour and the Nation, the Labour Party regards Co-operation as an 
indispensable element in the Socialist Commonwealth and looks forward to the time 
when it will include every member in the community. Labour will work in the fullest 
alliance with co-operators, will take constant counsel with them in elaborating its policy 
and will utilise their long experience and specialised knowledge to build the new social 
order.’493 
 
Taken in isolation, this statement could be viewed as a promising indictment of the 
extent to which co-operative methods of ownership could have featured in Labour Party 
policy. However, even at this early juncture, it was clear that the extent to which 
co-operative methods would be included in any economic re-organisation was limited. 
William Graham, President of the Board of Trade in the 1929 to 1931 Labour 
Government, in moving this resolution noted that ‘there is undeniably a variety of views 
as to the part that Co-operation should play’.494 Graham described the co-operative 
movement as an overwhelmingly consumer orientated movement, which was entering 
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to an increased extent into productive industry, indicative of the development of the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society in this period.495 This changing role appeared to be a 
concern to Graham, who emphasised that, in consultation, the co-operative movement 
would need to find its place in the transition to public ownership and control.496 Despite 
being mentioned within the resolution there was no real mention of the role of the 
co-operative movement in the ensuing discussion. Yet the language used in this 
resolution is telling - on one hand it is paying lip-service to the relationship between the 
co-operative and labour movements, placing emphasis on their unity stating that 
[co-operative] ‘principles of mutual aid are at heart identical with those of the Labour 
and Socialist movement’.497 On the other hand however there appears to be a 
recognition that co-operative ideas did not fit neatly into Labour Party economic policy 
which could be problematic. 
Another intervention was heard in the following year at the Labour Party Conference, 
when T. E. Williams, a member of the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society on the 
Labour Party Executive Committee from 1931 to 1936, and later Director of the 
Co-operative Wholesale Society, in seconding a resolution on the economic policy 
made an appeal for support for the co-operative movement.498 He stated that ‘during 
the Conference we have been discussing large questions of policy, but these questions 
will have to be determined and decided to a large extent upon national lines’. However, 
he argued that through the co-operative movement they could establish a larger 
measure of democratic control than they had ever had in the history of the country, 
exuberantly stating that ‘if they can do that with retail trade then what can they do with 
every industry in the country’ and that ‘there is no better propaganda organ than that of 
the Co-op Movement, which has in every city and town, and practically every village a 
local store’.499 Williams appealed to the conference to make the alliance of the trade 
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unions, the labour movement and the co-operative movement a real alliance, not only 
in word but an alliance in reality. This was a stunning advocacy of the role that that 
co-operation could play in the economic policy of the Labour Party, yet William’s words 
appeared to have little impact for the conference delegates and were largely ignored in 
the subsequent debates.  
This absence of a distinct co-operative voice at Labour Party conferences can be partly 
explained by their organisational isolation as the structure of the electoral alliance 
meant that the Co-operative Party was not represented on the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party and did not send delegates to the Party conference.500 
The exception here was the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society who through their 
direct affiliation to the Labour Party was able to maintain the seat reserved for affiliated 
socialist societies on the National Executive Committee. Yet this influence was only 
minimal as, although the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society represented co-operative 
interests, they were equally sympathetic to the Labour Party in terms of policy 
development. Furthermore as illustrated above, when T. E. Williams, the Royal Arsenal 
Co-operative Society member on the National Executive Committee did mention the 
co-operative movement this had little influence on the conference. This inability to 
directly influence Labour Party policy via Party Conference was one of the key 
arguments put forward by co-operators who advocated that the Co-operative Party 
should directly affiliate to the Labour Party.501 In addition, the Labour Party also 
suggested that affiliation would enable the Co-operative Party to have more influence 
on its policy. In a memo to the Labour Party and Co-operative Party members of the 
Joint Committee, the Labour Party outlined how affiliation would not destroy the power 
of an affiliated organisation to seek modifications in party policy, as the Labour Party 
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conference ‘presents an unequalled opportunity to swing the whole movement at the 
back of a common policy such as no Joint Committee could ever hope to obtain’.502  
The attitude of the co-operative movement to wider engagement in politics is also 
responsible for this lack of engagement with the Labour Party on policy issues during 
the 1930s. A recurring theme which emerges throughout the period under review is that 
the co-operative movement only appeared to engage in discussions of policy with the 
Labour Party when it had a direct impact upon their business, the prime example being 
agricultural policy as demonstrated above. This insular attitude was exemplified by the 
movement’s decision to decline an invitation to join the National Council of Labour in 
1935, as discussed in chapter two.503 Although the official response given at Congress 
by the National Co-operative Authority to the declining of this invitation was that ‘many 
of the matters considered [on the National Council of Labour] are outside the interests 
of the Co-operative Movement’, it also added that they would welcome means of 
consultation on issues affecting co-operative trade and any other subjects which the 
movement had special interests in.504 However, on the same page of the National 
Co-operative Authority’s report, there was an update on how discussions regarding 
agriculture were progressing with the Labour Party.505 Surely this reflected the need for 
co-operators to increase potential avenues of consultation on policy in contrast to 
remaining on the periphery of the Labour Party. This indicates that the movement at 
this stage had no interest in broader discussions of policy which did not directly affect 
their movement, and did not get involved with broader ideological discussions about 
the co-operative commonwealth. This is emphasised by the ‘ten year plan’ formulated 
by the Co-operative Union and the CWS in 1934, which took a business-like approach 
to increasing the strength of the movement through trade and membership targets by 
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the centenary of the Rochdale Pioneers in 1944, but did not dwell on the role that 
co-operative methods of ownership could have in new areas.506 
The lack of co-operative influence in the policies of the Labour Party was evident in 
1937, when they published Labour’s Immediate Programme and outlined the socialist 
measures they would implement within one term of government.507 This represented 
the culmination of the policy development of the Party that had been taking place from 
1932 and advocated the nationalisation of the Bank of England, coal, gas, electricity, 
land and transport, and economic planning as well as an commitment to social reforms 
such as improving education, welfare and the health service.508 At the Co-operative 
Party conference in 1937 Barnes outlined how ‘in its main principles of action it 
corresponds to the Co-operative Party’s One Parliament Programme adopted in 1933 
and published as the Britain Reborn set of pamphlets’.509 Thus, there was an emphasis 
on the unity between Labour’s Immediate Programme and the existing programme of 
the Co-operative Party which was vital in term of grass roots electioneering. Barnes 
highlighted two matters of immediate importance to the Co-operative Party in this 
programme – the repeal of penal taxation on co-operative societies and desire that the 
co-operative movement should play its part in the reorganisation of food supply (and 
eradicate the scandal of malnutrition).510 Labour’s Immediate Programme however 
contained no mention of the role co-operative methods of control and ownership could 
play in the re-organisation of the economy because of the limitations discussed and yet 
crucially it was this programme which formed the manifesto for the 1945 Labour 
Government. 
The main priority during the 1930s for the Co-operative Party, the co-operative 
movement and Labour Party was creating an appearance of unity. When debates 
surfaced which highlighted potential divisions over their views on ownership and 
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control, these were often put aside, or discussed in a non-threatening way. This was 
due to several organisational and constitutional factors including the political alliance 
with the Labour Party, limitations on the Co-operative Party’s creating and discussing 
policy, the lack of available platforms for policy discussion between the movements, 
and the inertia of the co-operative movement towards discussing political policy beyond 
their immediate business remit.  
External Challenges to Policy Development. 
This section examines what broader factors, outside the co-operative and labour 
movements, contributed to the political culture in which the Co-operative Party 
operated during the period 1931 to 1945. In examining the interwar period, Gurney 
argued that ‘powerful political forces and cultural trends worked against the 
universalising ambition of co-ops’.511 He cites the issue of taxation, boycotts by private 
manufacturers and ‘ongoing and vicious attacks’ on the principle of dividend by the 
Daily Mail and Daily Express as evidence of hostility to the movement.512 Elsewhere 
Killingback has demonstrated that during the 1930s co-operative societies were 
attacked on two fronts; through a political campaign by small shopkeepers and action 
taken by private enterprise to attack mutual trading.513 Combined with these personal 
attacks on the co-operative movement, working class people, who represented the bulk 
of the membership of the co-operative movement also suffered throughout the 1930s, a 
decade of high unemployment and rising consumer prices. Moreover the entire country 
was confronted with growing tensions internationally throughout the 1930s, culminating 
in the outbreak of the Second World War. Consequently, the policy development of the 
Co-operative Party was affected by various external factors which created a political 
need to work with, and emphasise unity with the wider labour movement. 
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From the Labour Party defeat in 1931 until the Labour Party victory in 1945 the 
Co-operative Party remained on the periphery of Parliamentary politics, with only one 
MP in the 1931 to 1935 Parliament, and only nine between 1935 and 1945. This was in 
part due to the poor performance of Labour generally, but also reflected a general lack 
of co-operative Parliamentary candidates.514 This significantly limited the extent to 
which the Co-operative Party could protect or promote co-operative interests in 
Parliament. Juxtaposed to this there was a significant amount of legislation hostile to 
the aims of the co-operative movement implemented during the 1930s, including the 
decision to tax co-operative reserves in 1933 and the National Defence Contribution 
imposed in 1937.515 It was highlighted by A. V. Alexander at the 1933 Co-operative 
Congress that William Leonard, the sole Co-operative MP, was faced with the most 
difficult task in protecting and promoting the movement even though many co-operators 
had not even voted for his point of view.516  
The extent to which this lack of representation impeded the ability of the Co-operative 
Party to protect co-operative business interests was mostly felt when the Finance Act 
of 1933 imposed income tax on the surplus of co-operative societies. The decision by 
the National Government to impose this tax, demanded by opponents of co-operation, 
was hugely unpopular with co-operators who viewed this tax as undermining the 
mutual aspect of co-operation. Thus, as explored in the chapter one, this issue 
consumed the energies of the Co-operative Party, and the wider co-operative 
movement who campaigned vigorously for its repeal. The ‘Penal tax’ was the primary 
issue upon which the Co-operative Party and the movement appealed to the electorate 
and in particular members of co-operative societies during the 1935 General Election 
campaign.517 Campaign literature also focused on the National Government and 
opposition to their tariff and trade policies which detrimentally affected the consumer 
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whilst bolstering up private enterprise.518 The campaign therefore was not fought on an 
advancement of co-operative ideas but on protection of both the movement and the 
consumer against the hostile National Government.519 This developed the Co-operative 
party’s identity as the only political party which represented consumers.  
The Labour Party also pledged to repeal the tax in their election mandate 
demonstrating solidarity with the co-operative movement on this issue.520 This was an 
astute political move by the Labour Party as the Co-operative Union subsequently 
advised societies to organise and vote on behalf of the Labour candidate (where there 
was no Co-operative-Labour candidate) for the first time in its history.521 Although the 
co-operative movement needed to remain independent from the Labour Party in terms 
of political organisation, the Labour Party’s support on this crucial matter was clearly 
enough for the leadership of the co-operative movement to back the Party as a whole. 
On one hand this, as chapter two suggested, illustrated one of the mutual benefits 
gained by Labour Party from their political alliance with the Co-operative Party. 
However, what this further indicates is that the Labour Party was sympathetic to the 
business needs of the co-operative movement and did to some extent value the 
alternative business model it embodied. Overall this co-ordinated response to the tax 
issue demonstrates that in face of external threats the co-operative movement, the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party could work together to oppose hostile anti-
co-operative and pro-capitalist legislation. 
Evidence from contemporaries affirm the sense of hostility which was experienced by 
many in the movement during the 1930s. For example at the 1935 Co-operative Party 
Conference, a resolution from R. Murray, director of the Scottish Co-operative 
Wholesale Society stated; ‘Our co-operative movement has had to face the threat and 
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the violence of the income tax, the threat and the violence of the marketing schemes, 
the threat of licensing our shops and the organisation of industry’.522 In the face of 
these external attacks it is not surprising that the movement, and consequently the 
Co-operative Party looked to the Labour Party for support and presented an image of 
unity, even if the short-term consequence of this was to the detriment of developing a 
clear co-operative political policy. This is aptly summarised in a quote taken from the 
1939 Party Conference which stated:  
‘Whatever the domestic differences may be between the Co-operative Party and the 
Labour Party, they are infinitesimal compared with our wholehearted opposition to this 
vile National Government, which stands in the way of Democratic Progress, stands in 
the way of the Co-operative Movement and stands in the way of every progressive 
working class movement.’523 
 
The changing international situation also deeply affected the policy direction of the 
Co-operative Party as the increasing threat of war from 1935 onwards dominated both 
the Labour Party and Co-operative Party conference proceedings. Thus the 
omnipresent threat of war meant that debates regarding ownership and control were 
put to one side and again emphasis was placed on unity between the Co-operative 
Party and Labour Party. Issues such as re-armament, food controls, peace policies and 
the possibility of a United Front were all discussed at length at Co-operative Party 
conferences. These debates are not considered within the scope of this thesis as they 
represent a different type of policy debate to that surrounding ownership and control, 
yet suffice to say that there were many conflicting opinions and ideas that intersected 
across the whole of the labour and co-operative movement, and that these emotive 
issues dominated the hearts and minds of Party activists, MPs and Party leadership.  
The Impact of the Second World War on Co-operative Party Policy. 
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 had significant implications for the 
entire co-operative movement. From this point the Co-operative Party leadership made 
it clear that ‘meaningless controversies’ were to be shelved and unity with the Labour 
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Party was paramount.524 This was reflected by negotiations between the National 
Co-operative Authority and the Labour Party being postponed in 1939 and also by the 
Co-operative Party’s adherence to the wartime electoral truce.525 This message was 
clearly conveyed by Barnes in his Chairman’s speech at the 1941 at Party Conference. 
He stated; 
‘The Co-operative Party has made its contribution to national unity, and I ask the 
delegates to this conference to be worthy of the great practical movement they 
represent, by keeping the urgency of this problem before them during the debates, so 
that differences of opinion and judgment fit in proper perspective with the overriding 
need for unity of purpose in prosecuting the war to a successful end.’526 
  
This emphasis on unity was also arguably reflected in the decision by the Co-operative 
Union to join the National Council of Labour as a permanent and equal member in 
1941.527 This move opened another platform where the three wings of the Labour 
Movement could meet to discuss policy and signified a greater interest from the 
co-operative movement in politics. Was this a channel that the Co-operative Party 
could use to influence? A survey of the minutes of the National Council of Labour in the 
period 1941 to 1945 does not reveal any significant policy discussion with regard to a 
specific co-operative contribution to issues surrounding ownership and control, even 
though for example the nationalisation of the coal industry was discussed at length. 
The main issue which dominated the co-operative movement’s contribution was 
discussions regarding opposition to the Purchase Tax and overall the co-operative 
representatives certainly brought a consumer and retail focus to the council.528 There 
was a co-ordinated response agreed to the publication of the Beveridge report which 
illustrates a level of discussion between all the member bodies of the National Council 
of Labour regarding important aspects of future policy.529 The co-operative movement 
                                               
524 Co-operative Party Annual Conference Report, (1940) p. 11.  
525 Co-operative Congress Report, (1945) p. 3. The decision to postpone was taken at a 
meeting of the National Co-operative Authority in September 1939. 
526 Co-operative Party Annual Conference Report, (1941) p. 4. 
527 National Council of Labour Minutes/Constitution, 1941/LPA/LHASC. 
528 ‘Typical’ contributions of the co-operative movement at a meeting included, food controls, 
shopping difficulties and occupational clothing. National Council of Labour/ Minutes/18 October 
1941. 
529 National Council of Labour /Minutes/24 November 1942. 
154 
 
attempted to present a united picture on other policy matters with the other members of 
the council; for instance in 1943 it was suggested that in view of the Co-operative 
Party’s interim report on post war reconstruction that the time had arrived to co-
ordinate the reconstruction proposals with the Labour Party and Trade Union 
Congress.530 They were advised however that this was not possible as the Labour 
Party still had many issues to decide on in their reconstruction sub-committees.531 
These sub-committees now held a more important policy role, emphasising the relative 
decline in importance of the National Council of Labour as a policy making body for the 
Labour Party.  
The Co-operative Party, representing perhaps the most politically active aspects of the 
co-operative movement, was becoming increasingly aware of the potential role that 
co-operative methods could play in the post war restructure of the economy. This is 
evident at the 1944 Co-operative Party conference where a resolution was passed 
which emphasised ‘the vital need for Co-operative Economy as the guiding principle for 
the ‘new world’. This resolution instructed that the Party executive get acceptance with 
the Labour Party and from the National Council of Labour on the pursuance of this 
principle as ‘practical socialism’.532 Mr Paling, from the Doncaster Party, who moved 
this resolution emphasised that in his 30 years in the labour movement little serious 
attention had been given to the propagation and discussion of co-operative economy, 
stating that co-operation was the only really practiced socialism in Britain but the 
Labour Party failed to recognise this.533 Discussing this resolution one delegate 
suggested that this required a re-orientation of co-operative principles as a guide for 
practical socialism and clearer definition of the co-operative movement’s role in a 
democratic state — something which had never been attempted before.534  
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One potential reason for this increased awareness of the contribution that co-operative 
ideas could make to the restructuring of the economy stemmed from the co-operative 
movement’s experience during the Second World War, which in contrast to that of the 
First World War bolstered the movement’s confidence. The strength of the movement 
and its value to consumers upon the outbreak of war was evidenced by the sheer 
number of people who signed up to their local co-operative store for their rations. The 
Central Board’s Report at the 1940 Co-operative Congress highlighted; 
‘Popular backing for the co-operative cause was never greater than present. Our 
registrations in the three main rationed commodities:- sugar 13 ¾ millions; Butter 12 ¼ 
millions; and bacon, 11 ¼ millions; prove the loyalty of our membership and trade, in 
spite of the limitations of rationing and supply difficulties.’535  
 
This, combined with their foray into Parliamentary politics arguably contributed to their 
improved experience of war and as Barnes claimed in 1940 ‘the co-operative 
movement has only to contrast its experience now with that of 1914 to 1918 to realise 
the value of Co-operative Party representation’.536 One particular cause for concern 
during the First World War had been lack of co-operative representation on both local 
and national food control committees – yet as Barnes noted the movement had by 
1940 ‘secured co-operative representation on all the commodity controls, central and 
local, that affect our business’.537 Furthermore, throughout the Second World War there 
was a particular emphasis on the special contribution played by the nine Co-operative 
MPs on issues surrounding food controls as evidenced in a Co-operative Party 
pamphlet.538 The pamphlet stated that the ‘knowledge and experience of the country’s 
food requirements give the Co-operative Members’ views on food restrictions 
considerable weight in the House’.539 This pamphlet also outlined how Barnes, as a 
Front Bencher and Alexander, as a member of wartime Government also contributed to 
debates on re-construction, welfare and military issues which arguably not only gave 
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Co-operative politicians significant experience of Government but also raised the 
political profile of the movement.540 At the 1946 Co-operative Congress it was reported 
that ‘the statistical section of this volume shows how the co-operative movement 
continues to advance and has emerged satisfactorily from the stress of war’. One 
example used to illustrate this was the increase in co-operative membership by one 
million between 1938 and 1945.541 The improved position of the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society and the contributions it made to the war economy are also 
discussed in Building Co-operation, reinforcing the improved experience of the 
movement generally in comparison with the First World War.542 Overall, it can be 
concluded from the above that by 1945 the co-operative movement, despite the 
difficulties of war, had made positive contributions to wartime politics and experienced 
the benefits of participation in politics. As the following chapter will examine, this was 
one reason which arguably changed their attitude towards the development of a distinct 
co-operative policy. A 1944 Co-operative Party conference resolution to pursue 
co-operation as practical socialism was indicative of an awakening, particularly within 
the Co-operative Party, to advocate a co-operative alternative to economic problems.543 
Conclusions 
This chapter argues that the policy of the Co-operative Party did not offer a 
co-operative alternative to the Labour Party’s policies on nationalisation during this 
period. On the contrary it has been demonstrated that the economic policies of the 
Co-operative Party were remarkably similar to those of the Labour Party throughout the 
period 1931 to 1945. Whilst this undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent 
marginalisation of co-operative methods from the programme of the 1945 Labour 
Government, several other conclusions regarding the political relationship can be 
elicited from this. Firstly the policies of the Co-operative Party, as embodied in their 
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Britain Reborn series, did not offer a distinctly co-operative alternative to state forms of 
nationalisation for a combination of factors which centred on creating unity within the 
co-operative movement but also with the Labour Party. Representing part of the 
broader labour movement the co-operative movement contained a range of political 
opinion, much of which associated closely with the Labour Party. Barnes is a key 
example of these dual identities and he, as Party Chairman, played a crucial role in 
curbing potentially fractious policy debates at Co-operative Party conferences. The 
political alliance and ongoing organisational discussions with the Labour Party during 
the 1930s also meant that an overarching emphasis on policy cohesion was crucial in 
terms of the Co-operative Party achieving Parliamentary Representation. Yet 
Co-operative Party policy also arguably represented a level of consensus of the basic 
first steps for socialism within the wider labour movement. Crucially however the 
co-operative movement had minimal business interests in the major industries that both 
the Labour Party and Co-operative Party advocated nationalisation of, and this 
contributed to this consensus.  
Secondly what this chapter has illustrated is that the structure of the organisational 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party meant that the 
Co-operative Party remained on the periphery of the Labour Party and could not 
contribute directly to the development of Labour Party policies. This was further 
complicated by the gradual incursion of the Co-operative Union, via the National 
Co-operative Authority, into policy discussions directly with the Labour Party, 
undermining the need, in this respect, for the Co-operative Party. Yet the extent to 
which the movement could influence the Labour Party remained limited, not only 
because of constitutional factors but mainly due to their reluctance to get involved in 
policy discussions with the Labour Party that did not directly impinge on their business. 
For example they were keen to seek agreement on agriculture as this was a major 
trade and business interest for the movement but did not look beyond the immediate 
business interests of the movement in politics. In contrast the Co-operative Party, 
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which arguably had a broader political outlook than the movement, had no authority to 
act on policy within the Co-operative Union, or in conjunction with the Labour Party.  
Did then this period represent as Carbery contested the ‘wasted years’ in which too 
much time was spent on organisation to the detriment of working out a co-operative 
contribution to policy? In the most literal sense, yes this was a fair assessment – as the 
Co-operative Party did not begin to offer a programme that was radically different to the 
Labour Party in this period. However, when the wider political culture in which the 
Co-operative Party was operating is considered the picture that emerges is more 
nuanced. Developing a political alliance with the Labour Party, and building up the 
grass roots organisation of the Co-operative Party was vital for the development of the 
Party as an organisation. It was also these priorities that enabled the election of 
Co-operative MPs which was the primary function of the Co-operative Party. The need 
for increased representation in Parliament had been emphasised by the challenging 
environment in which the co-operative movement operated in the 1931 to 1945 period, 
which although presenting barriers to policy development, necessitated unity with the 
Labour Party to protect co-operative interests in Parliament.  
The experience of the co-operative movement during the Second World War however, 
perhaps led to a realisation by the Co-operative Party and the co-operative movement 
of the potential contribution co-operation could make in politics and the overall value of 
involvement in the wider political arena, epitomised by the Co-operative Union’s 
decision in 1939 to finally join the National Council of Labour. However at this stage the 
framework of policies which would be enacted by the Labour Government in 1945 had 
already been developed, and co-operative methods of ownership, unsurprisingly did 
not feature in it.  
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CHAPTER 4: Towards a Co-operative Commonwealth? Defining 
the role of the co-operative movement in the Labour Party’s 
New Jerusalem, 1945-1951. 
The end of the Second World War and the election of a majority Labour Government 
signalled a positive change in 1945 for the Co-operative Party and the wider 
co-operative movement. It was a welcome break from the political challenges which 
had beset the movement during the 1930s. Furthermore, in spite of some of the 
devastating effects of the war, it was illustrated in the previous chapter that the 
co-operative movement’s experience during the war had strengthened its political 
ambitions. Consequently, the formation of a Labour Government in 1945 marked 
exciting prospects for the movement, illustrated by an article in the Co-operative 
Review.544 This article was optimistic in that the ‘end of the war and the return of 
Labour Government with full power will mean new horizons for the Co-operative 
Movement’ and moreover a ‘real opportunity for co-operative development in the new 
Britain’.545 Gurney has also emphasised this optimism in his assessment of the 
movement in the post-war period, in which he stated: ‘At the end of the World War II, 
the members, of the British co-operative movement were in a buoyant mood’, later 
adding that the movement had hoped to benefit directly from the Labour Party being in 
power.546 
Despite this optimism, Gurney and others have indicated that these expectations were 
not fulfilled and in fact the co-operative movement during the period of Labour 
Government remained politically isolated.547 As the introductory chapter outlined, this 
isolation was marked by the marginalisation of the co-operative ideas in Labour Party 
policies, as well as the exclusion of representatives of the co-operative movement from 
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public bodies such as the Economic Planning Board.548 The apparent political isolation 
of the movement has been summarised in recent history of the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society which stated ‘there was a real absence of strong political support for 
co-operative ideas when most needed’.549 
The crucial question which runs throughout this thesis is why the co-operative 
movement remained a peripheral influence on the Labour Party despite their political 
alliance. Yet whilst historians have addressed this marginalisation, none have focused 
on the Co-operative Party as a political organisation. For example, Manton has argued 
that the co-operative movement was not consulted by the Labour Party, neither were 
co-operative methods embraced in their policies regarding retail distribution and 
wholesaling in the post war period.550 Although Manton makes a persuasive argument 
as to why this was the case, his dismissal of the contribution made by the co-operative 
movement, representing a significant business interest as well as organised body of 
consumers is problematic. However, Manton is exploring the wider debates within the 
Labour Party with regard to these issues and his focus is not the co-operative 
movement. This chapter will depart from Manton, by exploring the reasons behind this 
peripheral influence from within the confines of the political relationship between the 
Co-operative Party and the Labour Party. 
Furthermore, by addressing the policy of the Co-operative Party and co-operative 
movement in this period, a new perspective will be added to existing analysis of the 
tensions within the Labour Party regarding their policy development from 1945. Again, 
as detailed in the introductory chapter, there is a consensus amongst historians of the 
Labour Party, that by 1950 the Party was divided over the future aim and content of its 
nationalisation programme.551 Equally, historians have recognised the level of 
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opposition from outside the Labour Party for their future nationalisation programme. For 
example, Manton argued that opposition from vested business was one of the reasons 
that the nationalisation of wholesaling was not pursued.552 The proposed 
nationalisation of sugar in 1949 resulted in a vigorous anti-nationalisation campaign led 
by Tate and Lyle, a large monopoly sugar refining corporation, who used cartoons of 
Mr Cube on their packaging proclaiming ‘Tate not state’.553 This chapter will illustrate 
how the discussions within both the co-operative movement and the Co-operative 
Party, can bring a new perspective to these debates from within the broader compass 
of the labour movement. This in turn, will demonstrate the plurality of ideological 
thought, particularly regarding forms of common ownership, within the wider labour 
movement. 
To consider why the Labour Party did not embody co-operative methods of ownership 
in the post-war period, this chapter will firstly examine the responses of the 
Co-operative Party and the movement to the nationalisation schemes implemented by 
the Labour Government from 1945. Secondly this chapter will assess the response of 
the Co-operative Party and the co-operative movement to the Labour Party’s proposals 
for a second term as outlined in Labour Believes in Britain in 1949. In particular this will 
consider the negotiations regarding the proposed nationalisation of industrial 
assurance and explore what these reveal about the relationship between the 
movements. Thirdly, this chapter will consider whether, as Carbery suggested, it was 
the Labour Party’s plans to nationalise industrial assurance in 1949 which ‘obliged’ the 
Party to determine its stance on public ownership.554 What other factors contributed to 
this development of a distinct co-operative policy on ownership, culminating in the 
publication of ‘The People’s Industry – A statement on social ownership, by the 
National Committee of the Co-operative Party’ in 1951?555 Fourthly, this chapter will 
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consider the extent to which the structural limitations of the relationship between the 
Co-operative Party, co-operative movement and Labour Party contributed to the 
marginality of co-operative ideas – again using the proposal to nationalise industrial 
assurance as an example to illustrate this. Manton argues that the co-operative 
movement’s case against nationalisation alienated many in the Labour Party because 
of its defence of the right of voluntary consumer co-operatives and language of the free 
market.556 However, this chapter will consider why it was important for the co-operative 
movement to maintain its defence of voluntary co-operation. Was this defence 
ideological, a desire to protect co-operative business interests, or represent a 
combination of the two? Lastly, this chapter will examine whether by 1950 the Labour 
Party was beginning to take the political aspirations of the co-operative movement 
more seriously. 
Whilst this chapter will not suggest that co-operative ideas were not marginalised by 
the Labour Party, it will argue that the responses and reaction of the Co-operative Party 
to Labour Party policy in the period 1945 to 1951 should be examined as a critique of 
the Labour Party’s nationalisation programme. Francis has shown that co-operative 
models of ownership were actually discussed as an alternative method to the 
centralised board model of nationalisation in the late 1940s, indicating that co-operative 
methods of control were at least considered by the Labour Party.557 He concludes that 
Labour Party policy makers and intellectuals did not support or pursue these ideas due 
to the perceived weakness of the co-operative management structure and partly 
because of the Labour Party’s continued ideological commitment to state 
nationalisation.558 However, did the fact that the Labour Party were considering 
co-operative methods indicate a closer political relationship between the movements? 
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Co-operative Responses to the Nationalisation Programme of the 1945 Labour 
Government. 
The General Election of 1945 was a huge success for the Labour Party who 
spectacularly defeated the Conservatives and gained their first majority government. 
This reflected a level of support for their 1945 Election Manifesto Let us Face the 
Future, which included nationalisation of key industries such as fuel, transport and the 
Bank of England plus implementation of the social reforms proposed by Beveridge in 
his 1943 Report.559 The 1945 to 1951 period of Labour Government has attracted a 
significant amount of attention from historians and is widely recognised as one of the 
most successful administrations in the Party’s history. Thorpe, for example, has 
asserted that ‘the record of the Labour Government elected in 1945 was formidable’ 
due to the introduction of significant social reforms, their programme of extensive 
nationalisation, maintaining full employment and playing a leading role in world 
politics.560 
The Labour Party’s victory equated success for the Co-operative Party: 23 
Co-operative-Labour MPs were elected, the highest to date, making the Co-operative 
Party the third largest political party in Parliament. In addition to this electoral success, 
Co-operative MPs were also given prestigious positions in the new Labour Government 
headed by Clement Attlee. Alfred Barnes became Minister of War Transport (Minister 
of Transport from 1946) and A. V. Alexander who was again appointed First Lord of the 
Admiralty (later Minister of Defence). The efforts of the Co-operative Party in building 
up their organisation and membership, whilst maintaining and developing relationships 
with the Labour Party at constituency level, evidenced in chapter two paid dividends in 
the 1945 election when many previously safe Conservative seats were taken by the 
Labour Party. 
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Speaking in 1949, Bailey, secretary of the Co-operative Party reflected that ‘Labour has 
now almost completed the programme for which it received a mandate in 1945 ... 
fundamentally there was nothing novel about it. It merely put into legislation ideas and 
schemes which had been discussed for a generation.’561 As demonstrated in chapter 
three, the nationalisation of transport, fuel, the Bank of England and the creation of a 
welfare state had been key tenets of Labour Party policy developed during the 
1930s.562 Beers has suggested that this programme of nationalisation, planning and 
social welfare, worked out in the 1930s, united the Labour Party during the war, and 
moreover, through the Labour party’s media programme was effectively and attractively 
communicated to the public’.563 Consequently, if co-operative policies were to be 
embodied in the 1945 Labour Party programme, it would have been essential that the 
Co-operative Party made a distinct contribution to the policy of the Labour Party during 
the 1930s.  
However, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, the Co-operative Party was 
unable in the period 1931 to 1945 to make a specifically co-operative contribution to 
the policies of the Labour Party. The organisational structure in which the Co-operative 
Party operated meant policy making was a complex issue which involved balancing the 
business needs of the movement, the diversity of political opinion in the movement and 
management of an electoral alliance with the Labour Party. Consequently, the 
domestic and economic policy developed by the Co-operative Party during the 1930s, 
outlined in Britain Reborn and restated in their 1943 policy document The World We 
Want, is in fact strikingly similar to Labour Party domestic policy and, therefore, explicit 
in its support of the Labour Party programme.564  
It is no surprise, then, that the election manifesto of the Co-operative Party in 1945 did 
not offer a radically different approach to the restructuring of the nation’s economy than 
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that proposed by the Labour Party. The Co-operative Party’s We Make Tomorrow – 
Guard his Future election manifesto of 1945, picturing a chubby smiling toddler on its 
cover, advocates the ‘public control of the coal mines, transport and the Bank of 
England’.565 Both also state that the public ownership of land is desirable.566 Other 
similarities between the two manifestos include the call for the creation of a national 
health service, implementation of welfare reforms, maintaining international peace, 
creating full employment and increasing the nation’s spending power and curtailing the 
restrictive practices of cartels and monopolies. There are some minor differences in 
detail, for example the Labour Party advocated the nationalisation of iron and steel, 
which is not mentioned by the Co-operative Party, and fuel in general, not just coal 
mining as specified by the Co-operative Party. In terms of a distinct co-operative 
contribution, the Co-operative Party did not give any specific examples, with the 
exception of agriculture, as to how co-operative ideology could contribute. Instead, a 
general reference was made as to how the movement’s ‘continued progress is 
essential to the fruitful association of free people’, thus it is hardly surprising that the 
Labour Party’s 1945 manifesto makes no mention of the co-operative movement’s role 
in restructuring the economy. 
The similarity between the two manifestos demonstrates a level of electoral 
expediency, as the electoral status of joint candidature meant it would have been 
unwise for the Co-operative Party to either contradict or offer something different to the 
Labour Party. This was even more pertinent following the change in organisation 
discussed in chapter two which meant Co-operative Party candidates now had to sign 
Labour Party standing orders and abide by the Labour whip in Parliament. However, it 
can also be argued that the correspondence between the manifestos also indicated 
that there was a substantial level of support from the Co-operative Party, and 
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consequently the wider co-operative movement, for the Labour Party’s proposed full 
employment policy, through the nationalisation of key industries. This was evident in a 
resolution passed at the 1945 Co-operative Congress, which urged for the return of a 
Labour and Co-operative Government to achieve ‘full employment of the nation’s man-
power and resources and such public ownership and general direction of the economy 
that is necessary to achieve it’.567  
This point has been addressed to an extent in the previous chapter, which highlighted 
that many co-operators, including political leaders such as Alf Barnes, identified closely 
with the Labour Party and adopted a statist approach to collective ownership – despite 
being active co-operators. Barnes’ association with these ideals and the Labour Party 
was reflected by the fact he had led the debate on post war reconstruction in 1943 as a 
Front Bencher for the Labour Party, in which calls were made for the nationalisation of 
key industries and the finance of the country.568 Moreover, as Minister of Transport, 
Barnes was directly responsible for the successful piloting of the Transport Act through 
Parliament in 1947. At the Co-operative Party Conference it was proudly reported that 
‘our colleague Alfred Barnes has claimed that the Transport Act is the greatest piece of 
socialist legislation ever carried through a democratically elected Parliament. We 
congratulate our colleague as the architect of this great measure’.569 The Transport Act 
of 1947 was based on the Morrissonian board model that had been questioned by 
co-operators, such as Fred Longden during the 1930s – it was a co-operative measure 
in any sense. Furthermore Lord Rusholme, General Secretary of the Co-operative 
Union, was appointed to as one of the five members of the Transport Commission, 
which would oversee the implementation of this legislation, thus implying approval for 
the measure from within the wider co-operative movement.570 
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An article by C. W. Fulker, Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee, reflected that the 
mass of legislation passed during the first Parliamentary session had caused little 
concern for the movement and that in terms of future legislation there was no sign of 
clashes on any major points of principle.571 There was a limited amount of attention and 
discussion regarding the nationalisation of coal, the Bank of England and transport at 
Co-operative Party Conferences and at Co-operative Congress during the 1940s, 
demonstrating a tacit support for these measures.572 Equally, however, there was little 
legislation which directly affected the functioning of the co-operative movement, as 
these industries were viewed by the co-operative movement as essential national 
services.573 Prior to 1945 there had, on occasions, been discussions regarding the 
divergent views on models of ownership, particularly in relation to existing co-operative 
trade interests as chapter three has illustrated. However, these tensions were often 
underplayed by the leadership of both Parties as being of no ideological significance 
but merely technical detail. An overall sense of unity existed between the Co-operative 
Party and Labour Party which was reflected in a general level of agreement on the 
aims for a first socialist government. 
Therefore, the ‘unquestioning support’ Carbery states was shown by the Co-operative 
Parliamentary group for the nationalisation plans of the Labour Government of 1945, 
was due to the constraints of their electoral alliance, but arguably also represented 
political support for these aims from the co-operative movement.574 The path of 
nationalisation implemented by the Labour Party had been mapped out before the 
outbreak of the Second World War and co-operative ideas were not represented 
largely because the co-operative movement had not contributed an alternative policy at 
this stage, and broadly agreed with the Labour Party on these first steps to socialism.  
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Co-operative Responses to the Labour Party’s Proposals for a Second Term – 
from Nationalisation to Mutualisation of Industrial Assurance. 
This section will examine the responses of both the Co-operative Party and the 
co-operative movement to the emerging policies of the Labour Party, during the later 
1940s. It will focus in particular on the Labour Party’s proposal to nationalise industrial 
assurance, as this, it is argued, forced the co-operative movement to consider in more 
detail their policies on common ownership.575 As Francis outlined ‘difficulties arose over 
the Labour Party’s plans for a second term when state ownership would be extended 
into trades where co-operative power was concentrated’.576 The implementation of 
‘short term goals’, such as welfare, social reform and nationalisation of key industries, 
which had commanded support across the labour movement, including the 
co-operative movement, had left the Labour Party by the late 1940s in a policy vacuum. 
For example, Toye has argued that although there was a level of basic accord within 
the Party on the 1945 election Manifesto, the rapid achievement of this by the late 
1940s left the Labour Party in a quandary whether it should veer to the left or right.577 
Furthermore, this policy vacuum had implications on the policy development of the 
Co-operative Party, whose policy statements had also reflected the priorities of the 
Labour Party.  
The Labour Party’s plans for a second term were outlined in their policy statement, 
Labour Believes in Britain published in May 1950. This statement contained a new 
shopping list of industries which the Labour Party proposed to nationalise in a 
subsequent term of government, including industrial assurance, sugar, cement and 
meat wholesaling.578 However, one of the major providers of industrial assurance was 
the Co-operative Insurance Society (CIS), which had been an integral part of the 
co-operative movement since 1867.579 The nationalisation of industrial assurance as a 
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public authority would therefore result in the Co-operative Insurance Society being 
‘taken over lock, stock and barrel’.580 This, and the general apathy shown by the 
Labour Party towards the co-operative movement in this policy statement, frustrated 
co-operators. Bailey commented in the Co-operative Party’s Monthly Letter that there 
was nothing in this policy statement from the Labour Party which would either 
strengthen or promote co-operation, instead he concluded ‘it points to the state as if it 
were the highest peak of organisation’.581 It is clear to see why Gurney indicated that 
this incident brought tensions between the co-operative movement and the Labour 
Party to a head.582 
The implications and potential consequences of this Labour Party policy statement on 
the co-operative movement were a focal point for discussion at the 1949 Co-operative 
Congress, which met shortly after its publication. Arguably the proceedings of this 
Congress provided the clearest political lead on policy relations with the Labour Party 
since the conception of the Co-operative Party, signalled by both a shift in the language 
used and the importance attached to this issue.583 There was still an emphasis on unity 
between the Labour Party and co-operative movement, but overall the tone is less 
passive.584 The preface to the proceedings of this Congress report for example state 
that ‘friendly but nebulous references’ to the co-operative movement in Labour Party 
policy may have been overlooked in the past, yet the subsequent proceedings indicate 
that as the Labour Party sought to extend their nationalisation programme, impinging 
on the movement’s existing interests and potentially restricting their further 
development, the movement realised it needed to act.585 Nevertheless, it soon became 
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clear that determining the role of the co-operative movement in a socialist state would 
be no easy task, as these remarks from T. H. Gill, President of Congress suggest; 
‘None of us will be prepared to submit to the conception of an all powerful corporate 
state. On the other hand we are satisfied that the ownership and control of the basic 
economy of the country must be in the hands of the nation. There is a vast territory in 
between, and it is necessary that we should know clearly how far public interest is to be 
protected still further by extensions of public control, and how far freedom will be 
possible for the co-operative movement to function and develop not only as a 
corrective to consumer exploitation, but also as a way of life to which people can 
adhere of their own free will.’586 
 
Here Gill deftly summarises the ideological predicament which the co-operative 
movement was presented - it desired the common ownership and control of the 
nation’s economy, but did not want a level of control which would eradicate the free will 
of the people as this would inhibit the development of the voluntary co-operative 
movement. Up until this juncture, the movement had been able to support the Labour 
Party’s nationalisation plans as they had focused on universal services for all 
consumers, in which the movement had only negligible trade interests. As a result of 
these discussions a resolution was unanimously passed encouraging immediate 
negotiations to be sought with the Labour Party to allow for the development of the 
co-operative movement within a collectivist economy, to ensure that the ‘co-operative 
method of voluntary organisation’ was recognised as an integral part of the national 
economy.587 
That Labour Party policy was a focal point of Co-operative Congress represented a 
major shift in terms of the political involvement of the Co-operative Union; as chapter 
three indicated, during the 1930s they had steered away from publicly getting involved 
in broad policy discussion with the Labour Party. On one hand this continued to reflect 
the fact that the co-operative movement were only concerned when policy impacted 
upon their business and trade interests – as in this instance there was a clear threat. 
However, this also reflected a wider change in the political culture of the co-operative 
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movement in which the Co-operative Union, through both its inclusion on the National 
Council of Labour in 1941 and its role in the 1946 Agreement with the Labour Party, 
became more actively and directly involved in political matters. 
Garnett’s A Century of Co-operative Insurance charts the sequence of negotiations 
between the Labour Party, Co-operative Union and the Co-operative Insurance Society 
over the proposed nationalisation of industrial assurance.588 There are several things 
that can be extracted from these negotiations regarding the political relationship 
between the Co-operative Party, co-operative movement and the Labour Party. Firstly, 
it was not the National Joint Policy Committee as constituted by the 1946 Agreement 
which conducted the negotiations regarding industrial assurance. For example in May 
1949 the Policy Committee of the Co-operative Union (a sub-committee of the newly 
created Central Executive which had taken over the functions of the National 
Co-operative Authority), along with members of the Co-operative Insurance Society 
met with representatives of the Labour Party government, including James Griffiths, 
Minister for National Insurance.589 At this meeting the Labour Party outlined their 
reasons for this proposed nationalisation, stating that there were serious abuses in the 
conduct of the industrial assurance business which could only be rectified by 
nationalisation. In response, Mr Dinnage of the Co-operative Insurance Society stated 
that the abuses referred to by Griffiths were now outdated. R. Southern, Secretary of 
the Co-operative Union argued that if these proposals were put into effect then 
policyholders with the Co-operative Insurance Society would lose the benefits of the 
non-profit making basis of co-operative enterprise and co-operative societies would be 
unable to insure with the organisation they had purposely created.590 Secondly, this 
demonstrates that the opposition of the movement was based on three strands; a 
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critique of the rationale for nationalisation; the defence of their business interests; and 
concern for the policyholders’ right to act co-operatively. 
The negotiations between the Co-operative Union, Co-operative Insurance Society and 
Labour Party continued throughout 1949. The Co-operative Union made it clear that 
they could not politically support the nationalisation of insurance, unless it excluded the 
Co-operative Insurance Society. Yet this was not an option for the Labour Party, who 
were faced with various elements of opposition to this proposal, along with resistance 
to other aspects of their new programme notably resistance to Tate and Lyle regarding 
the proposed nationalisation of the sugar industry. However, in a major policy shift, the 
Labour Party then changed its plans to nationalise industrial assurance and instead 
advocated the mutualisation of the industry in its 1950 Election Manifesto.591 This was 
a significant step for the Labour Party and arguably the first instance in which they 
positively advocated mutualisation rather than nationalisation or municipalisation as a 
form of ownership. Mutualisation was interpreted here by the Labour Party as common 
ownership by the policy holders, which in their view equated to co-operative ownership, 
as outlined in this extract from a Labour Party internal document;  
‘The Labour Party therefore proposes that all the industrial assurance offices should in 
future be owned not by private shareholders but by the policy holders themselves. In 
other words, all the Offices should be converted into mutual offices owned 
co-operatively by the shareholders.’592 
 
What is more striking here is the statement that ‘the Labour Party is not wedded in any 
doctrinaire fashion to one particular type of ownership’ and that ‘in this case it is clear 
that ownership by policyholders is the most suitable form of common ownership to 
adopt’.593 Considering that both historical and contemporary interpretations of the 
Labour Party economic policy in the late 1940s have emphasised the continued 
ideological commitment to state nationalisation, this statement at first appears to be 
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somewhat of an anomaly until it is understood in the context of its relationship with the 
co-operative movement. 
The proposed mutualisation raises several questions regarding the marginalisation of 
co-operative methods by the Labour Party in this period. Did it in fact suggest the 
opposite and did this embrace of mutualisation represent a diversion from the Labour 
Party’s attachment to state nationalisation? Was this policy a direct result of 
negotiations with the Co-operative Union and Co-operative Insurance Society, 
suggesting that the influence of the movement was greater than has previously been 
suspected? There were, however, several other factors which need to be considered in 
order to address these questions. In addition to opposition from the co-operative 
movement, this proposal also had strong opposition from trade unions and other 
existing industrial assurance offices, for example the Prudential.594 A letter from an 
unidentified member of the Labour Party’s Research Department provides an insight 
into some other factors that contributed to this decision, including the potential for 
mutualisation to increase overseas earnings as Americans seemed to prefer mutual 
offices, and that that a proposal for ownership by the policyholders was more attractive 
to the electorate.595 Thus, opposition from the co-operative movement was only one of 
many issues which led to this decision by the Labour Party. 
Nevertheless, the impact of co-operative opposition on this issue must not be 
underplayed. In this letter the author states that ‘I am venturing, even though it means 
using yet more paper on this wretched subject, to send you my purely personal views 
after the last and most extraordinary meeting with the Co-op on 9 November’.596 This 
indicates that although co-operative opposition to this proposal was frustrating in terms 
of the time and energy used to resolve the issue, the Labour Party felt that it was 
important and of value to them to resolve these differences. However, it is arguable 
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that this was in order to achieve unity within the wider labour movement on this 
proposal, and did not represent any significant embrace of co-operative ideology by the 
Labour Party. That ultimately, the mutualisation of industrial assurance was dropped 
from the 1951 Labour Party manifesto further supports this interpretation. Regardless, 
this decision gave the Co-operative Party hope for future policy collaboration, illustrated 
by a resolution passed at the 1950 Conference from the Royal Arsenal Co-operative 
Society which stated; ‘that this Conference shows its appreciation of the outcome of 
discussion between the co-operative movement and the Labour Party on industrial 
assurance and places on record the view that this might be a method of securing 
co-operative expression in other industries to be brought under public ownership’.597 
Finding its Political Voice? The Development of Co-operative Party Policy, 1945-
1951. 
What will be examined here is whether this environment of policy development 
provided a space for emergent tensions to take root over differences in the 
interpretation of common ownership as a means to achieving socialism. The proposed 
nationalisation of industrial assurance did force the Co-operative Union into 
negotiations with the Labour Party, in which they had to consider more seriously what 
the role of the co-operative movement would be in a socialist state. However, there are 
signs that, as early as 1946, a critique of the Labour Party’s focus on nationalisation as 
a method of socialism was emerging within the Co-operative Party. Jack Bailey wrote 
in the Co-operative Party Monthly Letter in June 1946 that ‘so little thought has been 
given in the British Labour Movement to socialist method that nationalisation is 
regarded by many as the one and only form of democratic ownership’.598 He explained 
that when asked why the co-operative movement should be expected to be treated 
differently to private enterprise, the answer was because it was different.599 He added 
that the key difference between nationalisation and co-operation as forms of social 
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ownership was that nationalisation was achieved by compulsion and co-operation by 
voluntaryism.600 Jack Bailey was appointed as Secretary of the Party after Sam Perry’s 
retirement in 1943, yet Bailey appears to have taken over from Barnes, who retired 
from his role as Chairman in 1946, in providing a lead on policy and ideology for the 
Party. Bailey was immediately much more vocal than either Perry or Barnes had been 
in terms of advocating a distinct co-operative contribution to socialism. This change in 
personnel was equally a contributing factor to the change in tone of co-operative policy 
and a consequence of the changing political culture of the movement. 
By the end of 1946, the Executive Committee of the Co-operative Party was beginning 
to reconsider its political programme. An article in the Monthly Letter, for example, 
stated how many changes had occurred since the publication of their most recent 
programme The World We Want in 1943; the war had ended and many of the reforms 
advocated in the policy (Social Security, a National Health Service, Nationalisation of 
Coal Mines, Bank of England, Electricity and Transport) had been implemented by the 
Labour Government. Thus the policy vacuum in which the Labour Party found itself 
applied also too the Co-operative Party. To increase the policy presence of the 
Co-operative Party it was decided that an annual statement on policy be prepared for 
Conference by the National Committee.601 Although as previous chapters have 
indicated the authority of the Co-operative Party conference was limited in what it could 
achieve, its constitutional function was to provide an arena for policy discussion - which 
would then be referred to the Co-operative Union for approval. Yet this decision to 
include a policy statement annually marks a clear commitment from the National 
Committee of the Co-operative Party to the continued development of their political 
programme.  
In 1948, the first such policy statement was presented to the Party Conference, 
covering both the international situation and domestic matters. The latter part of the 
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statement reflected on the achievements of the first two years of Labour’s government 
and reaffirmed the support given by the Co-operative Party for these measures.602 
However, it also raised some questions for the Labour Party regarding the future of its 
socialist policies. In moving the report, W. E. Wheeldon, a member of the Party’s 
National Committee, stated that ‘public ownership was not something which came in 
with the Labour Government but had been practiced by the co-operative movement for 
a hundred years’ and therefore in building a new Britain the co-operative movement 
needed be a full and active partner with the Labour Party’.603  
An examination of the 1948 Co-operative Congress report also reveals a growing 
interest in the policy of the Labour Party, with delegates arguing for the co-operative 
movement to clarify its relationship with the state in response to the recasting of the 
role of the state by the Labour Party. At this, A. J. Tapping raised a number of 
searching questions in his presidential address. They included questions such as 
‘where does the movement fit into new forms of planned economy?’ and a declaration 
that ‘although the government bears us some goodwill it also needs to recognise the 
positive qualities and possibilities of the Co-operative Movement’.604 The following 
resolution was passed which echoed the president’s address:  
‘That this Co-operative Congress places on record its gratification at the successes 
with which the present government has carried out policy for the public control of 
essential industries and services. It recognises however that further development of the 
policy of nationalisation must affect sections of the industry in which the Co-operative 
Movement is already established. It believes that in very large fields of enterprise the 
Co-operative Movement has established the best method by consumers’ organisation 
of meeting the needs of the people and calls upon the whole Labour Movement to 
accord to that method a clear and increasingly important place in future schemes of 
economic and social advance. In order that all sections of the working-class movement 
may work in harmony to achieve the most efficient method of satisfying consumer need 
it instructs the National Co-operative Authority to prepare a full statement of the place 
which the Co-operative Movement should occupy in developing collectivist economy. 
This statement after prompt consideration, to be submitted to National Council of 
Labour for inclusion in the programme at the next General Election.’605 
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In moving this, Mrs M. Millar of the London Co-operative Society, stated that the overall 
aim of this resolution was to work with the National Council of Labour to get a 
declaration that co-operative methods of control and organisation will be used and that 
it be ‘openly and clearly declared that Co-operation is part of this trinity’ - not just there 
in the background giving support.606 This resolution focused on the National 
Co-operative Authority and the National Council of Labour as potential vehicles for 
policy consultation, although as has been indicated previously, the policy role of the 
National Council of Labour was not as significant as it had perhaps been in the 
1930s.607 There is no mention of the National Policy Committee created by the 1946 
Agreement here, despite this policy avenue offering a more direct route to the Labour 
Party executive at this point. Nevertheless, what this resolution does illustrate is that 
even prior to the proposed nationalisation of industrial assurance the co-operative 
movement were becoming increasingly aware of the potential conflict between the 
Labour Party’s commitment to nationalisation as a policy and the business interests of 
the co-operative movement. 
At the 1949 Co-operative Party Conference, delegates unanimously passed a 
resolution urging the co-operative and labour movements to work together through the 
National Policy Committee to formulate an agreed policy on the place of the 
co-operative movement in a socialist economy.608 Although this statement echoed the 
sentiment of the one above at Co-operative Congress the main contrast was the 
platform through which each proposed the Labour Party be consulted – with the 
Co-operative Party looking to the machinery created by the 1946 Agreement. This 
composite resolution stated how it believed a Socialist Britain ‘could be achieved by a 
balanced use of the methods of Nationalisation, Municipalisation and Co-operation’. In 
many ways this emphasis on state, municipal and co-operative methods all having a 
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distinct role to play in the restructuring of society continued to echo the policy 
expressed by the Co-operative Party in the early 1930s, though as to which industries 
and services each form would be applied was never fully explored or developed 
beyond Britain Reborn. Also at the 1949 Co-operative Party Conference, a policy report 
was submitted by the National Committee on distribution. This, noted one delegate, 
provided a basis for a ‘timely discussion’ regarding the future of the movement, 
particularly in the light of the Labour Party’s publication of its new policy statement 
earlier in the year.609 The report outlined the concern felt by the Co-operative Party 
regarding over centralisation and loss of consumer influence and again argued that 
there must be adequate scope for voluntary movements such as the co-operative 
movement.610 Distribution was one of the new areas in which the Labour Party were 
seeking to develop policy and potentially extend nationalisation.  
The Co-operative Party leadership, however, remained aware of the constraints under 
which it operated in these discussions. At this conference, W. Bargh of the National 
Committee referred to the policy statement on distribution as a courageous attempt to 
persuade the co-operative movement of the country to make up its mind on policy 
suggesting that; ‘one of the great problems we have ... is the difficulty of getting this 
vast movement to crystallise its position and define its policy’.611 This point was 
reiterated at a later point in the debate when it was stated that even the leadership of 
the movement were unable to agree, referring to differing points of view between C. W. 
Fulker of the Parliamentary Committee and Jack Bailey of the Co-operative Party on 
the issue of milk distribution.612 
In February 1950 the political circumstances changed; in the first General Election held 
since 1945 the Labour Party lost significant electoral ground with their majority of 146 
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reduced to five.613 The 1950 Co-operative Party Conference, which took place shortly 
after this election, highlighted some of the likely consequences of this reduced majority. 
One speaker suggested that ‘the present Government cannot expand Socialism as 
they would have done with a working majority, but we can expand social ownership as 
far as the Co-operative Movement is concerned by expanding our trading activities 
where possible’.614 One result of this uncertainly is that it appears to have provided 
greater scope for the co-operative movement to contribute to the policy of the Labour 
Party by advocating the benefits of voluntary association.  
Two significant policy statements were published within the co-operative movement in 
1950 advocating the expansion of co-operative ideas in a socialist society: the 
Co-operative Party’s Building the New Britain and the Co-operative Union’s The 
Co-operative Movement in a Collectivist Economy.615 These represented a culmination 
of the development of the growing awareness in the Co-operative Party and wider 
movement as to the potential for using co-operative methods to extend state socialism, 
compounded by the proposals put forward by the Labour Party regarding industrial 
assurance and distribution. In Building a New Britain the message was clear, the Party 
wanted recognition of co-operation as a valid form of social ownership and acceptance 
that their method is not one that should be replaced by nationalisation. It stated that 
‘co-operators ask not for the establishment of a new principle, but for the application of 
one already recognised in other spheres’.616 Furthermore this statement recognised the 
potentiality of co-operation and argued that the Party should not limit its concerns to 
‘the institutions and organisations which at present express co-operative principles and 
methods’ and instead go beyond self-protection and flourish.617 It proposed that ‘it is 
peculiarly the task of the Co-operative Party to insist that the Co-operative Movement 
shall be used to its utmost as one of the instruments by which the people of Britain are 
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trained to ever greater responsibility in the use of economic and social power’.618 The 
statement did however emphasise a commitment to the nationalisation of appropriate 
industries, demonstrating the Co-operative Party’s continued support for the Labour 
Party through a commitment to the 1945 programme.619 Building a New Britain was a 
statement of political policy with the intention of forming the basis of a political 
programme, and in this respect was not necessarily a critique of Labour Party policy as 
ultimately the Co-operative Party still needed to work within their electoral machinery. 
In contrast, the Co-operative Union’s statement, The Co-operative Movement in a 
Collectivist Economy, embodied both an extension to the resolution detailed above 
from the 1948 Congress and a response to the Labour Party’s future policy plans. It 
reflected that ‘whilst the draft programme of the Labour Party for the return of a Labour 
Government has many excellent features there are also many disappointing aspects ... 
It is impossible to find any relation between meat wholesaling, sugar, industrial 
assurance or cement ...The piecemeal character of these proposals seems to indicate 
that so much preoccupation has been necessitated by current problems as to have left 
little opportunity for the very careful thinking required to work out an orderly and 
unsatisfactory programme of socialist advance’.620 It suggested that despite clause four 
of the Labour Party’s constitution calling for ‘common ownership’ not ‘nationalisation’, 
that for many years the Labour Party appears to have thought only in terms of 
nationalisation and municipalisation as the solution of economic problems and social 
injustice’ which was both curious and regrettable in terms of the potential co-operative 
contribution.621  
The importance of the voluntary principle was reaffirmed in this report and it was 
stressed that the movement strongly believed that ‘a democratic society will not apply 
the principle of compulsion to any part of the economic field, where the voluntary 
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principle already succeeds’.622 In order to meet the ‘vital rights and interests of 
consumers and consumer organisations’ the report outlined that the co-operative 
movement would ask the Labour Party to declare that the co-operative system is one 
based upon common ownership within the Party’s constitution and to agree that before 
detailed decisions be made on a range of consumer focused industries, now and in the 
future, that the movement be consulted.623 Moreover, the report highlighted that as 
future governments may be of a different political complexion, existing forms of social 
ownership which are not dependant on state legislation should be given plenty of scope 
to develop, which, perhaps given the disappointing results of the 1950 election, was a 
more pertinent concern to co-operators than it had been previously.624 
In essence, the report was an appeal to the Labour Party not to ignore the strength and 
potential of the co-operative movement in building a socialist society and represented 
an ideological critique of the Labour Party from within the co-operative movement. 
Consequently the report faced criticism from within the movement for focusing too 
much on the negatives and not actually defining much in terms of future policy, 
whereas the Co-operative Party had begun to think more clearly in terms of what its 
policy was on issues such as distribution and more generally regarding the wider 
application of co-operative principles in a socialist society, as evidenced in Building a 
New Britain. As a department of the Co-operative Union, the policy of the Co-operative 
Party needed to reflect the political mood of the movement yet their policy statements 
needed to be less critical due to the need to maintain the electoral alliance with the 
Labour Party.  
At the 1951 Co-operative Party Conference, a resolution was unanimously passed 
which called for the National Committee to consider the relationship of the co-operative 
movement to nationalisation and public ownership more generally and submit a 
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statement on the means of applying co-operative methods and principles where 
appropriate by the following year.625 Moving this, Mr H. James of the Liverpool Party, 
emphasised that it was the job of the co-operative movement and not the Labour Party 
to put forward co-operative alternatives, stating that being opposed to nationalisation 
was not enough. Musing over why the co-operative movement had yet to make up its 
mind on this matter, he suggested that this was in part due to vested interests within 
the co-operative movement and also because of the consumer versus producer identity 
issue.626 James added that ‘it is only fair that we should congratulate the Co-operative 
Movement upon having succeeded in persuading the Labour Party that the 
Co-operative Movement is a form of public ownership and should be extended. But ... 
where do we go from here?’627  
The resulting document, The People’s Industry – A statement on social ownership, by 
the National Committee of the Co-operative Party, was presented to the following 
year’s Party Conference in full, and unanimously accepted by delegates.628 An 
additional resolution from Mr H. James was also put forward, congratulating the 
National Committee on this and urging all sections of Party to encourage the Labour 
Party to adopt the proposals outlined in this statement.629 Ballard, in proposing the 
adoption of the statement, outlined to delegates how ‘Labour’s first programme, and its 
much less revolutionary second programme, have demonstrated the need to give 
careful thought to our future programme’.630 This policy statement considered two 
broad questions which it noted were occupying the labour movement more generally, 
firstly the structure of existing nationalised industries and secondly the future 
development of socialism.631 The introduction of the statement was an appreciation of 
the revolutionary work of the Labour Government, affirming that the Co-operative Party, 
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like the Labour Party, remained committed to nationalisation through the recognition of 
the achievements of the 1945 Government.632 Following the introduction, the first part 
of the statement concerned the structure of existing nationalised industries, and Ballard 
outlined that they believed that nationalisation had given too much power to central 
agencies and too little to workers and consumers.633 The second part of this statement, 
subtitled ‘Diversity in Social Ownership’, presented four methods of social ownership; 
state nationalisation, municipal control, consumer control and producer control.634 It 
assessed the benefits and suitability of all these methods, contending that although 
nationalisation may suit certain industries, there also needs to be scope in a socialised 
society for co-operative and municipal methods – hence its key message being 
diversity.635 This statement provided the most coherent policy document from the 
Co-operative Party at this point, and demonstrated a significant advance from 1945 
when their own political programme contained scant reference to how co-operative 
methods and principles would be utilised. In this respect Ballard stated; ‘This is our 
contribution. The Labour Party is a federation, having within it trade unions, socialist 
theorists and ourselves. We come forward with essentially a business experience 
behind us.’ He added that the Federation of British Industries, National Farmers’ Union, 
British Medical Association and TUC had all left their impress on present legislation 
and that ‘we want the next programme to bear the marks of a great co-operative 
contribution’.636 However, this policy was still limited in the impact it could hope to have 
on the Labour Party, as it did not provide a clear blueprint to inform Labour Party policy 
and remained more of a propaganda piece of policy promoting co-operative methods 
more generally. 
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Did then this development of a Co-operative Party policy which embodied co-operative 
methods reflect a purely defensive action as Francis suggested?637 Or was it 
symptomatic of a broader political shift within the Co-operative Party and the wider 
co-operative movement. To an extent, it is argued here that the development of 
co-operative policy during the period 1945 to 1950 can be interpreted as an 
ideologically motivated critique of the Labour Party’s overwhelming focus on 
nationalisation of industries and services as a route to socialism. This critique was 
based upon the movement’s own experience in voluntary co-operation. Moreover these 
policy responses indicate that there was a realisation within the Co-operative Party and 
the wider movement as to the potential contribution co-operative methods of ownership 
and control could make within a socialist society. In 1945, socialism was still viewed as 
being very much of the future, however the election of a Labour Government and the 
accomplishment of their political programme made socialism a reality and paved the 
way for further socialist expansion. As Barnes indicated in 1925 ‘If we analyse the 
nationalisation movement, the municipalisation movement and the co-operative 
movement, we see that for a considerable period there is plenty of room for growth for 
each other without coming into conflict with another to any serious extent’.638 However, 
by 1947 these movements had grown, in particular the nationalisation movement, and 
the co-operative movement was conscious it may not have room to continue to expand 
with this increasing emphasis on nationalisation. Consequently, faced with the reality of 
Labour Party’s pro-statist interpretation of a socialist society the entire co-operative 
movement, not just the Co-operative Party, was compelled to consider the contribution 
of co-operative methods in the achievement of socialism. 
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Organisational and Ideological Implications Raised by the Industrial Assurance 
Discussions. 
One crucial question raised by the industrial assurance matter is why co-operative 
opposition to this proposal did not come to the fore until 1949, when the Labour Party 
had actually first proposed the nationalisation of industrial assurance in 1928.639 Firstly, 
as chapters two and three indicated, both the Co-operative Party and the co-operative 
movement were not represented in the Labour Party policy making machine and did 
not contribute directly to policy discussions. Secondly, there was a degree of 
indifference from the co-operative movement to policy development beyond their 
immediate business concerns, which limited the development of a coherent 
Co-operative Party policy. Therefore, although in 1934 the Labour Party passed a 
resolution again calling for the nationalisation of industrial assurance for the reasons 
outlined, this neither came under the radar of the co-operative movement, nor was the 
implication imminent enough for them to take action.640 Thus if the industrial assurance 
incident represented the marginalisation of co-operative ideas by the Labour Party in 
the post war period, this reflected the wider political culture and structure of their 
relationship which consequently marginalised co-operative ideas within the Labour 
Party policy machine.  
Industrial assurance brought to the fore a key tension in the respective ideologies of 
the Labour Party and Co-operative Party which had previously been underplayed – 
state compulsion versus voluntary co-operation. This was not, however, a new 
distinction, as early as 1920 it was noted by T. W. Mercer in a pamphlet outlining the 
arguments for and against a political alliance with the Labour Party. He stated that the 
co-operative movement emphasised voluntary efforts as a method for achieving the 
co-operative commonwealth, whilst the Labour Party advocated that this could be 
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achieved through an act of Parliament.641 A growing intellectual interest in the 
co-operative movement and its relation to the Labour Party in the late 1940s is 
reflected by the publication of a selection of essays in 1948, in which Jack Bailey’s 
essay makes a strong case for the defence of the voluntary principle and provides an 
insight into movement thinking on the issue642 Bailey outlines how some socialists 
argue that the continued existence of voluntary co-operation is unimportant and that 
they must adapt to socialism, particularly because ‘the Co-operative Movement should 
be well content if it obtained from the State monopoly powers in the distribution of 
certain commodities’.643 However, according to Bailey, these arguments ignored the 
voluntary character of the British co-operative movement ‘which neither coerces, nor 
wishes to be coerced’ and that socialists should ‘jealously’ preserve voluntary 
co-operation if they want to enlarge and increase freedoms.644 
Similarly, an article in the New Statesman in 1949 suggested that there was no future 
for the co-operative movement unless they abandoned voluntary co-operation and 
began to act as an agent for the state.645 In response to this article, Jack Bailey stated 
that this was clearly a dilemma of the author’s own creation as many fields of the 
economy should provide scope for various agencies - co-operative, state and 
private.646 This was discussed by G. D. H. Cole in his pamphlet A Guide to the 
Elements of Socialism published by the Labour Party in 1947.647 Cole suggested that 
one way to overcome the problems between state ownership and co-operation, for 
instance in the case of milk, would be to give co-operative societies, as agents of a 
state board, a monopoly of the retailing of milk.  
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However, the co-operative movement were opposed to the idea that state imposed 
co-operation would enable the movement to find a place within a socialist society. 
Bonner indicates how co-operative theorists had long indicated that the co-operative 
movement should not operate as an instrument of the state as this would be against 
the movement’s ideas of freedom of association.648 Thus, even if the state granted full 
control for the co-operative movement for the distribution of a commodity, such as milk, 
this would not be welcomed by the movement as it would be at odds with the principle 
of voluntary association. The continuing and deep rooted importance and significance 
of the voluntary principle to the movement can be elicited from the proceedings of the 
1937 Conference of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA), held in Paris. In a 
discussion surrounding the current application of the Rochdale Principles it was stated 
that ‘the idea of obligatory membership of a Co-operative Society never entered into 
conception of the Rochdale Pioneers, neither in planning their society, or subsequent 
development’.649 Voluntaryism, although not one of the seven Rochdale principles, did 
however remain central to the International Co-operative Alliance’s conception of 
co-operation. At this conference it was recognised that the state could impinge upon 
the voluntary character of co-operation if it imposed restrictions or compulsions, but as 
voluntary association would not be inhibited within free association the Committee of 
the International Co-operative Alliance felt that they only had to stress the need for 
complete recognition of this principle.650 A decade later voluntaryism remained an 
implicit ideological principle of co-operation and a key source of tension with the Labour 
Party. 
Despite this awakening within the co-operative movement that co-operators needed to 
be more pro-active in promoting co-operative methods of ownership and control, the 
scope for the co-operative movement to contribute to policy development within the 
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Labour Party remained limited. The main weakness was that there was minimal 
co-operative representation on the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party 
and at Labour Party Conferences, both of which held important policy making 
functions. Joseph Reeves, Labour MP for Greenwich from 1945, and member of the 
Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society Political Purposes Committee was the only 
co-operative representative on the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, 
a seat he held from 1945 to 1963. Writing for the research department of the Labour 
Party in 1950 on the co-operative movement, Reeves states that; 
‘As a member of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party I take my fair 
share of responsibility for the proposals contained in Labour Believes in Britain. But I 
must point out that on a very large executive, I was the only person representing 
directly the interests of co-operators.’651 
 
Reeves added to this that in his view there will be no adequate solution of the problem 
of the relationship until the co-operative movement is related to the Labour Party in the 
same intimate manner as the trade unions, as ‘then and only then will the Co-operative 
Movement have the same right to share in the actual shaping of Labour Party policy’.652 
Reeves was not alone in this view, as evident by the 1945 resolution to Co-operative 
Party Conference from both the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society and Manchester 
and Salford Society to affiliate directly to the Labour Party.  
Like the 1930s, lone co-operative voices were occasionally heard during Labour Party 
Conferences during this period. For instance Percy Daines, a Co-operative Labour MP 
for East Ham North, argued the co-operative case in the Labour Party Conference 
discussions on Labour Believes in Britain. Daines contended that a detached observer 
listening to the debates of the previous day would have drawn the conclusion that there 
were only two ways in which they could proceed, either state socialism or private 
enterprise. Yet he proposed that there is a ‘third way that must command the attention 
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of all socialists’ and that was the co-operative movement.653 However, Daines received 
no backing on this statement and the debate continued without any consideration of 
this third way. By retaining their independence, the Co-operative Party remained 
periphery of the Labour Party and therefore so did the ideology it embodied. 
The Changing Policy Relationship between the Labour Party and the 
Co-operative Union 
By 1950 a slight change in the attitude of the Labour Party to the co-operative 
movement is evident. This section will consider that by 1950 the Labour Party did not, 
and could not, afford to alienate the co-operative movement. Contrary to previous 
assessments, it will be suggested here that the Labour Party did begin to take the 
policy concerns of the co-operative movement seriously and consult them on aspects 
of policy. As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the decision to propose 
mutualisation not nationalisation of industrial assurance in part reflected the need to 
reach agreement with the co-operative movement. At the 1950 Co-operative Party 
Conference, William Coldrick in his Chairman’s address reflected that ‘it has now 
become apparent that the Co-operative Movement has become too important to be 
ignored, even by our political opponents’.654 In addition, the policy tensions between the 
Labour Party and the Co-operative Party during the General Election campaign of 1950 
had not escaped the attention of the Conservative Party who had published a series of 
three pamphlets seeking to ‘woo’ co-operators using propaganda such as ‘sooner or 
later they [the Labour Party] mean to nationalise your co-op’.655 The Co-operative Party 
and Co-operative Union continued to advocate for complete unity with the Labour Party 
and were keen to remind co-operators of the previous hostility shown by the 
Conservatives, but nevertheless this contributed to broader anti-nationalisation rhetoric 
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and could have influenced co-operators who were concerned about ceding consumer 
rights to state control and lost the Labour Party votes. 
The increased level of collaboration between the Labour Party and the Co-operative 
Party is evident from the co-operative movement’s attendance at the Dorking 
Conference in May 1950. This was a policy conference held by the Labour Party at 
Dorking to discuss future policy. The importance of this to the co-operative movement 
is highlighted in this quote from the Co-operative Review;  
‘The passing by Congress, with virtual unanimity, of the special report on the place of 
the Co-operative Movement in a collectivist economy, together with an initiation of 
policy talks at Dorking by the Labour, Trades Union and Co-operative Movements may 
mark a new epoch in co-operative participation in the political life of this country.’656 
 
More significantly, it was not only voices from within the co-operative movement who 
were of this opinion. An article from the New Statesman and Nation which was 
reprinted in the Co-operative Review stated that ‘seen in perspective, the Dorking 
Conference will be remembered as the first occasion on which the Labour Party 
formally recognised the right of the Co-operative Union to share in the formulation of 
Socialist Policy’.657 The New Statesman article contended that the Labour Party losing 
electoral ground in the General Election of 1950 had changed the atmosphere and had 
begun to realise the effective limits of nationalisation and recognise that the consumer 
is just as important as the producer in society and consequently co-operative ideas and 
methods may have a role to play.658 
An examination of the Research Department records of the Labour Party from 1945 
revealed an internal document examining the The Co-operative Movement in a 
Collectivist Economy, which raised questions for the Labour Party regarding its 
relationship with the co-operative movement.659 This document stated that; 
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‘The problem that faces the Labour Party at the moment is a difficult one. It must 
decide in principle whether to conduct the consultations with the co-operative 
movement a) on the short term basis of the nationalisation projects put forward by the 
in the last manifesto, together with a few other relative questions such as milk and coal 
distribution; or b) on a longer-term basis, involving serious discussion of the place of 
the movement in a socialist society.’660 
 
This document suggested that the Party perhaps had an obligation to come to a clear 
conception of what they wanted from the co-operative movement in the future and 
outlined a number of questions for consideration. Furthermore it stated ‘there is the 
very real problem of the voluntary principle of co-operation to be faced and resolved’ 
indicating that the movement’s attachment to this principle was difficult for the Labour 
Party to fully embrace. Nevertheless, the overall tone of this document suggests that 
the Labour Party were willing to consult more closely with the co-operative movement 
on both long and short term questions regarding the nature of their relationship.661 
However, by 1951, the Labour Party was struggling to define its policy, particularly in 
terms of nationalisation and social ownership, to such an extent that these last minute 
attempts to involve co-operative ideas in their policy programme were perhaps futile. 
The electoral disappointment of 1950 and subsequent defeat in 1951 divided the Party 
and arguably diminished any potential support and backing for the inclusion of 
co-operative ideas, despite the promising events of 1950. As Rhodes indicated in his 
study of the Labour-Co-operative relationship, the Labour Party defeat in the 1951 
election meant there was no immediate need for the Labour Party to discuss in detail 
the proposed legislation affecting the co-operative movement; to this he concluded 
‘with the end of the Labour Government a distinct phase in Co-operative-Labour’ 
relations had terminated.662  
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Meanwhile the Co-operative Party continued to independently develop their policies on 
social ownership, as evident in The People’s Industry, continuing to emphasise the 
important contribution voluntary co-operative methods could play in a socialist society. 
Nevertheless, the limitations in which the Co-operative Party operated continued to 
dominate, epitomised by the Co-operative Union’s response to the much heralded 
policy statement, The People’s Industry. Despite the positive reception of this 
statement at the 1952 Co-operative Party Conference it was not raised for discussion 
at Co-operative Congress in 1952, the reason given being that there was too little time 
for the Co-operative Union to properly review this statement following the Co-operative 
Party Conference and prior to Congress. As an article from R. Southern, General 
Secretary of the Co-operative Union outlined, this decision led to criticism from many 
within the movement.663 This incident serves to highlight the lack of authority the 
Co-operative Party had in making progressive statements regarding the role of the 
co-operative movement. The Co-operative Party were stifled by the bureaucracy of the 
Co-operative Union and this ultimately signified why the policies of the Co-operative 
Party would not be embodied by the Labour Party, as it was the Co-operative Union 
and not the Co-operative Party who had a policy relationship with the Labour Party. 
Conclusions 
Whilst the marginality of co-operative methods within the state focused policies of the 
Labour Party from 1945 to 1951 has not been questioned, what this chapter has done 
is provide a new interpretation of the policy relationship between the Labour Party and 
the Co-operative Party in this period. This interpretation positions the Co-operative 
Party on the periphery of the Labour Party, yet illustrates that the co-operative 
movement more generally adopted a greater political role than previously. In the main, 
this increased politicisation was in the main a business focused response to Labour 
Party policies which would significantly affect the co-operative movement. However, 
this also reflected both a deep concern for the protection of the principle of voluntary 
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association and the potentiality that this principle could offer to a nascent socialist 
society. 
A discussion article in 1950 published in the Monthly Letter raised some interesting 
points with regard to the changing attitude of the Co-operative Party and movement in 
general, regarding discussions of policy with the Labour Party. It recalls that in the past 
the aim of discussions with the Labour Party was not to disturb any co-operative 
institution, and thus the co-operative side was always on the defensive - ‘acting not as 
a vehicle for social change but almost as if we had become an agent of the status 
quo’.664 However, the article concluded that if the Co-operative Party was to win the 
respect of its allies it must have something to say about economic problems and not 
just confine itself to the unconditional defence of an institution.665 This change in 
perspective is arguably illustrated by the policy discussions and reports both at Party 
Conference and Co-operative Congress in the period 1948 to 1951, in which there is a 
clear attempt to define the role of the co-operative movement in a socialist society.  
However, despite a political awakening within the co-operative movement it has been 
illustrated throughout this thesis and calcified in this chapter that one reason which 
contributed to the marginalisation of co-operative methods by the Labour Party was the 
unique structure of the political relationship. By refusing to affiliate nationally to the 
Labour Party, the Co-operative Party, and therefore the co-operative movement 
remained on the periphery of the national policy making organisation of the Labour 
Party. However, despite this continued constitutional weakness it can be argued that by 
1950 the Labour Party were not as dismissive of co-operative ideas as has previously 
been suggested. This was epitomised first by the decision to propose the mutualisation 
of industrial assurance and secondly by the inclusion of the movement into the policy 
discussions at Dorking in 1950. The co-operative movement and Co-operative Party’s 
emerging contributions to policy discussions reflects a greater divide within the broader 
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labour movement as to the future purpose and direction of nationalisation. The 
concerns and criticisms of the co-operative movement could not be ignored as they 
were representative of a large portion of the consumers in Great Britain, many of whom 
were Labour Party supporters. 
Crucially, what this chapter has demonstrated is that the co-operative movement’s 
commitment to the principle of voluntary association was the key difference between 
the ideology of the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party. Moreover, this difference 
emerged in the period 1945 to 1951 to a greater extent than previously because of the 
Labour Party’s indifference to this principle in the forming of policies which extended 
state control into areas which the co-operative movement had both trade interests and 
room for expansion. This indifference was arguably the main reason why the 
co-operative movement created and supported their own political organisation, through 
the Co-operative Party.  
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CONCLUSION 
Altogether this thesis has demonstrated the continued importance of studying the 
organisational structure of a political party in order to understand the political culture in 
which it operated. Like Thorpe, this research has illustrated a huge gap in 
historiography regarding political organisation, which Thorpe argues has in more recent 
years been viewed as old fashioned.666 This thesis has analysed and detailed the 
significant constitutional limitations in which the Co-operative Party operated, due to its 
symbiotic relationship with the Co-operative Union and political alliance with the Labour 
Party. It argues that these limitations directly contributed to the marginalisation of 
co-operative ideas within the policy of the Labour Party. Furthermore, it has brought to 
the fore the anomalous nature of the political alliance between the Co-operative Party 
and the Labour Party, clarifying that whilst local affiliation between the parties was 
commonplace there was no national affiliation, a fact which has been repeatedly 
misunderstood or overlooked by historians of the Labour Party.  
Initially, the focus of this thesis was an examination and analysis of the ideological 
discord between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party in the post war Labour 
Government, to develop an understanding of why co-operative ideas were 
marginalised. However, it soon became evident that the intersections between 
organisation and ideology were hugely significant to understanding this, emphasised 
particularly by the absence and misunderstanding of the Co-operative Party as a 
distinct political organisation in existing twentieth century political historiography.  
To analyse why co-operative ideas of ownership did not achieve any prominence in 
Labour Party policy two key research questions were framed. Firstly, to what extent 
was this due to organisational and constitutional reasons and secondly, to what extent 
was the organisational structure of the political alliance with the Labour Party 
underpinned by ideological differences. By addressing these questions in the context of 
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the political alliance this thesis has shown that the organisational structure of this 
alliance was shaped largely by varying ideological approaches to common ownership, 
yet the nature of their organisational alliance meant that the Co-operative Party 
remained on the periphery of the Labour Party and was unable to make contributions to 
their policy. Consequently voluntary co-operation as a method of common ownership 
remained marginalised within the Labour Party and reaffirmed this sense of ideological 
discord. 
In addition it is clear that the complexity of the relationship between the Co-operative 
Party and the co-operative movement shaped the nature of the relationship with the 
Labour Party, to a greater extent than has previously been acknowledged. The 
Co-operative Party, despite being the outward political manifestation of the 
co-operative movement, was constrained by its relationship with the Co-operative 
Union. The Co-operative Union remained the final authority on all decisions affecting 
the organisational and policy development of the Co-operative Party. The Co-operative 
Party Annual Conference, an arena where politically conscious co-operators met to 
discuss political matters affecting the co-operative movement and beyond, had no 
binding authority. There was a constant sense of frustration amongst delegates that 
this undermined the role and function of the Party throughout the period in question. 
These continued limitations in which the Co-operative Party operated led to ever 
increasing frustration from within the Party that their policy discussions were, as one 
conference delegate stated, tantamount to ‘playing sandcastles’.667  
It is further clear that Co-operative Party Conference was not the arena where both the 
leadership of the Co-operative Union and the Labour Party wanted potential differences 
discussed at length. The layering of political activity in the Co-operative Union meant 
matters of policy with the Labour Party were dealt with by appropriate representatives 
from within the co-operative movement, particularly as these were often determined by 
                                               
667 Co-operative Party Conference Report, (1950) p. 60. 
197 
 
the business needs of the movement. Thus, the National Co-operative Authority, later 
the Policy Committee of the Central Executive, took on a policy role for the 
co-operative movement and not the Co-operative Party. The logic behind this was that 
the National Co-operative Authority represented the entirety of the movement whilst the 
Co-operative Party did not command support from all societies within the Co-operative 
Union. However, the National Co-operative Authority had authority to make decisions 
without Congress and therefore could influence the overall direction of the movement. 
The Co-operative Party was largely bypassed in policy discussions with the Labour 
Party, as their role was viewed as largely administrative and functional – to achieve 
political representation to protect and promote co-operation. The Co-operative Party 
was represented on the National Co-operative Authority and could contribute to 
ongoing policy discussions in this respect, yet as a political organisation it limited policy 
function or authority. For instance negotiations regarding Industrial Assurance were 
carried out between the Co-operative Union, the CIS and the Labour Party – not 
directly with the Co-operative Party. Nor did these discussions utilise the National 
Policy Committee, a much heralded aspect of the 1946 Agreement. 
The nature of the alliance with the Labour Party also affected the policy development of 
the Co-operative Party. Firstly, it was crucial that the Labour Party and the 
Co-operative Party offer similar political programmes as ultimately candidates stood 
under the joint banner of Co-operative-Labour. Gaining representation in Parliament 
was a key function for the Co-operative Party and working in alliance with the Labour 
Party offered a route in which this could be achieved. In this respect, the Co-operative 
Party served the co-operative movement as a democratic way to facilitate the 
contested issue of co-operative involvement in Parliamentary politics. Thus debate over 
potentially divisive points of policy regarding methods of ownership was stifled at 
Co-operative Party conferences in an attempt by Co-operative Party leadership to 
maintain harmony with the Labour Party. The influence of Alf Barnes in these formative 
years of the Co-operative Party must not be understated – and the varying influences 
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of key Co-operative Party personnel including Barnes, Sam Perry, Albert Ballard and 
Jack Bailey is a potential area ripe for future research. Barnes was a staunch supporter 
of the Co-operative Party - and as Party Chairman he arguably had a vested interest in 
maintaining it as a separate organisation. Yet Barnes was also a trade union unionist 
and had an ILP background and in this respect he embodied the triumvirate of the 
labour movement. 668  His influence both on the policy and the organisation of the 
Co-operative Party, particularly during the 1930s is evident as the Co-operative Party, 
in line with the Labour Party argued for collective ownership of key industries and 
services in their Britain Reborn series. Yet the Britain Reborn series, whilst not offering 
distinctly co-operative voice in politics, also reflected a level of consensus which 
existed across the wider labour movement in Britain as to the first steps needed to 
replacing capitalism with common ownership.  
The Co-operative Party is criticised for not having a distinct co-operative contribution in 
its policies during the 1930s, yet what this thesis has illustrated is that it had no time, 
scope or authority to do so.669 Furthermore, the nature of the alliance with the Labour 
Party meant that the Co-operative Party had limited avenues open to influence the 
policy of the Labour Party. As the Co-operative Party existed as a separate 
organisation and did not affiliate to the Labour Party nationally they were not 
represented within the organisational structure of the Labour Party. Combined, these 
illustrate the why co-operative methods were marginalised within the Labour Party. 
However, the most fundamental reason why co-operative methods of ownership never 
achieved any prominence in Labour Party was the inertia of the Co-operative Union in 
engaging with policy discussions beyond their immediate business remit. It was the 
Co-operative Union which had the policy relationship with the Labour Party, particularly 
from 1932. Crucially, this meant that it was the policy outlook of the Co-operative 
Union, and not political policies of the Co-operative Party that influenced the Labour 
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Party. However as this thesis has demonstrated the Co-operative Union took little 
interest in political policy beyond their immediate trade remit particularly during the 
1930s when the Labour Party was undergoing a period of policy transformation and 
various sections of the Labour Party were engaged in policy debate. This is 
characterised by their decline of the invitation to join the National Council of Labour in 
1935 – which had been negotiated by the Co-operative Party as a compromise for 
Co-operative candidates signing the standing orders of the Labour Party. As chapter 
three has shown this attitude was in part due to the hostile political environment in 
which the movement and party operated in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the implication 
was that the co-operative movement did not have a strong policy voice within the 
Labour Party in this period. Furthermore the Co-operative Party as a department of the 
Co-operative Union was affected by this inertia and thus its policies did not engage 
more widely with ideology of a ‘co-operative commonwealth’.  This layering of political 
activity within movement arguably diluted the potentiality of Co-operative Party – and 
more significantly the extent to which it could be expected to influence the policy of the 
more dominant Labour Party. 
Returning to the political alliance between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party, 
what became evident throughout this analysis was that the organisational differences 
between them were rarely discussed publicly in detail at a national level – and this 
again contributes to the invisibility of this relationship in Labour Party historiography. 
However, an examination of the Joint Committee minutes has revealed that this 
alliance was contested and did take time and effort from both sides to maintain. The 
fundamental issue which divided them organisationally was the issue of affiliation. The 
Co-operative Party did not fit neatly into the Labour Party’s desire for a united political 
organisation – and continued to treat the co-operative movement as a section of its 
organisation. It did seek unity with the co-operative movement on issues, such as 
agriculture, when the two had varying approaches. In this sense the Labour Party 
viewed the co-operative movement as being under the umbrella of working class 
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organisations of which it saw itself as the political embodiment. The continued 
expansion of the Co-operative Party alongside the Labour Party frustrated the Labour 
Party. 
However, as chapter four has illustrated, the apathy shown towards existing 
co-operative interests by the Labour Party and their lack of understanding of the value 
of voluntary co-operation is key to understanding why the co-operative movement 
retained this arms-length political relationship with the Labour Party. Whilst the 
co-operative movement can be criticised for not actively promoting co-operation as a 
way to restructure society, equally it did not want the co-operative movement to be 
subsumed by state socialism and reacted when it was threatened. As indicated there 
was a consensus in the period 1931 to 1945 between the Co-operative Party and the 
Labour Party with regard to the first steps to a co-operative or socialist commonwealth. 
Essentially, the interpretation of a co-operative commonwealth embraced co-operative 
as well as municipal and state ownership – as long as this was not to the detriment of 
co-operative methods. The initial nationalisation programme of the Labour Government 
did not directly affect co-operative business but was targeted as universal services and 
goods which affected all consumers and on this level was welcomed by the 
co-operative movement.  
The greatest shift, therefore, in the political approach of the Co-operative Union was in 
1949, when the Labour Party, in planning their programme for a second term, began to 
advocate the extension of state powers into areas which potentially undermined the 
efforts of voluntary co-operation as a form of ownership. The proposal to nationalise 
industrial assurance in Labour’s Immediate Programme was a pivotal issue which 
demonstrated to the leadership of the Co-operative Union that they needed to be pro-
active in their approach to planning the future development of co-operative methods.  
To a limited extent it can be argued that the co-operative movement enjoyed a small 
measure of success in influencing Labour Party policy, evident mainly in their 
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‘embrace’ of mutualisation instead of nationalisation of industrial assurance. Moreover, 
the inclusion of co-operative representatives at the Dorking Conference indicated that 
the Labour Party was beginning take the policy concerns of the co-operative movement 
more seriously. This was reflected in their subsequent policy statement Labour and the 
New Society which for the first time made more than a cursory reference to the 
co-operative movement and cited it as an alternative form of common ownership.670 
This ‘embrace’ however was cut short by the 1951 election defeat of the Labour Party 
which made these policy discussions less relevant with the Labour Party out of power.  
Nevertheless, the Co-operative Party, as a political organisation remained on the 
periphery of this increased collaboration. The Co-operative Party realising the policy 
void left by the implementation of the 1945 Labour Party programme had been 
considering in detail the role co-operative methods could play in a socialist society, 
through a series of policy statements culminating with adoption of their statement The 
People’s Industry – A statement on social ownership at their Conference 1952. This 
document articulated the role that co-operative methods could make within a socialist 
society – yet the Co-operative Union, now arguably less concerned with these matters 
of policy issue now the Labour Party was no longer in Government, delayed discussion 
of this statement at Congress till the following year. This reaffirms the distinction in 
attitude between the Co-operative Party and the Co-operative Union to creating a 
distinct co-operative political policy.   
To conclude, the marginalisation of co-operative ideas by the post war Labour 
Government reflected the inertia of the co-operative movement in advocating a 
‘Co-operative Commonwealth’ as an alternative to state socialism from 1931 onwards. 
The Labour Party did not engage to any great extent with methods of co-operative 
ownership in their policies, but neither did the Co-operative Union. This was 
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emphasised by the limited authority of the Co-operative Party, as the outward political 
expression of the movement. 
In 1958 a new political agreement between the Labour Party and the Co-operative 
Party was reached, following a decision by the Labour Party to terminate the 1946 
Agreement and seek a new basis for its relations.671 The 1958 Agreement changed the 
dynamic of the alliance again, this time by imposing a cap on the number of seats 
which co-operative candidates could contest and stipulated that candidates be referred 
to as Labour-Co-operative.672 The 1958 Agreement signalled a deliberate attempt to 
stymie the growth and influence of the Co-operative Party within their organisation. 
Most significantly what is also demonstrates is the continued contested relationship 
between the Labour Party and the Co-operative Party beyond 1946.  
Why was this relationship so organisationally problematic? As this thesis has 
demonstrated the Co-operative Party did have an anomalous position within the Labour 
Party and this was a source of friction. An article in the New Statesman discussing the 
relationship between the Co-operative Party and the Labour Party in 1957 described 
the former as a ‘historical accident that had outlived its usefulness’.673 There was an 
element of frustration from the Labour Party leadership of what to do with the 
Co-operative Party, as their desire for an electoral alliance yet maintenance of a 
separate political organisational created an organisational oddity. However, what this 
thesis has argued is that the Co-operative Party, as a political department of the 
Co-operative Union, maintained a separate identity because of ideological differences.  
The distinction between a ‘Co-operative Commonwealth’ in which co-operative 
methods of voluntary association could take root and develop was at odds with the 
Labour Party vision for state nationalisation and control. Whilst it is argued that the 
Co-operative Party and the co-operative movement did not proactively always promote 
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co-operative forms of ownership, they did however fiercely defend the rights of 
voluntary co-operation when threatened. What this illustrates is that within the broader 
labour movement there was a deeper divide over the road to socialism between the 
Labour Party and the co-operative movement, reaffirming the plurality of organisational 
and ideological influences which contributed to the development of the Labour Party. 
Whilst this thesis does not deny that state socialism dominated the policy of the Labour 
Party during the period 1931 to 1951, it has illustrated that the co-operative movement 
embodied an alternative form of ownership that has been systematically marginalised 
both by the Labour Party and by historians of the Labour Party. Ultimately this was due 
to the organisational structure of their political relationship which left the movement on 
the periphery of Labour Party politics.  
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